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Abstract  
The thesis seeks to explain how and why power-sharing arrangements come into being, succeed 
or fail their purpose by combining negotiation theory with consociational power-sharing theory. 
The thesis compares case studies from South Asia (Punjab, Mizoram, in India and Sri Lanka) 
and Eastern Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Transnistria and Gagauzia, in Moldova), while 
building its own model of negotiating conflict in deeply divided societies.  
All selected case studies experienced different intensities of violent ethnical conflicts that were 
or still are managed by different patterns of power-sharing arrangements. In case of the Eastern 
European states, various degrees of involvement of international actors have taken place. I 
analyze the (re)action and support of domestic actors in terms of efficacy and legitimacy of and 
involvement with central state institutions, perceived as de facto or de jure protectorates of the 
external powers. Despite the growing number of cases in which ethnic conflicts are regulated 
by means of consociational power-sharing arrangements relatively little systematic comparative 
work has been undertaken. By means of mutually enriching and reciprocally completing 
syntheses of different approaches to power-sharing based on the selected case studies I intend 
to add to as well as extend the existing body of knowledge.  
After the introduction and critical review of the literature, the thesis analysis case studies from 
South Asia and Eastern Europe. The thesis combines power-sharing and negotiation theories 
into a comprehensive theory of ethnic conflict management in deeply divided societies and 
develops a new model for successful negotiations in such settings. The analysis of each case 
study follows the levels-of-analysis approach and analytic narrative methods. 
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I. Conceptual Framework 
 
The crucial problem in politics is the management of conflict. No regime could endure which did not cope with 
this problem. All politics, all leadership and all organization involve management of conflict.1 
 
I.1. Deeply Divided Societies: Conflict, Consociation and Negotiation 
Due to the fact that power-sharing as an approach to conflict management has been 
recommended to and applied in one form or another during nearly all peace negotiations in the 
past three decades (since it has been introduced and advocated by Arend Lijphart), it becomes 
necessary to analyze its foundational principles for two reasons. First, the concept of power-
sharing is mostly associated with two approaches – (1) the consociational theory by Arend 
Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1985, 1996, 2002, 2008, 2012) and (2) Donald L. Horowitz’ (1989, 1990, 
1992, 1993 2000) centripetal model, hence there is a need to assess both the practicality of 
power-sharing as well as its types. Second, since this particular mode of conflict management 
may be applied to various types of societies, it is eminent to classify those as well. 
The theory of consociational democracy differentiates between cooperative and adversarial 
styles of elite behavior. Consociational democracy is defined by a coalescent style of elite 
behavior in plural societies where elite cooperation is characterized by power sharing and 
consensus decision making. Consensus is reached by leaders who engage in mutual 
compromises in order to avoid deadlock or stalemate and find common ground.  
This broad distinction between competitive and consociational styles of decision making allows 
consociational theorists to identify grand coalitions as “the primary characteristic of the 
consociational democracy, where the leaders of all the important segments of the society 
cooperate”2 to govern the state jointly. What the theory cannot explain is under what conditions 
grand coalitions (and other consociational devices) do in fact produce power sharing and 
consensus decisions. Furthermore, it fails to describe and predict the power relations and 
decision modes within such coalitions. If power is shared in a coalition, who gets what share of 
the power? If consensus is reached by means of mutual compromises, who concedes most, and 
who least? 
                                                 
1 Schattschneider, quoted in Nordlinger, E.A. (1972). Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Occasional Papers 
in International Affairs, 29. Center for International Affairs. Harvard University, p. 1. 
2 Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, p. 25. 
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The inability of the theory of consociational democracy to explain when and why power sharing 
will result and what exactly it will amount to derives, according to Jörg Steiner,3 from a lack of 
a common set of assumptions from which the “favorable conditions” for consociational 
democracy can be deduced. In what follows, I will argue that the negotiation theory can provide 
a basis from which the above questions can be addressed. 
 
I.2 Definitions, Assumptions and Terminology 
In the subchapter below some of key concepts will be presented and used throughout the thesis.  
 
Conflict-regulating arrangements 
Following Mitra, I define conflict-regulating arrangements as those decision-making 
procedures, institutional devices, and behavioral rules which are potentially capable of 
accommodating antagonistic groups to one another, thereby providing a framework within 
which conflicts are successfully regulated.4 This is similar to what Mitra calls “a level playing 
field”5 (i.e., a combination of policies and institutions, which provide the necessary means of 
trust in and legitimacy of the state and justify the participation of its citizens as well as respect 
of the rules to be played upon).  
The arrangements analyzed in the next chapter include: 1) executive power-sharing, i.e. grand 
coalition; 2) segmental autonomy, i.e. both symmetrical and asymmetrical federalism; 3) the 
principle of proportionality that could be applied in several ways, with basic characteristic 
being that the influence on the decision-making process of groups is proportional to their 
numerical strength;  and 4) mutual veto (i.e., minority blocking rights). Blocking rights could 
be extended to government decisions as a whole or only to those which bear upon the conflict’s 
central issues. They are formal and informal in character. 6 
 
Success 
I define “success” as the realization of goals that the institutional designs and engineering set 
to achieve, the legitimacy of such institutions as well as citizens’ attitudes, perceptions and 
willingness not only to enjoy positive but also to accept negative freedom rights7 (e.g., their 
ability to tolerate and work together with others, who are “different” from themselves, their 
                                                 
3 Steiner, J. (1981). The Consociational Theory and Beyond. Comparative Politics, 13(3), 1241-50. 
4 See: Figure 1, A neo-institutional model of democratic change. 
5 See: Mitra, S.K. (2008). Level Playing Fields: The Post-Colonial State, Democracy, Courts and Citizenship in 
India. German Law Journal, 9(3), pp. 343-66. 
6 Cf. Nordlinger, 1972, pp. 20-41.  
7 See Berlin, I. (2004). Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-54.  
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readiness and aspiration to promote the public good through participation in the political 
process and demand accountability of political authorities). 
 
Conflict 
Following Wolff (2006), who defines “conflict” as “a situation in which two or more actors, 
[who interact with each other], pursue incompatible, yet from their individual perspectives 
entirely just, goals.”8 Similarly to Wolff, I understand the “ethnic conflicts” as a form of 
conflicts in which at least one party defines its raison d’etre and its goals in (exclusively) ethnic 
terms, and the primary cleavage is based on ethnic distinctions. Thus, “ethnic conflicts are a 
form of group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its 
causes, and potential remedies along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic 
divide.”9 For the thesis, not all ethnic conflicts are of interest. The focus will be on the outcome 
of intense conflicts, or in other words conflicts characteristic of deeply divided societies. If not 
prevented, the intense conflicts are not solved, but rather regulated, in the short run.  
 
Deeply divided societies  
The general definition of “deeply divided societies”, synonymously used to plural societies,10 
infers an ethnically diverse society in which ethnicity is understood as a politically salient 
cleavage around which “interests are organized for political purposes, such as elections.”11 In 
an ethnically divided society, then, ethnic differences are used as a ground for creation and 
preservation of segments—groups of individuals under ethnically constructed banners. 
 
Deeply divided societies 
While the concept “society” is usually favoured in literature, some argue that the term “society” 
is an unfortunate one as it often provides an inaccurate description.12 Stefan Wolff defines 
deeply divided places as “the existence of two (or more) separate civil societies strongly aligned 
                                                 
8 Wolff, S. (2006). Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 2. 
9 Idem., p. 2. 
10 “I shall use the terms deeply divided society and plural society as synonymous. A plural society that is sharply 
divided along religious, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate sub-societies with their own political parties, 
interest groups, and media communication. These sub-societies will be referred to as segments.” Lijphart, 2008, p. 
67; consider also Nordlinger, 1972, p. 7: “when a sizeable proportion of individuals who share some class or 
communal characteristic become subjectively aware of their similarity to other such individuals, value that 
similarity positively, and attribute some importance to it in defining their relations with individuals who do not 
share that social characteristic – then these social differences may be said to draw people into segmental divisions 
or segments.”. Contrary to Lijphart, I consider “deeply divided societies” as societies in a potential or actual state 
of conflict. Once conflict is managed, regulated or solved they become plural.  
11 McCulloch, A. (2009). Seeking Stability Amid Deep Division: Consociationalism and Centripetalism in 
Comparative Perspective. Ontario: Queen’s University Kingston.  
12 Ibid. 
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with different ethnic groups.”13 John McGarry claims that the concept “divided society” 
describes “a single society, which is plural or divided, when minority nations would prefer to 
see their state as being comprised of different societies.”14 Being aware of these limitations and 
the ongoing debate, I will use the concept of “deeply divided society”, “place” being too open-
ended and vague.  
 
Political stability 
Lijphart argued that a stable democratic regime is likely to remain democratic and  demonstrates 
a low frequency or threat of political violence.15 However, besides this “continued operation of 
specific patterns of political behavior”16 I do add a “quality”- variable when speaking of 
stability of the system. As Steiner has pointedly concluded: “[i]f the essence of democracy is 
defined as stability in the sense of the absence of political protests and political unrest, [then] 
too much tranquility and calm may be harmful for a good democracy. [Thus] democratic 
stability should be replaced with the concept of democratic quality, […] which should include 
at least the following elements: civil liberties, citizen participation, competitive elections, 
elections, absence of severe violence, civility in the political discourse, respect for minorities, 
equal opportunities.” 17 
 
Ethnic group and ethnic identity 
I use the term “ethnic” in its broader sense, by which I mean any group-based ascriptive 
identity, actual or imagined. This larger view is persuasively argued by Donald Horowitz 
(1985).18 In my thesis I follow the consociationalists’ opinion that ethnic and ethnonational 
                                                 
13 Wolff, 2006, p. 186. 
14 McGarry, J. (2005). Consociationalism and Pluri-National States, Northern Ireland and Other Cases. Paper 
presented at the Conference Implementing Peace Agreements: Israel/Palestine, South Africa and Northern 
Ireland. Van-Leer Institute, Jerusalem, pp. 2-3, original emphasis. 
15 Lijphart, 1977, p. 4. 
16 Lustick, Ian S. 1979. “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control”, World Politics, 
31(3), pp.324. 
17 Steiner, J. (2002). Concluding remarks: Responses to critiques of consociational theory. Acta Politica Special, 
37, p. 233. 
18 Horowitz uses ethnicity as an umbrella concept that “easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, 
and religion; it covers 'tribes,' 'races,' 'nationalities,' and castes”, Horowitz, D. L. (2000). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 
Berkley: UC Press, p. 53, also p. 224; consider also Chandra K. (2006). What is Ethnic Identity and Does It Matter? 
Annual Review of Political Science, 9, pp. 402–403; Kymlicka, W. (2007). The New Debate on Minority Rights 
(and postscript). In Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (ed.) Multiculturalism and Political Theory. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Varshney, A. (2002). Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life. New Haven: Yale 
University Press; and Varshney, A. (2003). Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality. Perspectives on Politics, 
1(1), pp. 85-99; Wilkinson, S.I (2004). Votes and Violence. Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Minorities at Risk project, at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/. 
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identities are of frequent importance.19 This does not imply primordialism, but the fact that 
through political and social action ethnic communities are constructed over time, but their 
deconstruction especially in  deep division and conflict situations is not easy.20 At least in 
democracies, the distinctive feature of ethnicity over alternative identity forms can be directly 
measured as an empirical phenomenon through surveys and election results. 
 
Minority 
I use the term “minority” in an even broader meaning. Besides using it as a synonym for ethnic 
group, e.g. actual and ascriptive identity that both terms share, the term “minority” does 
implicate other facets as well. It gives me a wider framework to conceptualize and demonstrate 
the implications of my thesis. Factors and situations such as for example minority-majority 
status, or majority with a minority complex (self-consciousness being a crucial factor), could 
serve as additional motives for group mobilization, influencing decisively the origins, 
escalation as well as regulation of a conflict.  
 
Consociation as power-sharing  
In my thesis use the terms consociation and power-sharing21 interchangeably, being aware that 
it might be perceived as somehow limited in understanding. There are also other forms to share 
power.22  
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Cf. O’Leary, B. (2005). Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments. In Sidney 
Noel (ed.): From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. McGill-
Queen's Press – MQUP, p. 4. 
20 I adopt the stance of contextualism, which emphasizes changing nature of ethnic identity, seeing it as a socially 
constructed phenomenon that is also available for instrumental use. Cultural makers are frequently manipulated 
by ideologies, and cultural categories are “available for instant manipulation by those seeking power” – the “ethnic 
entrepreneurs”, in Bandarage, A. (2009). The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka. Terrorism, ethnicity, political 
economy. London: Routledge, p. 10. 
21 “In my writing after 1969, I started using the term ‘power-sharing’ democracy more and more often as a synonym 
for consociational democracy. The main reason is that I started to use consociationalism not only as an analytical 
concept but also as a practical recommendation for deeply divided societies. The term ‘consociational’ worked 
well enough in scholarly writing, but I found it to be an obstacle in communicating with policy-makers who found 
it too esoteric, polysyllabic, and difficult to pronounce. Using ‘power-sharing’ instead has greatly facilitated the 
process of communication beyond the confines of academic political science”, Lijphart, A. (2008). Thinking about 
Democracy, Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, p. 6. 
22 There are other ways by which to share power, among them, temporary coalitions in times of crisis, and not least 
of all, integrative method propagated by Horowitz. Nevertheless, on the one hand, I will not make use of 
“integrative power-sharing”, and on the other, the integrative approach, with unicameral legislative and 
Presidentialism (two quasi-majoritarian aspects) it propagates, has not entirely convinced me of the merits of being 
called an institutional design to share power.  
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State nation vs. nation state 
Nation-state, which is “a product of European imagination”, has been associated with two 
processes: state-building, in which state gains centralized power over its territory, and by 
penetrating civil society constructs political and social infrastructure to enable decision 
implementation; and nation-building, in which elites use power acquired during the state 
building process to create a national identity and/or culture. Navaratna-Bandara asserts that in 
South Asian context, the penetration by the post-colonial state through its legal and 
administrative apparatus into the cultural space belonging to the minorities produced stiff 
resistance from the minorities, conscious of their ethnic identity, and finally paved the way for 
the emergence of minority self-determination movements demanding either the protection of 
cultural rights, regional autonomy or independence.23 The penetration that was meant to make 
one nation out of a myriad of different ethnic communities was perceived not as a salad bowl-
integration, but as a melting pot-assimilation, i.e. as prescribing a “partisan victory of one 
community over another.”24  
In an excellent comparative article on institutional engineering: “’Nation State’ or ‘State 
Nation’? India in Comparative Perspective”, Linz et al. have introduced the concept of “state 
nation” as opposed to “nation state”.25 According to the renowned scholars “state nation” 
policies involve building a sense of belonging (or “we-feeling”) regarding the state-wide 
political community, “while simultaneously creating institutional safeguards for respecting and 
protecting socio-cultural diversities.”26 The authors continue by asserting that the sense of 
belonging may appear as definition of tradition, history and “shared culture in an inclusive 
manner, with attachment to common symbols of the state and/or inculcating some form of 
Habermasian “constitutional patriotism.””27 
In their comparative study, Linz, Stepan and Yadav give the example of Belgium, Spain, 
Canada, and India, asserting that “had political leaders in [the above-mentioned countries] 
insisted upon attempting to impose one language and culture on the country and insisted upon 
                                                 
23 Navaratna Bandara, A.M. (2006). Nation Building or Nations Building: A Critical Evaluation of the Theory and 
Practice of National Integration. In Amal Jayawardane (ed.) National Integration in Sri Lanka. Colombo: Ministry 
of Ethnic Affairs and National Integration, p. 25. 
24 Cf. O'Leary, B. (2008a). Consociation. The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. McMillan: 
Detroit, p. 58. 
25 See Linz, J.J. et al. (2003). Nation State or State Nation? Comparative Reflections on Indian Democracy. In K. 
Shankar Bajpai (ed.). Democracy and Diversity. India and the American Experience. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 50-106. 
26 Idem., p 53. 
27 Idem., p. 54; consider also another example of the “state” created before “nation” and in which “nation-building” 
is still perhaps incomplete. Massimo d’Azeglio, who uttered the famous words: “L'Italia è fatta. Restano a fare 
gli Italiani” (colloquial translation: “Now that we have made Italy, we need to make Italians”), in Bogaards, M. 
and Crepaz, M.M.L. (2002). Consociational Interpretations of the European Union. European Union Politics, 3(3), 
p. 372. 
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homogenizing French -style unitary nation state, the cause of social peace, inclusionary 
democracy, and individual rights would not have been served in any of these four, long-standing 
democratic states.”   
In their final considerations they recommend “asymmetrical federalism”, a consociational 
arrangement, i.e. segmental autonomy, as a possible approach to democracy for deeply divided 
countries such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka that have “more than one territorially based, already 
politically activated, linguistic-cultural majority within the existing state.”   
 
Negotiation 
According to Pfetsch (2007) “negotiation is a social process in which two or more parties 
interact in the search for an acceptable position with regard to their differences and concerning 
the same issue of conflict.”28 Negotiations are finite, having a beginning and an end.  
 
Sri Lanka vs Ceylon 
For historical and contextual suitability, I am aware of the fact that it would be right to use the 
names inter-changeably, due to the fact that until 1972, the name of Sri Lanka was Ceylon. In 
my thesis, however, for the period up to 1972 Constitution, I will use the name Sri Lanka as 
well. Furthermore, using Sri Lanka “inadequately” emphasizes the ethnic outbidding and 
nation-building policies sat long before 1972 (i.e., Citizenship Act of 1948 or language 
provisions of 1956). Ceylon, as name, will figure in quoted literature such as official acts, 
agreements, etc.  
  
                                                 
28 Pfetsch, F. R. (2007) Negotiating political conflicts. Basingstoke England; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, see 
the Chapter “Conflict as the Subject of Negotiation”, pp. 16-34. 
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I.3 Research Questions, Propositions and Case Studies 
This thesis makes use of qualitative and quantitative research methods and seeks to merge 
conceptual and empirical work on power-sharing practices and modes of negotiation. It consists 
of six case studies: two cases from India, Punjab (1947-1999) and Mizoram (1947-1987), Sri 
Lanka (1947-2009), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1989-2004) and two cases from Moldova, 
Transnistria and Gagauzia (1989-2014). All selected case studies29 experienced different 
intensities of violent ethnical conflicts that were and still are managed by different patterns of 
complex power-sharing arrangements. In all cases both endogenous as well as exogenous 
factors play an important role in understanding conflict stages and its settlement. Thus, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Mizoram, Sri Lanka and Moldova experienced various degrees of covert 
and/or overt involvement of international actors.  
Three research assumptions, shared by both Horowitz and Lijphart and criticized by many 
others and described by McCulloch, inform this thesis.30 First, the institutional design is the 
most important assumption to ensure political stability and quality of life in deeply divided 
societies; proper institutions are “the most prominent, and often the only, channel of 
communication between disparate groups.”31 As Reilly and Reynolds observe in their work, 
institutions “must facilitate communication channels between groups who need to talk. If they 
exclude people from coming to the table, then their conflicts can only be solved through force, 
not through negotiation and mutual accommodation.”32 The first theoretical assumption on 
which this thesis is based is that institutions matter. 33 
Second argument, underlining the importance of institutional design is the role of the political 
elites. As Ulrich Schneckener suggests, the consent of elites “is a conditio sine qua non for 
achieving an agreement in the first place” and “the extent of their participation helps to 
determine the long-term stability of any agreement.”34 Elite level politics represents the 
necessary piece of the conflict management puzzle. This “top-down” perspective has to be 
balanced by a “bottom-up” approach, which however cannot replace it and is not as important. 
The “bottom-up” approach argues the importance of civil society and intra-group collaborations 
                                                 
29 The case studies were selected both purposively and information-oriented. The Thesis combines both Most 
Similar Case Studies (MSSD) and Most Different Case Studies (MDSD) methods of comparison. 
30 See McCulloch, 2009. 
31 Reilly, B. and Reynolds, A. (1999). Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies. Papers on International 
Conflict Resolution. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, p. 4. 
32 ibid. 
33 Luckham, R. et al. (2003). Democratic Institutions and Democratic Politics. In Sunil Bastian and Robin 
Luckham (ed.) Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict- Torn Societies, 
London: Zed Books, p. 18; see also McCulloch, 2009. 
34 Schneckener, U. and Wolff, S. (2004). Managing and settling ethnic conflicts: perspectives on successes and 
failures in Europe, Africa, and Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 283; also see Nordlinger, 1972. 
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and relations as opposed to inter-group ones, to manage or prevent conflicts in deeply divided 
societies.35  
The second theoretical assumption is that democracy matters.36 Democratic institutions “allow 
conflicts to formulate, find expression and be managed in a sustainable way, via institutional 
outlets such as political parties and representative parliaments, rather than being suppressed or 
ignored.”37  
Power-sharing thus entails a political system in which the “authority of state is administered 
jointly, and not only by one narrow constituency.”38  In my opinion, power-sharing is the only 
means and it can be considered as a panacea for conflict prevention, management or settlement. 
It represents the best means by which to avert conflict and to foster conciliatory practices in 
divided societies but it can also fail (e.g., Lebanon).  
The third assumption is that ethnic identities usually matter. This does not imply primordialism. 
Ethnic identities are constructed over time, by political and social action, but they are not easily 
deconstructed, particularly in conditions of deep division and conflict.39  
O’Leary asserts that consociational power-sharing arrangements do not need to be need not be 
all-inclusive, holistic and complete, but can be applied in a focused manner to the areas and 
sectors that need attendance (e.g. language, self-rule, affirmative action, etc.). Moreover, 
consociational arrangements “need not be applied mechanically throughout the entirety of 
politics.”40  
Moreover, in the classical literature41, the sources of democratization are located in elite 
behavior. It asserts that the process of democratization emerges when a relatively small circle 
of elites decides to accept the existence of diversity in unity and solve their conflicts peacefully 
                                                 
35 In this sense see the seminal Varshney, 2002, in which he talks about the members of the different groups and 
their “everyday forms of engagements” that cross the divide; see also Varshney, A. (2001). Ethnic Conflict and 
Civil Society: India and Beyond. World Politics 53, pp. 362-398; O’Flynn, I. (2007). Review Article: Divided 
Societies and Deliberative Democracy. British Journal of Political Science 37, 731-751, and; Taylor, R. (2001). 
Northern Ireland: Consociation or Social Transformation? In John McGarry (ed.) Northern Ireland and the 
Divided World: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in Comparative Perspective. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 36-52. 
36 According to Norris (2008), “Using key developmental and stability indicators, it has been argued in a large-N 
study, supplemented by paired case studies, that all kinds of regimes, including non-democratic regimes, which 
exhibit some power-sharing institutions and practices, outperform those that do not” quoted in McCulloch, A. and 
McGarry, J. (ed.) (2017). Power-Sharing. Empirical and Normative Challenges. London: Routledge, p. 63. 
37 Luckham et al., 2003, p. 38. 
38 Bieber, F. (2005). Power-Sharing After Yugoslavia: Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power-Sharing 
Institutions in Post-War Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. In Sid Noel (ed.) From Power-Sharing to Democracy: 
Post Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, p. 85. 
39 See O’Leary, 2005, pp. 3-43. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Cf. Dahl, R.A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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through democratic rules and procedures.42 Their final goal being, what Mitra calls “a level 
playing field”43, i.e. a combination of policies and institutions, which provide the necessary 
means of trust in and legitimacy of the State and justify the participation of its citizens as well 
as respect of the rules to be played upon.  
Setting it in South Asian context and underlining the role of elite agency, Mitra in his superb 
comparative study on successful and failed cases of conflict management44 develops a neo-
institutional model of democratic change leading to legitimacy of the state and preventing it 
from failure, i.e. collapse: 
 
Figure 1. A dynamic neo-institutional model of innovative regional governance45  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The neo-institutional model has two important aspects: 1) the maneuvering room the 
constitution allows the elites to have in accommodating and regulating conflicts and 2) “the 
                                                 
42 Linder, W. and Bächtiger, A. (2005). What drives democratization in Asia and Africa? European Journal of 
Political Research, 44, p. 863. 
43 See: Mitra, 2008. 
44 See Mitra, S. K. (1999b). Effects of Institutional Arrangements on Political Stability in South Asia. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 2, pp. 405-428. 
45 The figure is taken from Mitra, S. K. and Bhattacharyya, H. (2017). Politics and Governance in Indian States. 
Bihar, West Bengal and Tripura. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., p. 40; the extended and comprehensive 
comparative study that subsequently followed the above-mentioned article Mitra, 1999(b). 
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political accountability of elites,”46 which means precisely what I have stated before, i.e. elites’ 
commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and 
stability; and the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation. 
Moreover, Bill and Hardgrave assert that political development, i.e. democratic change, 
involves “the creation of political institutions sufficiently adaptable, complex, autonomous and 
coherent to absorb and order participation of these new groups“47 in a politically stable setting.  
Thus, institutions matter. A well-institutionalized democratic state both provides room for self-
determination movements to emerge and possess a fair amount of legitimate coercion to repress 
these movements (i.e., two-pronged strategy).48 Weak political institutions, on the other hand, 
are more often a cause than a consequence of growing social conflict.49 Consequently, 
Rupesinghe claims that “the state is not an arbitrator, not neutral: it is itself a focal point of 
competition, a protagonist in the conflict.”50  
 
Figure 2. Developing Country Democracies: Political Context and the Trajectory of Self-
Determination Movements51 
  State/ Central Authority 
  Well institutionalized Weakly institutionalized 
Elites’ 
Strategy 
Accommodating 
1. the inverse “U” curve of ethnic 
politics 
2. Peaceful breakup of the state  
Unaccommodating 3. Demands and repression cycle 
4. Turbulence  
and/or breakdown 
 
A well-institutionalized state that would be able to design appropriate political institutions to 
peacefully channel conflicts is of high importance to the politics of divided societies. Since 
these societies often exhibit fragmentation; political institutions in general should facilitate 
communication channels between assertive groups. In case they exclude groups from 
expressing the grievances and demands democratically, their conflicts cannot be solved through 
negotiation and mutual accommodation but only through force. 
Sahadevan points out to the fact that institutional decay, i.e. weak[ening] state, will gradually 
set in “when the state’s rule-making, -applying, -adjusting, and -enforcing institutions show 
                                                 
46 Mitra, 1999(b), p. 417. 
47 Bill, J.A. and Hardgrave, L. (1973). Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory. Merrill. 
48 Cf. Kohli, A. (1997). Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of Self-
Determination Movements in India. The Journal of Asian Studies, 56(2), pp. 325-344. 
49 “State where the Central Authority is weak institutionalised is not able to share power with minorities. It is more 
often a cause than a consequence of growing social conflict” Weiner, M. (1989). The Indian Paradox. Essays in 
Indian Politics. New Delhi: Sage, p. 128. 
50 Rupesinghe, K. (1987). Theories of Conflict Resolution and Their Applicability to Protracted Ethnic Conflicts. 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 18(4). 
51 This is an adaptation of the figure from Kohli, 1997, p. 329. 
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preferential treatment [to] a particular group while disregarding the legitimate grievances of 
other groups, admitting that there are limits to what institutions can do especially when 
demographics encourage politicians to disregard minority preferences.”52  
Additionally to Mill’s assertion and consociational approach of solving the puzzle (i.e., 
achieving stability and regulating the conflicts in deeply divided societies), there is another 
approach developed by Ian Lustick, called “control” approach.53. It starts from the assumption 
made by Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle that deeply divided societies cannot become 
full-fledged, mature and robust democracies, but through “the dominant majority 
configuration.” 54 This is characterized by “infrequent ethnic cooperation, immoderate ethnic 
politics at the expense of minority groups at the constitutional as well as the policy level, and 
eventual repression of minority political activity. Majoritarianism is the cause of the dominant 
community and electoral machination is its method of preserving its dominance.”55 The basic 
point here is that it is possible to have stable democracy in a divided society in the absence of 
consociational arrangements, by means of a system of control. 
Same community majorities may win control over all major offices and governments56  propose 
discriminatory public policy and conceptions of merit, but most states are multi-ethnic and multi 
confessional, and many are pluri-national. For this reason, integrationist and assimilationist 
politics, even when motivated by high-minded considerations, and however historically 
vindicated elsewhere, are recipes for conflict in deeply divided territories. In O’Leary’s opinion, 
“[t]o commend integration, and especially, assimilation where there are rival national self-
determination claims is partisan or, alternatively, utopian.”57 It is partisan when one community 
seeks to nationalize the state or region in its image on no better claim than might (numbers) 
makes right, it is utopian when (potentially or actually) antagonistic communities are instructed 
to fuse. O’Leary concludes that partisans and utopians succeeded many times in the last two 
centuries, “too often after bloodbaths.” 58 
As mentioned above, all six selected case studies I will analyze and compare experienced 
ethnical conflicts that were or still are managed by different patterns of complex power sharing 
                                                 
52 Sahadevan, P. (2006). Negotiating Peace in Ethnic Wars. International Studies; 43(3), p. 249. In his study 
Sahadevan explains the civil war from an institutionalist standpoint, arguing that to explain the Sri Lankan ethnic 
conflict one needs to understand the correlation between institutional decay and Tamil mobilization. 
53 Lustick, I.S. (1979). Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control. World Politics, 
31(3), pp. 325-344. 
54 Rabushka, A. and Shepsle, K. A. (1972). Politics in plural societies: a theory of democratic instability. 
Columbus, Ohio: Merill, p. 90; pp. 141-142. 
55 Idem. 
56 McEvoy, J. and O’Leary, B. (ed.) (2013). Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. Philadelphia, P.A.: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
57 O’Leary, 2008, p. 48. 
58 Idem. 
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arrangements, which were reached at through a process of ‘principled’ negotiation.59 In all six 
cases both endogenous as well as exogenous factors are crucial to understand conflict stages 
and its settlement. 
I.3.1 India 
Albeit many scholars, political scientists and area specialists have described democracy in India 
as being a kind of a puzzle or paradox, miracle or conundrum60, and besides a short, but at least 
equally important61 for its democratic institutions, intermezzo during the Emergency years 
(1975-1977), India has been a democracy for over 70 years now. The problems it faced and still 
faces have been pointed out in Carciumaru (2012) such as the Naxalites’ insurgency, cross-
border terrorism, separatist and secessionist struggles (Tamils, Sikhs, Nagas, Kashmiris etc.), 
atrocities against minorities, discrimination based on caste prejudice, as well as corrupted and 
criminalized politicians and police.62 This notwithstanding, India’s democracy is a fact63, as 
well as a matter of pride of and rooted in the identity of its citizens, who cherish their 
achievement of being called “world’s largest democracy”. Consider the following survey, in 
which the respondents had to answer the question of how proud they are to be an Indian: 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 Principled negotiation is a method developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury. It offers some negotiation norms 
that are developed to facilitate and enable reaching an agreement. According to the authors, there are four basic 
points-people, interests, options, criteria– which can be used under any circumstances to define a straightforward 
negotiation method. Requirements of principled negotiations are: separation of people from issues; focus on 
interests and not on positions; invention of new options for mutual gain and insistence on objective criteria to 
choose options. The main hypothesis states that following these four points negotiations will “have a greater chance 
of reaching a successful and lasting outcome.” Moreover, principled negotiators know their ‘best’ as well as 
‘worst’ alternative to a negotiated agreement (i.e., BATNA and WATNA). See Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1999). 
Getting to Yes: negotiating an agreement without giving in. London: Random House. 
60 “even sensational displays of Hindu Nationalism, civil war in Kashmir, and unending insurgency did not 
dislodge India from relatively high-capacity democracy. We might regard India either as a miracle or as 
conundrum.” in Tilly, Ch. (2007). Democracy. Cambridge University Press, p. 54; Some of them have not given 
India’s democracy even a fair chance to survive, see Harrison, S.S. (1960). India: The Most Dangerous Decades. 
Princeton University Press. 
61 “By voting Indira Gandhi out of the office, India showed its commitment both to democracy and to the intrinsic 
value of its institutions” see Carciumaru, Radu. 2012. “Managing Diversity. Power Sharing or Control? A 
Comparison between India and Sri Lanka,” Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, 70, p.5. 
62 See Carciumaru, 2012. Consider, in addition: “Among nearly 5,000 candidates in the current election [n.b. the 
general elections of 1998], hundreds are gangsters and criminals, men and women awaiting trial or already 
convicted but free on bail for crimes like murder, kidnapping and blackmail.”, Burns, J. F. (1998). The World; The 
Front-Runner in India Is Deep Doubt. New York Times. 
63 The country is labeled free by Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/india; and has a 7.23 
composite democracy index, calculated by Economist Intelligence Unit, https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-
index, accessed on July 13, 2018. 
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Table 1: Pride in India, 1990-200564 
 WVS 1990 WVS 1995 WVS 2001 SDSA 2005 
Very proud 67 66 67 61 
Quite proud 25 19 21 28 
Not proud 5 8 5 2 
Not at all proud 3 1 2 1 
Don’t know/ No answer 0 6 5 8 
N 2466 2040 2002 5387 
 
Indian historian Ramachandra Guha, in describing the nature of leadership in India, pointedly 
reached to the following conclusion: “In India, the sapling [of democracy] was planted by the 
nation’s founders, who lived long enough (and worked hard enough) to nurture it to adulthood. 
Those who came afterwards could disturb and degrade the tree of democracy but, try as they 
might, could not uproot or destroy it.” 65 
At Independence, however, India had a completely majoritarian constitution.66 According to 
Carciumaru (2012), the question the founding fathers and constitution-makers had to deal with 
was “what kind of institutions and practices should be created to act as an incentive for ethnic 
groups to mediate their differences through legitimate institutions of a common democratic 
state?”67  
As to religion, India’s constitution-makers faced four big issues: (1) what relationship should 
be between religion and the state; (2) whether religious communities should continue to have 
“separate electorates” and reservations in government posts, as they did under British rule; (3) 
whether they should have their religiously given personal laws or a unified body of civil code 
for marriage, divorce, property inheritance, and so forth; and (4) whether religious minorities 
should continue to have educational institutions.68 
Regarding language: at Independence thirty different languages, almost all with their own 
scripts, were spoken by at least one million inhabitans of India. In descending order of number 
of speakers following languages were spoken by between thirty-two to thirteen million people:  
                                                 
64 The question of pride has been asked in the widely used comparative public opinion survey World Values Survey. 
This can be confirmed with the State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA) survey of the Centre for the Study of 
developing Societies (CSDS), in Linz et al., 2003, p. 79. 
65 Guha, R (2007). India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy. London: Macmillan, p. 
745. 
66 Adeney, K. (2002). Constitutional Centering: Nation Formation and Consociational Federalism in India and 
Pakistan. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 40(3), p. 22; consider also Brass’ observation: “Nehru writes 
that the Indian mind was ‘completely conditioned to believing that whatever was British was best’ and calls it no 
wonder that the Indian Constitution is but an “amended version” of the 1935 Government of India Act.”, in Brass, 
P.R. (1994). The Politics of India since Independence. The New Cambridge History of India, IV.1. Cambridge 
University Press, p. 149. 
67 Carciumaru, 2012, p. 10. 
68 Cf. Stuligross, D. and Varshney, A. (2002). Ethnic Diversities, Constitutional Designs, and Public Policies in 
India. In Andrew Reynolds (ed.) The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, 
and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press; see also Carciumaru 2012, p. 10. 
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Telugu, Bengali, Marathi, Tamil, Urdu, Gujurati, Kannada, Malayalam, and Oriya (excluding 
Hindi) According to the 1961 Census of India, the largest language, Hindi, was spoken by 30.37 
percent of the total population. Urdu and Punjabi were listed as separate languages.69  
As comparativist Alfred Stepan pointedly observed, “[b]y Benedict Anderson's standards there 
would appear to have been more than enough raw material for territorial nationalists to imagine 
(and attain) separate independent nation(s) in South India. In the last decades of the British Raj 
more than ninety percent of the population in South India spoke languages in the Dravidian 
family, all of which had their own scripts and were unintelligible to the major language of the 
North, Hindi.”70 Lloyd I. Rudolph, brilliantly captured the conflict-potential at the 
Independence: “With the coming of independence, anti-Brahmanism was increasingly 
accompanied by an anti-North, Dravidian nationalist outlook. Opposition to Hindi as the 
national language, the destruction of the caste system, and threats of secession from the Indian 
Union became major political themes.”71 
The myriad of problems emerging, some of which I generically mentioned above (Nehru’s 
famously dismissed them as “the fissiparous tendencies”), have found at both the state and 
national level different solutions and strategies, ranging from repression, put in the words of a 
senior IPS officer, to “hit them over the head with a hammer, then teach them how to play the 
piano” 72 to strategies of appropriation, that is dividing the movement, co-opting its leadership, 
and satisfying elite demands for power and patronage,73 and of accommodation, leading to 
political integration.  
Due to India’s extreme diversity (the country being pluri-ethnic, pluri-religious, and pluri-
linguistic) the best way to achieve political stability and democratic quality was for elites “to 
accept the existence of diversity in unity and wage their conflicts peacefully through democratic 
rules and procedures.”74 Pratibha Patil, India’s first woman to become President expressed the 
situation as follows: "We, in India, have understood that Unity in Diversity is the real strength 
of our country. By looking after the interests of each section of our diverse population we 
                                                 
69 For an analytic discussion see Das Gupta, J. (1970). Language Conflict and National Development: Group 
Politics and National Language Policy in India. Berkeley: UCP, pp. 31-68. 
70 Stepan, A. (2006). How Nation State “Grammar” Helped Construct Polar and Conflictual Identities: Sri Lanka 
and The Tamils, pp. 46-47. 
71 Lloyd, I. R. (1961). Urban Life and Populist Radicalism: Dravidian Politics in Madras. The Journal of Asian 
Studies, 20(3), pp. 286-287, also consider in the same edition of the Journal the following articles: Weiner, M. 
(1961). Violence and Politics in Calcutta. The Journal of Asian Studies, 20(3), pp. 275-281 and Hart, H. C. (1961). 
Bombay Politics: Pluralism or Polarization? The Journal of Asian Studies, 20(3), pp. 267-274. 
72 Cohen, P. (2001). India, Emerging Power. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 113. 
73 Brass, 1994, p. 183. 
74 Linder & Bächtiger, 2005, pp. 861-880. 
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strengthen our unity".75 So how did policymakers and decision-holders look after strengthening 
the democracy and making it meaningful even for the minorities to be a part of?   
Ironically it is one of the fierce critics of consociationalism –Paul Brass– to assert, that it was 
due to consociational arrangements that India did succeed in managing the conflicts and 
accommodating both the demands of ethnic groups and assertive minorities that emerged after 
independence.76 To extend Brass’s statement, whenever a conflict emerged it was managed by 
means of a consociational practice, in terms of constitutional and policy engineering. I have 
selected two conflicts from India, which were successfully regulated, where both exogenous 
and endogenous factors played an important role in their emergence and escalation. 
I.3.1.1 Punjab 
In Punjab, I will be looking at the Khalistan movement. The movement’s goal was the 
establishment of a separate state for Sikhs - Khalistan ("The Land of the Pure"). 
According to Mitra (1995, p.63), the movement for Khalistan “could not exist but for the 
sentiments of sacrifice, honour, dignity and pride inspired by the memories of the Sikh gurus -
spiritual leaders of the community who in past centuries provided a focus of resistance against 
Muslim rulers.”77 
I.3.1.2 Mizoram 
As in Movement for Khalistan, the Indian government used a two-pronged strategy in 
regulating and settling the ethnic conflict. The case study of Mizoram fits both the 
consociational power-sharing institutions as well as ‘principled’ negotiation I analyze, explain 
and advocate for. 
I.3.2 Sri Lanka  
In case of Sri Lanka, I will compare two different approaches in managing and accommodating 
diversity – the system of control and the consociational power-sharing. Sri Lanka also 
                                                 
75 MacLaren, M. (2007). 'Thank you India' - Reflections on the 4th International Conference on Federalism, New 
Delhi, 5-7 November 2007. German Law Journal, 9(3), pp. 367-388. 
76 India “has adopted many consociational devices, some permanently, some temporarily, to deal with interethnic 
conflicts and centre-state conflicts as they have arisen.” in Brass, P.R. (1991). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory 
and Comparison. New Delhi: Sage, p. 343. 
77 Subrata K. Mitra (1995) The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia 
in Comparative Perspective, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Jan., 1995), pp. 57-77; see also 
Mitra, Subrata K., (2016) Encapsulation without Integration? Electoral Democracy and the Ambivalent 
Moderation of Hindu Nationalism in India, Studies in Indian Politics, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp. 90-101. 
Conceptual Framework 
25 
represents the first case study I will be analyzing the hypotheses regarding the external 
(military) intervention and mediation. 
I.3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The only case study with a comprehensive role of the endogenous actors in imposing complex-
power-sharing institutions based on the Dayton Peace Accords and, thus, ending the conflict, 
which did not have a winner.   
I.3.4 Moldova 
Former republic of the Soviet Union, which had and still has to deal with and mitigate two 
ethnic conflicts, civil war, frozen conflict, endogenous actors, EU conditionality and other 
policies and challenges, having important lessons to teach that exceed its geopolitical 
constraints. 
 
One of the aims of the case studies is to have as different and yet as similar case studies that 
will enable me to draw conclusions and to generalize.78 
  
                                                 
78 Robert Putnam, in one of his public lectures at the University of Aarhus, held in 2013, stated “as political 
scientists, we specialize in generalizations”. While his assertion might seem crude and rude at the first glance, or 
it might have just been an innocent joke, it does capture the essence of my commitment as political scientist and 
conviction as a member of civil society, to be relevant, when other do not care; to be able to predict, when others 
speculate; to predict based on meticulous, profound knowledge and understanding, theoretical depth and empirical 
breadth. We should be able, based on recurring patterns, similarities as well as differences, to analyse, understand, 
explain or predict, independent of the context, and at the same time being aware of it.  
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I.4 Methodology  
 
Selection bias 
The levels-of-analysis approach undertaken in this study will be examining the Sri Lankan 
Tamil conflict, from its roots in the 1940s till 2009; Mizo conflict, in particular, from its 
escalation in 1958 to its resolution in 1986; Bosnia and Moldova from the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, respectively; whereas in Punjab’s case; I will investigate the 
radicalization of the movement in the late 1970s, culminating with 1984 riots and subsequent 
‘banalization’ in the 1990s.79  
The case studies are intentionally selected for certain characteristics, thus the case selection 
being both purposive and information-oriented. The thesis combines both Most Similar Case 
Studies (MSSD) and Most Different Case Studies (MDSD) methods of comparison. Thus, the 
case studies are different except for the variable of interest (management of ethnic conflict, 
which leads to durable peace/political order) and negotiation processes (how stakeholders 
negotiate).  
 
Surveys 
In 2017, the State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA) project published its second report, 
containing questions on democracy’s support common to five South Asian countries (India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal), but also with a special set of questions for India 
and Sri Lanka.80   
In presenting the findings, a distinction between the “legitimacy of institutions” and the 
“efficacy of institutions” will be made. The survey’s data enables to complete the picture by 
bridging the gap between policy implementation and its acceptance (i.e., between elite-driven 
policies and the efficacy of institutional engineering),81 concerning the accommodation of the 
demands of both minorities and majorities, on the one hand and on the other the legitimacy “in 
the eyes of the masses” of elite’s enterprise (i.e., in implementing the arrangements to 
accommodate diversity).  
Legitimacy and efficacy issues will be underpinned with data regarding the level of trust, 
positive identification with the state, support for democracy; the issue of political integration of 
“minorities” will be showed by the answers regarding political identities and loyalties. 
                                                 
79 See the life cycle of an ethnic conflict in Mitra, 1995, p. 68. 
80 State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA) Report II. 2017. SDSA Team, Lokniti-CSDS: Jain University Press. 
81 Cf. Mitra, S.K. (2005a). The Puzzle of India's Governance. Culture, Context and Comparative Theory. London: 
Routledge, pp. 179-205; Cf. Carciumaru, 2012, p. 20. 
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Additionally, according to Norris, “if the rules of the game mean that some groups are 
systematically organized into politics and others are systematically organized out, ideally (one 
needs) to understand not just how groups voted but also how they regard democracy and the 
political system.”82 Given the existence of social and political disparities within every 
democracy, in general one would expect to find that ethnic minorities would prove more 
negative than majority populations. Conclusively, Norris’ hypothesis is that “within each 
country, ethnic majorities will express greater support than minorities for the political 
system.”83 From the survey’s data mentioned above through which the “support” can be 
measured; I will refute this hypothesis as well. 
 
I test the dependent variable ‘principled’ negotiations, based on its four constituent principles. 
Furthermore, I test, confirm or refute four hypotheses advanced by Biswas84 on my case studies, 
and thus expanding and enriching the theory of negotiation and power-sharing: 
Hypothesis 1: The probability of negotiations in democracies is higher compared to 
autocracies. 
Hypothesis 2: In federal systems, chances of negotiations are higher. 
Hypothesis 3: In general, intervention will increase the chances of negotiations. 
Hypothesis 3.1: Military intervention decreases the probability of negotiations. 
Hypothesis 3.2: Mediation will increase the likelihood of negotiations. 
Hypothesis 4: Democracies increase the likelihood of negotiation, occurring after intervention. 
  
                                                 
82 Norris, P. (2002). Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, 
and Democratization. In Andrew Reynolds (ed.) The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict 
Management, and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press, 206-247. 
83 Idem, p. 218. 
84 Biswas, B. (2006a). Managing Discontent: Institutions, Intervention and Ethnic Conflict. pp. 38-41. 
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I.5 Comparative Area Studies: Combining Area Studies and Comparative 
Politics  
The suggestion that the countries of the Eastern Europe, in particular Balkans, or South Asia, 
in particular India, are incomprehensible to outsiders and incomparable with other regions, has 
been a historical constant running through both political discourse and research in the past 
decades. The implied specificity of the region has in many ways reaffirmed the perception of 
the Balkans or India as exotic and distinct. This tension between claims to uniqueness and 
incomparability are also easily (mis)understood in the debates between scholars of particular 
disciplines and those defending area studies. The experts of a particular region emphasize the 
importance of specific local knowledge, while those who jump across regions with great ease 
in their research downplay regional specificities. This tension is particularly visible in the field 
of comparative political science. 
Drawing on Florian Bieber’s seminal “Of Balkan Apples, Oranges, Grandmothers and Frogs. 
Comparative Politics and The Study of Southeastern Europe”,85 I argue that the Balkans and 
South Asia as well as the countries of the region need to be understood in a comparative 
perspective. Such a comparative perspective needs to tackle the challenge of self- and externally 
imposed uniqueness, while also engaging with scholarship, political science in particular, which 
downplays any need for specific local knowledge.  
For decades, the relationship between area studies and comparative political science has been 
difficult. Area studies traditionally emphasized knowledge of the local, including the 
specificities of language, culture, and history. The complexity of local knowledge appears to 
stand in conflict with comparative political science, which by definition requires regions and 
countries to be cases that are comparable and generalizable. Although these tensions are by no 
means new, they have been accentuated by the global crisis of area studies and the rise of 
quantitative, large-n (i.e. large number of cases) political science.86  
Conventional area studies have been challenged from two directions. Cultural theorists and 
postcolonial theory have challenged area studies for its inherent cultural bias by either creating 
colonial frameworks of domination (Said) or by conceptualizing regions as passive objects of 
(Western) research.87 A different criticism has been leveled against area studies by mainstream 
                                                 
85 Bieber, F. (2014). Of Balkan Apples, Oranges, Grandmothers and Frogs. Comparative politics and the study of 
Southeastern Europe. In Promitzer et al. (ed.) Southeast European studies in a globalising world. Vienna: Lit 
Verlag, pp. 11-23. 
86 Mahoney found that around 90% of articles published in leading American political science journals are based 
primarily on quantitative methodology - Mahoney, J. (2007). Debating the State of Comparative Politics: Views 
from Qualitative Research. Comparative Political Studies, 40(1), pp. 34-35. 
87 Jackson, P.A. (2003). Space, Theory, and Hegemony: The Dual Crisis of Asian Area Studies and Cultural 
Studies. Sojourn, 18(1), pp. 1-41. 
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political science, especially in the United States, namely that of being methodologically 
unsophisticated and that the regional focus inhibits cross-regional and large scale comparisons 
that have become common in the discipline.88 
Area studies have evolved and provide four responses to these critiques: First, as Peter A. 
Jackson has argued in regard to Asian area studies, despite globalization, regional and cultural 
knowledge remains relevant, and down-playing the importance of culture, geography and 
regions merely re-affirms hegemonic Western discourses. Second, regional knowledge can 
prevent theory-driven research subordinating knowledge of the cases to the level of banality or 
distortion. Third, the use of geographic regions as one of the units of scholarly inquiry can also 
be justified from the perspective of a particular nexus of historical features that are neither 
given, unchanging or fixed, but which provide for a useful unit of analysis. Here, regions can 
provide a useful corrective to the state—and often implicit nation-state—bias. Fourth, the 
benefits of ‘thick description’ are not just about knowledge of the particular for the sake of the 
appreciation of detail or specificity, but for detecting relationships that large-n studies might 
neglect. This can thus help avoid the risk of false equivalencies or causal mechanisms89 in 
comparative studies. Such ethnographic perspectives might stand in the way of parsimonious 
(and often reductionist) theory-building, but there is also increasing recognition in political 
science of the benefits of combining quantitative and qualitative research.90  
Even if different research methods can be combined, methodological and epistemological 
tensions remain between these different approaches that cannot easily be resolved. This debate 
is one area studies, including Balkan studies, has to confront. As Benedict Anderson already 
noted in the late 1970s, the response of area specialists should not be a superficial catching up 
with particular methodological and theoretical fashions or a withdrawal into the corner of 
special knowledge.91 Comparative methodology can help to overcome some of the earlier 
limitations of area studies. Area studies does not only have to confront the disciplinary criticism 
noted above, but also the risk of reifying a “sui generis world view” of individual, incomparable 
cases, as outlined above. The study of the Balkans and South Asia needs to avoid reproducing 
clichéd views and assumptions from outside and within the region. According to Bieber (2014), 
the concept of comparative area studies can be useful here. Basedau and Köllner have argued 
                                                 
88 Munck, G.L. and Snyder, R. (2007). Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics: An Analysis of Leading 
Journals. Comparative Political Studies, 40(1), pp. 5-31. 
89 Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. The American Political Science Review, 
65(3), pp. 682-693. 
90 Coppedge, M. (1999) Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in Comparative 
Politics. Comparative Politics, 31(4), p. 465-476. 
91 Anderson, B. (1978). Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies. In E. Ayal (ed.) The State of Thai 
Studies. Ohio University Centre for International Studies, pp. 193-247, here p. 232, quoted in Jackson, 2003, p. 8. 
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that in comparative area studies “profound area knowledge of one or more areas is combined 
with methods of comparison across nations or other empirical entities, or other empirical 
entities.”92 Comparative area studies can be based on three levels of comparison, namely, within 
the region, between regions and between sub-sets of countries or other units across regions.  
Such an approach combines context with aims of generalization and theory, even if it may often 
be regionally bounded.93 Only context and regional knowledge will help us identify apples as 
apples and oranges as oranges. 
 
I.6 The Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis seeks to explain how and why power-sharing arrangements come into being, succeed 
or fail their purpose by combining negotiation theory with consociational power-sharing theory. 
Additionally, by marrying the theories and based on the lessons learnt from the case studies, it 
analyses and proposes strategies to negotiate what seems non-negotiable and irrational. The 
thesis contributes to the existing research on conflict resolution and explains how traditional 
and modern approaches lead to innovative solutions, e.g. public policy, whereas the innovative 
solutions thus emerging lead to legitimacy, stability, robustness and efficacy of a power-sharing 
system. The thesis compares case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe. With regard to 
the selected case studies from South Asia, these are India (Punjab and Mizoram), and Sri Lanka 
(Sinhala – Tamil, Sinhala - Tamil - Muslim), whereas in the case of Eastern Europe, the thesis 
focuses on the case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova (Transnistria and 
Gagauzia).  
The thesis builds its own model of negotiating conflict in deeply divided societies; by 
combining and extending the neo-institutional dynamic model (Mitra 1999, 2005, 2018), Faure 
and Rubin’s model of structure and agency in negotiating cultural conflicts (1993) and the 
methods of levels-of-analysis approach (Cordell and Wolff 2014). The thesis fine-tunes its 
model of “multilevel ‘principled’ negotiation,” and claims its validity and applicability both in 
western as well as non-western contexts. The thesis consists of six chapters, besides a general 
Introduction.  
Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the general theme of ethnic conflict and negotiation in post-
conflict societies. Besides the research questions and hypothesis, it includes subchapters on 
definitions, terminology, methodology and the structure if the thesis. It first explains why the 
                                                 
92 Basedau, M. and Kellner, P. (2007). Area Studies, Comparative Area Studies, and the Study of Politics: Context, 
Substance, and Methodological Challenges. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 1, pp. 110-111. 
93 Bunce, V. (2000). Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations. Comparative Political 
Studies, 33(6-7), pp. 703-734. 
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selected case studies are compared, whether the size matters, and how one can generalize from 
these findings. Moreover, given the fact that the case studies are selected from both post-
colonial and post-communist contexts, the chapter seeks to explain whether it is the same by 
looking at similar characteristics such as post-conflict, post-traumatic and transitional societies. 
While being aware of deterministic-causal predictions, which could be disconfirmed by a single 
“critical” case, the case studies are probabilistic, theory-confirming and theory-informing. 
However, the case studies are picked in accordance with the hypothesis and not systematically 
and their number is inherently limited. Thus, the thesis analyses deeply divided societies.  
Chapter 2 sets the analytical framework of the thesis. It undertakes a critical review of the 
existing body of literature on negotiation and (consociational) power-sharing (both liberal and 
corporate) theories. It analyses and explains what is ‘power-sharing’, how does it work and not 
work sometimes, and whether favorable conditions to achieving as well as maintaining power-
sharing system matter. With regard to negotiation, it starts with analysis of two principles of 
negotiation process - positional and principled negotiations. The chapter looks at how one 
comes to the negotiation table and, eventually, to an agreement based on power-sharing 
institutional arrangements. It deconstructs the process of negotiation by showing how to 
‘negotiate negotiation’ and what the conflicting groups have to give up in order to be able to 
negotiate and reach a durable solution. It starts from the premises of the ‘principled’ negotiation, 
which state that one can negotiate anything as long as the principles are followed, and critically 
examines their validity in a non-western, post-conflict, transitional setting. The chapter also 
shows why the parties should be interested in negotiating an ‘amicable solution’ in the first 
place, what are the incentives, who negotiates (regimes, rebels, etc.) and what are the parties 
prepared or willing to give up in order to reach an agreement. Moreover, additional concepts 
relevant to the analysis of the case studies, such as BATNA, asymmetry, mediation, mutually 
hurting stalemate, ripeness and prisoner’s dilemma, are discussed and thoroughly analyzed. The 
concluding part of the subchapter analyses whether principled negotiation is adequate in 
negotiating identity-based conflicts. The last subchapter merges negotiation theories and power 
sharing into a theory of ethnic conflict management in deeply divided societies.94 It states that 
a durable settlement of an ethnic conflict can be reached through a “multilevel ‘principled’ 
negotiation”, whereas the durability and legitimacy of solutions depend on finding an 
appropriate formula made of identities and institutions for handling ethnic relations - a 
comprehensive consociational power sharing system. 
                                                 
94 Cf. McCulloch and McGarry, 2017, pp. 405-424. 
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Chapter 3 analyses the case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe. With regard to the 
selected case studies from South Asia, these are India (Punjab and Mizoram), and Sri Lanka 
(Sinhala – Tamil, Sinhala - Tamil - Muslim), whereas in the case of Eastern Europe, the thesis 
focuses on the case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova (Transnistria and 
Gagauzia). In case of the Eastern European states, various degrees of involvement of 
international actors have taken place. I analyze the (re)action and support of domestic actors in 
terms of efficacy and legitimacy of and involvement with central state institutions, perceived 
as de facto or de jure protectorates of the external powers. Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Moldova constitute a part of a broader regional phenomenon such as transition from 
authoritarian to democratic systems, subsequent inclusion of minority demands, as well as both 
experience with different intensities of violence based on ethnic/cultural conflict and 
international actors’ intervention and mediation. The knowledge gained from the European 
cases viewed as instances of complex consociational power-sharing serves as a viable tool and 
sheds a new light on mitigation and management of such seemingly intractable and protracted 
conflicts as Kashmir and Sri Lanka. The analyses of each case study follows the levels-of-
analysis approach and analytic narrative methods. Thus, each ‘story’ has a ‘prelude’ explaining 
how and why did the conflicts emerge and escalate as well as how these were settled (in terms 
of structure, agency and process).  
The dependent variable ‘power-sharing’ is measured through a ‘power-sharing index’ (PSI), 
which includes the following factors, which serve as explanatory and/or independent variables: 
(1) group representation; (2) proportionality; (3) separation of powers; (4) qualified majority 
for constitutional amendments; (5) inclusiveness of cabinets; (6) minority government; (7) 
functional veto players (8) veto power for political parties/groups; (9) segmental autonomy 
(including both symmetric and asymmetric autonomy); (10) federalism.95 These are quantified 
in a scale going from zero to nine, with an additional point for each factor. For the second 
dependent variable “durable peace”, which a conflict settlement should lead to, the data from 
Polity IV and v-dem used. The logic and empirical accuracy of the coding is done transparently 
in order to be easily verified. The dependent variable “’principled’ negotiation” is measured 
through its four constitutive characteristics (people, interests, options, criteria), which are 
quantified by 1 (applicable) or 0 (non-applicable). Chapter 4 consists of conclusions and lessons 
drawn from the case studies, it revisits the theoretical framework and the hypothesis, and 
evaluates the proposed model of “multilevel ‘principled’ negotiation” across the cases. Chapter 
                                                 
95 Linder & Bächtiger, 2005; Cf. Bogaards, M. (2014). Democracy and Social Peace in Divided Societies. 
Exploring Consociational Parties. Palgrave Macmillan. 
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5 spells out the contribution to the theories of conflict resolution, negotiation and power-
sharing, whereas Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, comprises policy recommendations based 
on theoretical and empirical findings of the Thesis. 
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II. Power-Sharing and Bargaining Power between Theory and Practice 
[…] if I may be permitted to conclude with a minor note of blasphemy, it may be said of new 
concepts as it was said of the salvation of souls “there shall be weeping and gnashing teeth, for many 
are called but few are chosen.”96  
 
II.1  Consociational Power-Sharing97 
II.1.1 The Model 
O’Leary points out to the fact that “consociational thinking has a long history and its lineages 
may be traced to the sixteenth-century Protestant philosopher Johannes Althusius (1557-1638), 
the early-twentieth-century Austro-Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, and more recently, 
the Nobel laureate Sir Arthur Lewis. It is, however, inescapably associated in our times with 
Arend Lijphart, its contemporary creator and most important advocate.”98 
Besides Lijphart, a number of other authors99 from about 1960 onwards have been working on 
the consociational theory. Thus, explains Lijphart “while the terms “consociation” and 
“consociational democracy” have become widely accepted, a number of other terms referring 
to basically the same concept have also been in use: Proporzdemokratie,  
Konkordanzdemokratie, “segmented pluralism,” the “politics of accommodation””.100 
According to Lijphart, the “essence of consociationalism is the search for broadly acceptable 
compromises; it does not require that decision-makers abandon their original preferences, that 
they whole-heartedly support the compromises, or that they never cast a vote against a particular 
compromise proposal. Amicable agreement and decision by interpretation are therefore the 
usual consociational modes, but the other two modes may also occur.”101   
Thus, consociationalism, relies in particular on elite, i.e. political leaders, cooperation as the 
principal mechanism of successful conflict management in deeply divided societies, their 
acceptance and readiness to share power. According to Lijphart, “power-sharing does not 
                                                 
96 Almond, G. (1956). Comparative Political Systems. Journal of Politics, 18(3), p. 409. 
97 The etymology of consociation derives from the Latin for “with” and “society”: Consociation translates as 
“union” or “connection”. Today, consociation describes a “society of societies”. The concept has some similarities 
with federation, but is not a synonym; consociations can exist in nonfederal states, See O’Leary, B. (2008b). The 
Logics of Power-sharing, Consociation and Pluralist Federations. In Marc Weller and Barbara Metzger (ed.) 
Settling Self-determination Disputes. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 277-278. 
98 O’Leary, 2005, p. 3. 
99 See Bibliography: besides Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1979, 1985, 1996, 2002, 2008), other authors that expanded, 
amended and enhanced the theoretical framework of consociationalism are, in alphabetical order, the following: 
Armingeon, 2002; Crepaz, 2002, Daalder, 1974; Elazar, 1985; Kerr, 2006; Lehmbruch, 1975 and 1993; McGarry, 
2005; O’Leary, 2005; Schneckener, 2002; Steiner, 1981; van Schendelen, 1985; and Weller, 2008.  
100 Lijphart, A. (1979). Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links. Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, 12(3), p. 499. 
101 Lijphart, A. (1985). Power-Sharing in South Africa. Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, p. 113. 
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deviate much from the basic principle of majority rule. It agrees with that fundamental premise 
that majority rule is superior to minority rule, but it accepts majority rule merely as minimum 
requirement: instead of being satisfied with narrow decision-making majorities, it seeks to 
maximize the size of these majorities.”102 O’Leary concludes by stating that “consociationalists 
want majorities, rather than a majority or a plurality.”103 And that a negotiated consociational 
settlement “is better than a winner-takes-all outcome—especially where taking all implies 
killing, expelling, or assimilating the losers.”104 Horowitz states in his seminal work that under 
conditions of simple majority rule: “Ethnic parties developed, majorities took power, and 
minorities took shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of minority exclusion 
from government, underpinned by ethnic voting, was potentially permanent. Civil violence, 
military coups, and the advent of single party regimes can all be traced to this problem of 
inclusion-exclusion.”105 A tyranny of majority is improbable in a consociational democracy. 
Sisk observes that “consociationalists suggest that conflict management is best promoted by 
accommodation among ethnic group leaders representative of their communities precisely 
through cooperative problem solving. When a sufficiently cohesive core of moderates does 
exist, power-sharing is a viable means of democratic governance. There is no single, 
transportable model of power-sharing, but rather a broad menu of conflict-regulating practices, 
institutions, and mechanisms.”106  
Conclusively, Lijphart lists following requirements for a successful consociational democracy: 
ability of elites to accommodate various interests and demands of the groups; ability to 
transcend cleavages and cooperate with elites of rival groups; elites’ commitment to maintain 
the system and improve its cohesion and stability; and, “all of the above requirements would be 
based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation.”107 
 
                                                 
102 Lijphart, 2008, p. 12.  
103 O’Leary, 2005, p. 10. 
104 Idem. 
105 Horowitz, 2000, p. 629.  
106 Sisk, T.D. (1996a). Power Sharing in Multiethnic Societies: Principal Approaches and Practices. In Gail W. 
Lapidus and Svetlana Tsalik (ed.): Preventing Deadly Conflict. Strategies and Institutions. Proceedings of a 
Conference in Moscow, Russian Federation; A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, Moscow, p. 20.  
107 Lijphart, 2008, p. 32 and Lijphart, 1977, p. 25. 
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II.1.2 The Evolution of Consociationalism and Its Four Basic Principles108 
Lijphart defines consociational democracy in terms of four principles: grand coalition, 
segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto. All four principles deviate from the 
Westminster model of majority rule. 109 
 
II.1.2.1 Grand Coalition 
Grand coalition is defined by “joint governance of political leaders coming from all segments 
of the plural society.”110 In such grand coalitions power sharing may take a variety of forms. 
O’Leary distinguishes “between complete, concurrent, and weak democratic consociational 
executives,” reaching to the conclusion that “consociational executives need not be all inclusive 
grand coalitions.”111  
O’Leary points to the fact, that “consociations may exist, which do not include all segments in 
government."112 This situation arises in any large and complex state or region, such as India, 
for example, in which “there are numerous small ethnic minorities and categories of persons 
that are not sufficiently significant—demographically, electorally, or politically—to be 
organized into any consociational settlement.”113 
An important aspect regarding executive power sharing/grand coalition is the quality of 
governing parties or coalitions. Based on O’Leary and Bogaards’ findings, “governing parties 
may be classified as consociational by four criteria: (1) the extent to which they draw support 
from each major segment of voters at plurality levels or above; (2) the extent to which they are 
descriptively representative in the legislature and the cabinet of the state or region that they 
govern; (3) their internal party organizational characteristics (i.e., the extent to which their 
internal governance follows consociational traits of executive power sharing, autonomy, 
proportionality, and veto rights); and (4) the extent to which they follow consociational 
practices to manage crises that have national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious roots.”114 According 
to the above mentioned criteria Bogaards distinguishes three types of consociational party: the 
Alliance type of consociational party, which is “made up of separate organizational entities that 
                                                 
108 This subsection draws extensively on Lijphart, 1969; 1979; 2002 and 2008; O’Leary, 2005 and 2008; Sisk, 
1996(a) and Sisk, T.D. (1996b). Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. United States Institute of Peace; Schneckener, U. (2002). 
Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation. Journal of 
Peace Research, 39(2), pp. 203-228; as well as Schendelen, M. van (1985). Consociational Democracy: The Views 
of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms. Political Science Reviewer, 15, pp. 143-183. 
109 See Lijphart, 1979, pp. 499-516. 
110 Idem.  
111 O’Leary, 2005, p. 12. 
112 Idem, p. 13. 
113 Ibid. 
114 O’Leary, 2005, p. 17. 
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function as a unity in the context of competitive multi-party elections;” 115 the Congress model 
and the single party model. 116 
 
II.1.2.2 Segmental Autonomy 
Lijphart asserts that “the principle of segmental autonomy means that decision-making 
authority is delegated to the separate segments as much as possible,”117 and thus when 
compared to majority rule, it may be characterized as “minority rule over the minority itself in 
matters that are the minority's exclusive concern.”118 It complements the grand coalition 
principle: on all issues of common interest, the decisions are made jointly by the segments' 
leaders, but on all other issues, decision-making is left to each segment. The ideal consociation 
maximizes both the segments' power in the area of common concerns and their freedom to 
organize their own affairs autonomously (i.e. asymmetrical or corporate federalism). 
Moreover, federal institutions can accommodate territorially concentrated ethnic groups, (i.e. 
ethnic federalism). In ethnic federations the allocation of powers between central and regional 
governments is invariably a difficult, and ongoing, balancing act.119. 
Besides territorially concentrated groups the acknowledgment of the group rights or corporate 
federalism is also a stipulation of this principle.  
Finally, an important aspect of the segmental autonomy is the principle of “voluntary 
affiliation”120 or self-determination (as opposed to pre-determination).  
 
II.1.2.3 Proportionality 
Lijphart indicates that “proportionality serves as the basic standard of political 
representation.”121 The most important aspect of the consociational principle of proportionality 
is electoral system based on proportional representation that also includes proportionality in 
legislative representation that can occur without formal proportional representation, 
proportional appointment to the civil service, and proportional allocation of public funds. 
According to Lijphart, the importance of proportional representation (PR) is not only that it 
yields proportional results and permits minority representation –two important advantages from 
consociational perspective—but also that it permits the segments to define themselves—“the 
                                                 
115 Bogaards, M. (2005). Power Sharing in South Africa. In Noel Sidney (ed.) From Power Sharing to Democracy: 
Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. McGill-Queen's Press – MQUP, 164-183. 
116 Cf. Bogaards, 2005, pp. 172-174; see also Bogaards, 2014, pp. 1-19. 
117 Lijphart, 1979, p. 500. 
118 Idem. 
119 See Sisk, 1996(a), p. 17. 
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121 Lijphart, 1979. 
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principle of self-determination of the segments of a plural society”.122 Lijphart continues with 
advantages of self-determination stating that “it avoids the problem of discriminatory 
choices,”123 especially serious in “countries where there are two or more large segments,”124 
and also one or more very small minorities. These minorities run the risk of being overlooked 
or disregarded. In many cases, the main segments of a plural society may want to be recognized 
as formally and specifically as possible. In these circumstances, it may make sense to use a 
combination of pre-determination and self-determination: for instance, a two-tier system of pre-
determination of the large segments and self-determination of any other group that may aspire 
to similar, though not necessarily identical, rights of representation and autonomy.125 
Pippa Norris pointedly observes that “in contrast to majoritarian electoral systems, proportional 
representation produces a more proportional outcome facilitating the entry of smaller parties 
into parliament, which includes the election of ethnic minority parties and in its turn this 
producing greater diffuse support for the political system among ethnic minority 
populations.”126 
 
Figure 3. Advantages of proportional representation electoral system (after Pippa 
Norris)127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pippa Norris in her seminal article “Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of 
Ethnic Conflict, Electoral systems, and Democratization” reached an interesting conclusion, 
that although “under PR, minorities should display more positive attitudes towards the political 
system, and political leaders would learn to collaborate within parliaments through deliberation, 
negotiation, and compromise—“through ballots not bullets”—encouraging conciliation 
between their grass-roots supporters, the study found no evidence for the Lijphart’s proposition 
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that PR party-list systems are directly associated with higher levels of support for the political 
system among ethnic minorities.”128 
Moreover, according to O’Leary’s interesting findings129 the “territorial concentration of 
communities may facilitate proportional representation of legislators by ethnic, racial, religious 
or linguistic origin.”130 The Quebecois, for example, are proportionately represented in 
Canada’s parliament, although Canada uses a single member plurality electoral system. 
Furthermore, in countries which have majoritarian electoral systems, a proportional 
representation of communities may still be achieved, though it may be more difficult to 
guarantee, and will usually involve separate rolls or corporate, i.e. asymmetrical, representation.  
However, O’Leary demonstrates that “systems of reserved seats, or informal norms, are less 
likely to achieve proportionality smoothly than proportional electoral formulae. They may also 
involve pre-empting people’s identities and preferences, or adopting corporate (pre-
determined) rather than liberal (self-determined) principles of representation.”131  
 
II.1.2.4 Mutual or Minority Veto 
The fourth consociational principle—the minority veto, is “at the heart of the concrete 
assurances of consociationalism.”132 A very important observation is that “minority veto may 
be either an informal or a formal rule.”133 Although in a consociational democracy the grand 
coalition rule is supposed to the mechanism to share power, “the purpose of the mutual veto is 
to provide such a guarantee. In contrast with majority rule, it may be called negative minority 
rule.”134 ´  
Schneckener differentiates between three types of veto rights: (1) the delaying veto; (2) the 
indirect veto, and (3) the direct veto.135 The first type aims at delaying a decision in order to 
reconsider the issue. The second type leads to indirect veto for each group since specific 
conditions have been met in order to pass legislation in parliament. The third type enables 
groups to declare a matter to be of “vital interest” and to stop any political action.136O’Leary 
rightfully points out that in consociational systems, formal veto rights should mostly apply to 
the domains of the politics of identity and security, i.e. in ethnic, religious or national domains, 
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129 O’Leary, 2008, pp. 52-54. 
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132 Sisk, 1996(a), p. 5, and Lijphart, 1979. 
133 See Ljphart, 1979. 
134 Lijphart, 1979, p. 501. 
135 Schneckener, 2002, p. 221. 
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and not to every policy sector. In effect, in these domains, groups require parity of power, rather 
than proportional power.137 
 
II.1.3 Characteristics of Power-Sharing Arrangements 
Power-sharing is, broadly speaking, committed to the representation and participation of all 
major ethno-political actors in key decision-making channels. Institutionally, power-sharing 
consists of “those rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups 
within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among 
collectivities competing for power”.138 To assess the stability, effectiveness and fairness of 
power-sharing institutions, it is important to understand the range of ways by which power is 
shared. Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie conceptualize power-sharing along four 
dimensions.139 The political dimension “details the distribution of political power among the 
parties to the settlement,” primarily through electoral, administrative and executive 
proportional representation at the centre140 while the territorial dimension considers autonomy 
arrangements in either federal or regional form. Military and economic forms of power-sharing, 
respectively, distribute the state’s coercive power and economic resources among key groups. 
Many of the cases considered in this volume combine certain dimensions. 
In terms of political power-sharing’s institutional design, there are three further distinctions that 
matter: whether the agreement to share power is formal or informal, whether power is shared 
directly or indirectly, and whether it is based on a corporate or liberal understanding of power-
sharing. 
Formal vs. informal 
Political institutions, which have a constraining effect on political behaviour, operate either 
formally or informally. Formal rules operate within official channels and are often embedded 
in the legal and constitutional framework of the state141, whereas informal rules are “created, 
communicated and enforced outside of official sanctioned channels”142. As with other 
institutional frameworks, power-sharing arrangements may be the result of formal rules, either 
                                                 
137 O’Leary, 2008, p. 56. 
138 Hartzell, C. and Hoddie, M. (2003). Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing 
Arrangements. Journal of Peace Research, 40(3), p. 320. 
139 Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell, C.A. and Hoddie, M. (2007). Crafting peace: power-sharing institutions 
and the negotiated settlement of civil wars. University Park: Pennsylvania State. 
140 Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, p. 320. 
141 Koneska, C. (2014). After ethnic conflict. Policy-making in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia. Farnham: Ashgate, p. 33. 
142 Helmke, G. and Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. 
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temporary or permanent, that are constitutionally enshrined or formalized as part of a peace 
agreement, or they may be a matter of political conventions and other informal practices. As 
the case of Lebanon demonstrates, both formal and informal rules can be enduring.  
For many power-sharing advocates, such as Arend Lijphart, the preference is for informal 
arrangements. In a democratic setting, informal power-sharing provides a level of flexibility 
that allows the polity to respond to shifting demographic and voting trends. In Switzerland, the 
‘magic formula’ for appointments to the Swiss Federal Council operates on an informal basis. 
Between 1959 and 2003, it divided the seven executive seats between the four main parties; the 
formula was later modified to accommodate shifts in voting patterns. Informal agreements also 
suggest the presence of mutual trust and the “spirit of accommodation” that is so important for 
effective power-sharing.143 This was the case in the Netherlands, which, as the political salience 
of pillarization declined, was able to move away from consociationalism in part because the 
informal nature of its arrangements already suggested sufficient levels of trust and cooperation. 
However, informal arrangements are not always appropriate. They make it difficult for groups 
excluded from the initial informal pact to access political power and their ‘behind- closed-
doors’ nature brings a lack of transparency that might facilitate corruption, clientelism and other 
illicit activities.144 Moreover, because of the lack of trust that characterizes divided societies, 
minorities are reticent to accept informal arrangements and will use whatever bargaining power 
they have to push for strong guarantees and protections (Cyprus, for example). 
As power-sharing theory and practice evolve, there has been a notable shift in where the model 
is applied. While Switzerland and the Netherlands are plural societies, they do not exhibit the 
violence and fractiousness of contemporary power-sharing cases, such as Bosnia, Moldova or 
Serbia. This shift implies the adoption of power-sharing, often on a coercive basis, amid 
conditions of a profound lack of trust or even a willingness to cooperate. Under such conditions, 
“there is probably no alternative to formal constitutional and legal rules to govern power-
sharing and autonomy in deeply divided societies”145. Moreover, how these formal and often 
highly contentious arrangements fare is contingent on two further distinctions in power-sharing 
theory: whether power is shared directly or indirectly, and whether it is premised on liberal or 
corporate rules. 
 
                                                 
143 Lijphart, 1977. 
144 Koneska. 2014. 
145 Lijphart 2002, p. 54. 
Power-sharing and Bargaining Power between Theory and Practice 
42 
Direct vs. indirect 
Power-sharing arrangements can be designed with the direct representation and participation of 
all major groups in government in mind, or they may be designed indirectly by having 
victorious political parties seek support from across the ethno-political divide. The former 
arrangement is referred to as consociationalism, whereas the latter is called centripetalism or 
the integrative approach. Consociationalism begins from the principle of inclusivity; its 
ultimate goal is to ensure the “widespread inclusion of all ethnopolitical groups in governing 
processes“146 and that they are included on their own terms. This means direct political 
representation for all groups, regardless of whether they elect moderates or extremists to 
represent them.  
As mentioned above, consociationalism is associated with four key institutions, all of which 
can be designed in multiple ways: executive power-sharing, proportionality, veto rights and 
autonomy arrangements. Executive power-sharing can function in both presidential and 
parliamentary systems and grand coalitions can include varying levels of group support. As 
O’Leary suggests, power-sharing coalitions can be complete (all major segments are included), 
concurrent (majority support from each segment) or weak (at least one segment has only 
plurality support)147. The proportionality principle is intended to ensure that “all ethnopolitical 
groups are included in the processes of “executive, legislative, judicial, bureaucratic, military 
[and] cultural power.”148. One mechanism for this is the use of proportional representation (PR) 
electoral systems. Lijphart (2008) has strongly advocated for a closed-list PR electoral system 
while others have advocated the single transferable vote, the electoral system used in Northern 
Ireland.149 In other cases, such as Bosnia, an open- list PR system is employed. Veto rights are 
also incredibly diverse. They can be enacted in the legislature, the executive or both; as 
McCulloch remarks “a veto may prompt an immediate suspension of the proposed legislation 
or it may defer the vote and refer the issue to committee for further consideration;”150 the issue 
areas to which veto rights pertain may either be constitutionally prescribed or open-ended.   
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II.1.4 Consociation: Facilitating Factors and Favorable Conditions 
There has been a large variation in the lists of favorable conditions151, which could be explained 
partly by the detection of new empirical cases, partly by the discussion of these factors by other 
scholars.152  
 
Figure 4. The interaction between favorable conditions and maintenance of 
consociational153 
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As far as Lijphart concerns, there are ten variables that may make the establishment and 
maintenance of a consociational democracy in a plural society more or less likely. Generally a 
factor that is favourable for the establishment of a consociation will also be a positive condition 
for its maintenance.154 Accordingly, the favourable conditions are: 1) no majority segment; 2) 
segments of equal size; 3) small number of segments; 4) small population size; 5) external 
threats; 6) overarching loyalties; 7) socioeconomic equality; 8) geographical concentration of 
segments; 9) traditions of accommodation and 10) special rights claim155. 
First condition holds that in a plural society no segment of the population should be in majority. 
The second factor ties on the first stipulation that the segments in the society should have 
roughly the same size.156 Andeweg pointedly posits that these factors emphasize the importance 
of the “absence of a solid majority, i.e. the existence of a multiple balance of power among the 
social segments. Minority status for all groups means that militant intransigence not only 
threatens political stability (a leader may not recognize the danger or may not care) but also 
reduces a segmental leader's influence to that of a voice in the wilderness, whereas by sharing 
power at least something can be gained. From the opposite point of view, if political elites could 
                                                 
151 Cf. Lijphart 1969, pp. 216-222; 1977, pp. 53-103; 1985, pp. 119-28 and Lijphart 1996, pp. 262-263 and 
Carciumaru, 2012.  
152 Daalder 1974, Nordlinger 1972, Steiner 1974, see Andeweg, R.B. (2000). Consociational Democracy. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 3, p. 521; also Carciumaru, 2012. 
153 Figure adapted from Lijphart, 1985, p. 120. 
154 Lijphart, 1985, p. 119. 
155 In 2002 Lijphart added yet another condition based on his observation of Maori claims: “When I was in New 
Zeeland in 1998, I witnessed the frequently heated debate about the problems of the Maori community. One of the 
sources of tension is the Maori claim to special rights on the ground that the Maori are the original people of New 
Zeeland. Claims to such special rights greatly complicate efforts to find consociational solutions. Hence the 
absence of such claims is a favorable condition –number 10– for consociational democracy”, Lijphart, 2002, 20. 
156 Belgium is given a positive score on this, although terms of language spoken ca. 60% of the population speaks 
Dutch leading to the conclusion that segments other the Dutch may speak the language and nonetheless consider 
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count on a solid majority, why would they share power with and make concessions to the losing 
minority? It is not in their self-interest, democratic norms do not require it, and their followers 
may not accept it.” 157  In this sense an additional favorable variable in countries with a solid 
majority would have to be present: elites of the majority will cooperate in case they have well-
founded fear of casualties.158  
The next two factors are also interconnected; the more segments whose interests have to be 
respected are involved, the longer it will take to reach a decision. Nonetheless, a decision thus 
reached would score better in terms of its implementation. Lijphart and Lehmbruch include the 
size factor as important, in the sense that small states are more manageable159, i.e. easier to 
govern, because the “political elites all know one another, interact regularly, and therefore 
negotiate more easily without too much constituency pressure.”160 However, in Federalist 51, 
Madison made an interesting point arguing that “minority rights are protected by extending the 
size of an area governed so that “society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and 
classes of citizens that the rights of individuals, or of minority, will be in little danger from 
interested combinations of the majority.”161 In other words, larger political units offer 
heterogeneity of interests that make it difficult for a cohesive majority to tyrannize a minority. 
Moreover, “personal contact between leaders depends more on psychological than on 
geographical distance; the social segmentation that characterizes consociational democracies 
already multiplies the number of organized groups and makes decision making complex, so that 
contribution of size in this respect can only be marginal.”162 Psychological and political 
closeness rather than geographical distance is stressed by O’Leary as well, who continues: 
“’Great hatreds, little room’, was Yeats’ memorable line about intra-Irish ethno-religious 
relations.”163 The fifth condition—points to the fact that “small states are likely to feel 
externally threatened and be more induced towards internal accommodation.”164 Nevertheless, 
the direct external threat operates independently of its size. Shared external threats provide 
elites with significant incentives to accommodate each other’s communities whatever the state's 
population size.  
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Taking into account the above mentioned, we could categorize the facilitating conditions in 
either structure-oriented or actor-oriented conditions, as follows: 
 
Table 2: Conditions favouring power-sharing 
Structure-oriented conditions Actor-oriented conditions 
1. No majority segment 8. Dominant elite165  
2. Segments of equal size 9. External pressure  
3. Small number of segments 10. Traditions of accommodation 
4. Small population size 11. Absence of special rights claim 
5. Socio-economic equality   
6. Overarching Loyalty  
7. Geographical concentration of segments  
 
Source: Author’s table (see Carciumaru 2012, p.2), based on Andeweg 2000, Lijphart 2002, Schneckener 2002. 
 
Schneckener added another two actor-oriented conditions: 1) comprehensive participation, 
stating that all relevant parties (including paramilitary organizations) should be represented in 
peace-making efforts and institutionalized power-sharing; 2) respect for status quo , 
presupposing that all parties in power-sharing executive respect the agreed type of 
consociationalism; and one structure-oriented condition—moderate pluralism—stating that the 
moderate multi-party system should neither be established according to monolithic 'national 
fronts' nor be fragmented in competing nationalist factions.166 
Besides four principles and fourteen favorable conditions, other constitutional choices for 
successful power-sharing would include: “a parliamentary instead of presidential system;167 the 
head of state, i.e. the president -a primarily ceremonial office; at least two-thirds majority 
requirement for amending the constitutions, i.e. constitutional rigidity; an active judicial review, 
and an independent central bank.” 168 
Lastly, an important point that still needs to be made is that consociational theory is not only 
an empirical theory of explaining political stability in divided societies (such as Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Lebanon and Nigeria, as well as European Union and 
India to name just a few), taking political system in each country as a given,169 but also a 
normative theory. Based both on Lijphart’s theory as well as on ingenuity and inventiveness of 
                                                 
165 A condition that is implicit and not explicit mentioned by Lijphart, 1985 and 1996, whereby political elites are 
able to control and to persuade their support base. 
166 Schneckener, 2002, pp. 203-228. 
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the politicians consociation/power sharing model has been prescribed, recommended to and 
implemented in a large number of countries (ranging from South Africa, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Northern Ireland, Burundi to Chechen and Dagestan Republic) 170 as 
a method of conflict regulation and a better type of democracy for plural or deeply divided 
societies.  
 
II.1.5 Critique and Its Rebuttal: Debating power-sharing 
Andeweg admits that “consociationalism has been a controversial theory”, however, he 
continues that “instead of one great debate about its validity there are numerous small debates 
about various aspects and applications.”171  
The popularity of the consociational model among constitutional engineers is less a reflection 
of the model’s intrinsic merits172 than of the relative lack of coherent alternatives.173 While 
criticizing consociationalism Barry admitted that: “It is not my intention to suggest that I have 
any alternative panacea to offer. In fact my own view of the prospects is extremely bleak.”174 
Proponents of consociation are regularly accused of racism, anti-Enlightenment thought, 
promoting apartheid, and even condoning ethnic cleansing.175 To this type of criticism Lijphart 
counters by stating that “[i]t is not necessary for consociational theory to surrender to its critics, 
because all of the criticisms are unjustified and exaggerated.”176 
A common misbelief is that consociations invariably stop free electoral competition by forcing 
voters to vote for “their” national, ethnic, religious or tribal candidates.177 Sisk pointedly states 
that “by “freezing” group boundaries in the political system, for example through statutory 
reservation of offices for specific group representatives, a consociational power-sharing system 
is said to be an undynamic model for conflict management.”178  
Finally, according to Barry “consociational institutions are arguably antidemocratic because 
they can cushion vigorous opposition politics. For example, the absence of an opposition party 
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in a grand coalition may detract from the accountability of the government.”179  He addresses 
the issues of freezing the identities, by making a strong stance for self-determination, I quote: 
“In systems of pre-determination, there is a strong temptation to fix the relative shares of 
representation and other privileges for the segments on a permanent or semi-permanent basis 
[...] self-determination has the advantage of being completely flexible, since it is based on a 
numbers of people supporting the different parties and registering as members of cultural 
groups. It is naturally and continually self-adjusting.”180 Moreover, “consociationalists believe 
that certain collective identities, especially those based on nationality, ethnicity, language, and 
religion, are generally fairly durable once formed.”181 However, Barry’s idea of a “co-operation 
without co-optation” based on, i.e. alleged weakness of group autonomy,182 is not a plausible 
and viable choice for plural societies.183 Barry misinterprets power-sharing by treating power-
sharing and political moderation as clearly different and separable factors. In Lijphart’s view 
the best way to encourage moderation is to give a party the opportunity to participate in 
government.184 In this sense Gurr’s supportive conclusion is well worth quoting: “[w]hat is the 
functional place of communal groups in the global system of states?” 185 According to Gurr the 
most pertinent approach is “the positive-sum coexistence of ethnic groups and plural states”, 
which means both “recognizing and strengthening [emphasize added], communal groups within 
the existing state system.”186 
Horowitz argues that Lijphart places much emphasis on the freedom of leaders to enter 
consociational arrangements, but little is placed on “structure of incentives” within which 
political leaders work. Consociationalism assumes that “political elites enjoy a high degree of 
freedom of choice, and that they may resort to consociational methods of decision-making as a 
result of the rational recognition of the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies and a 
deliberate effort to counteract these dangers.”187 In Horowitz’s opinion “such freedom does not 
generally characterize conditions in severely divided societies.”188 Though leadership is 
important it has limited freedom to choose its own path. Moreover, since elite competition is 
                                                 
179 Idem. 
180 Lijphart, 2008, p.71-73. 
181 O’Leary, 2005, p.8. 
182 Critics argue that even if it is not on a territorial basis group autonomy may encourage ethnic conflict by 
explicitly recognizing the legitimacy of ethnic groups and by making them stronger, more cohesive, and more 
distinctive. This could lead to an eventual secession. Cf. Barry 1975; Brass, 1991, Nordlinger, 1972. 
183 Cf. Lijphart, 200, pp.78-86; also Sisk, 1996(a), p. 7. 
184 Lijphart, 1985, p. 104. 
185 Gurr, T.R. (1995). Minorities at Risk: a global view of ethnopolitical conflicts. Washington D. C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, p. 323. 
186 Idem. 
187 Lijphart 1977, p. 165; Cf. Horowitz, 2000, p. 573. 
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one of the sources of ethnic conflict, it would be a mistake to impute good intentions to leaders 
without good political reasons for thinking they would in fact entertain such intentions.189  
So why would political leaders compromise? First, Lijphart argues that “the only way for ethnic 
or any other parties not just to enter but also to stay in the cabinet is to reach compromises with 
their coalitional partners; they have a very strong incentive to compromise—political 
power!“190 Moreover, minorities obviously have stronger incentives than majorities to enter 
coalition governments. That is why Lijphart emphasized that the first condition that favour 
power-sharing is the absence of a majority group. But what about deeply divided plural societies 
such as Sri Lankan where there is a solid majority—the Sinhalese? Nordlinger comes up with 
a list of incentives that would lead political leaders to accommodate: 1) the existence of a 
common external threat; 2) the recognition that conflict distracts from economic well-being; 3) 
the drive for power; and 4) the avoidance of bloodshed and suffering.191 The last motive is 
arguably the most powerful. Desire for conflict avoidance has been termed by Lijphart the “self-
negating prophecy”: the belief that further escalation of violent conflict will not advance groups 
aims but will in fact make them unattainable. Steiner makes us aware, how crucial leaders can 
be and how difficult it is to incorporate great leaders into consociational theory by giving the 
example of Mandela and his strongly moderating influence on the masses when he came out of 
prison. Steiner concludes that consociational scholars should not a priori assume that elites are 
more reasonable and moderate than the general public with regard to inter-cultural relations, 
but this is an empirical question that needs to be carefully investigated in each case. Special 
attention should be paid to the middle level of elite, who are the most hostile towards other 
cultures. 192 Another criticism is that consociations make no difference, because “they only 
work well where they are not needed or are redundant.”193 Donald Horowitz maintains that: 
“the sine qua non of consociationalism turns out to have little applicability in the severe conflict 
conditions of Asia and Africa.”194 Wilkinson comes to the same conclusion stating that those 
seeking to resolve conflict in new democracies in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet 
Union, “would do well to look elsewhere for permanent solutions.”195 
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Lijphart counter argues indefatigably that “there are clear cases where power-sharing has 
worked successfully in ethnically divided countries –Switzerland since 1943, Belgium since 
1970, Lebanon from 1943 to 1975, Malaysia from 1955 to 1969, Suriname from 1958 from 
1973, and the Netherlands Antilles from 1950 to 1985—as well as in three countries with deep 
religious-ideological cleavages—Austria from 1945 to 1966, the Netherlands from 1917 to 
1967, and Luxemburg during the same period of about half a century.”196  
Additionally, as O’Leary rightfully points out, there are at least three current experiments of 
so-called “complex consociations,”197 besides Northern Ireland, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Macedonia.  
Consociational decision-making is also criticized on the ground that it is too time-consuming 
so that consociational countries are not able to react quickly enough in crisis situations. 
Furthermore, it is said that the political outcomes are not innovative enough in a fast changing 
world of globalization.198 Consociational is also criticized for being economically inefficient 
since subsidies are distributed in a wasteful way to satisfy all groups. It is true, but once a 
change has been implemented a high degree of legitimacy persists and the change cannot easily 
be turned back.199 Additionally, in response to immobilism, the critics should consider that 
proportionality and autonomy contain significant aids to decisional effectiveness. The former 
is an extremely valuable time-saving formula for allocating resources and appointments. The 
latter distributes the total decision-making load among several public and semi-public bodies, 
thus alleviating the burdens on each of them.200 
Finally Brass asserts, that “consociationalists and the theorists of the plural society consistently 
ignore the experience of India, the largest, most culturally diverse society in the world that has, 
except for a period of two years, functioned with a highly competitive and distinctly adversarial 
system of politics [...] yet, it is not consociational democracy at all.”201  Being aware of the fact 
that the exception of India may be a serious blow to the applicability of consociational theory 
and after carefully reexamining the type and quality of India’s democracy Lijphart reached an 
arguable conclusion that India “displayed all four crucial elements of power sharing theory”202. 
                                                 
196 Lijphart, 2008, p. 43, Cf. Schneckener, 2002, p.217. 
197 See subchapter II.1.4 “Complex Power-Sharing” 
198 Consider Bogaards’ following statement: “Consociationalism belongs to the ‘statist’, and one would add 
‘static’, models that may obscure rather than illuminate future possibilities for the EU”, in Bogaards and Crepaz, 
2002, p. 368. 
199 Lijphart, 2002, p.41. 
200 See Lijphart, 1985, p. 100. 
201 Brass, 1991, p. 343; Cf. Lijphart, 1996, pp. 258-268. 
202 Lijphart, 1996, p. 259. 
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Thus, according to his findings, “India is not a deviant case for consociational theory but an 
impressive confirming case.”203  
Power-sharing advocates make the pragmatic argument that broad inclusion is needed when 
groups are deeply or violently divided; in such circumstances political exclusion represents too 
high a cost. Power-sharing is seen as a critical political strategy for dealing with protracted 
conflicts: conflict parties are more likely to accept settlements when they are included in power-
sharing institutions204, and external mediators are increasingly likely to promote the adoption 
of power-sharing deals as a way of ending war and building peace.205 Beyond these short-term 
considerations, power-sharing is believed to offer a “parity of esteem” between groups - to use 
the language of Northern Ireland’s agreement - which suggests that the state is obliged to treat 
both majorities and minorities in a reasonable and respectful manner in exchange for the 
acceptance of the legitimacy of political institutions.206 Moreover, its proponents emphasize its 
ability to democratically accommodate linguistic, religious, ethnic and national differences. Sid 
Noel notes, “power-sharing mechanisms are intended to serve the dual purpose of promoting 
post-conflict peace building and serving as a foundation for the future growth of democratic 
institutions”207.  
Further critique is centered on the alleged inability to produce peace and stability, either through 
perverse incentives or through an “adoption problem.” Rupert Taylor (2009) laments the 
“injustice” of a consociational system premised on what he sees as a kind of systemic 
sectarianism that only serves to entrench and exacerbate divisions, thereby denying citizens in 
divided societies both peace and justice. Donald Horowitz (2014) meanwhile suggests that 
power-sharing suffers an “adoption problem.” Ethnic minorities do not want to settle for 
anything less than consociationalism, while ethnic majorities prefer majoritarian rules but may 
be willing to settle on centripetal arrangements. The intractability of positions means that any 
agreement may be difficult to achieve, which prolongs conflict and instability. The instability 
critique stems from an underlying belief that consociational power-sharing in particular simply 
entrenches and exacerbates divisions. 
Another line of criticism focuses on the governability of power-sharing systems. Executive 
formation is frequently a protracted affair as parties bargain for a share of power. It can often 
                                                 
203 Lijphart, 1996, p. 268; Lijphart, 2008, p. 42; see also Lijphart, 2007, pp. 14-49.  
204 Walter, B. (2002). Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
205 Vandeginste, S. and Sriram, C.H. (2011). Power Sharing and Transitional Justice. A Clash of Paradigms? 
Global Governance, 17(4), pp. 489-505. 
206 Thompson, 2002. 
207 Noel, S. (ed.) (2005). From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided 
Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, p. 1. 
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take months - even more than a year - to agree to a cross-community coalition amenable to all 
sides. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon and Belgium have all struggled with prolonged 
executive formation whereas executive formation in Northern Ireland benefits from the 
automaticity of sequential portfolio allocation (SPA) procedures. McGarry and his long-
standing co-author Brendan O’Leary consider the stability and adoptability of executive power-
sharing arrangements from the perspective of the consociationalism-centripetalism debate.  
Once formed, power-sharing coalitions also face several legislative challenges. Veto rights run 
the risk of thwarting the legislative agenda and bringing it to a standstill.208 Even without vetoes, 
it is alleged that power-sharing may result in a dearth of policy innovation with parties only 
able to agree to lowest common denominator strategies. Particularly in its consociational guise, 
power-sharing has been accused of overemphasizing constitutional issues, keeping 
ethnonationalism alive and bread-and-butter issues off the agenda.209 The effectiveness of 
power-sharing governance is thus called into question. 
Many scholars perceive power-sharing to be in tension with the normative pursuit of transitional 
justice; Vandeginste and Sriram (2011) go so far as to suggest that power-sharing and 
transitional justice may represent “a clash of paradigms.”210 Part of the issue is that “those who 
are given the greatest benefits in power-sharing arrangements are usually those who engaged 
in armed violence; they are also highly likely to have engaged in human rights abuses”.211 As a 
result, the protection of human rights and the prosecution of past wrongs may not receive 
adequate attention at the peace table. Power-sharing, it is claimed, may be required for peace 
but that peace comes at the cost of justice. While this may satisfice in the short term, it is 
unlikely to facilitate stability, effectiveness or fairness over the long term.212 Vandeginste and 
Sriram note that there has been little attempt at the global level to either reconcile transitional 
justice and power-sharing, or to at least prioritize one over the other.213  
Another normative line of inquiry, suggests that power-sharing scholarship sets gender aside as 
an identity or social location that does not motivate people in the same way as ethnonationalism 
does. From a feminist perspective, such thinking serves the interests of ethnicized elites while 
continuing to exclude women and other marginalized communities from key sites of political 
                                                 
208 Bieber, 2005; McEvoy&O’Leary, 2013. 
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power.214 By being fair to one identity grouping - ethnic and ethnonational groups - power-
sharing manifests a form of unfairness for others. This also impacts upon power-sharing’s 
ability to provide the conditions under which justice may be pursued.  
Writing in 1972, Alvin Rabushka and Shepsle identified four configurations of ethnic politics: 
(1) competitive (where no group enjoys dominance); (2) majority domination; (3) minority 
domination; and (4) fragmented. In each configuration they suggested that the prospects for 
stable democracy “appear dim as the historical record has indicated”215. Competitive ethnic 
configurations were predicted to polarize, to become centrifugal through “ethnic outbidding,” 
and to generate civil wars or coups; dominant majorities were predicted to stay dominant (with 
moderate reformers among them kept in line by the threat of hard-liners’ outbidding them); 
dominant minorities were thought unlikely to concede democracy in which they would lose; 
and fragmented ethnic configurations were considered unlikely to develop state-wide brokerage 
parties and likely to succumb to military dictatorships or one-party rule. The authors did 
consider Switzerland a counterexample to the thesis that deeply divided places cannot be 
democratically stable. They took care of the anomaly, at least in their eyes, by attributing its 
stability to its being a confederation (in which largely homogeneous cantons hold most power, 
and potentially divisive ethnic or linguistic competition is therefore minimized). The take-home 
message from Politics in Plural Societies was that neither majoritarian nor power-sharing 
democracy offered much hope of stability for deeply divided places (what they called “plural 
societies”). 
Retrospectively, the authors were correct in 1972 to doubt the prospects for democratic stability 
in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and in some Caribbean cases (e.g„ Guyana and Trinidad). The same may 
certainly be said for Cyprus, Rwanda, and some of Zanzibar’s history, as well as for the Congo, 
Sudan, Nigeria, Lebanon, and Yugoslavia. Yet the subsequent picture across the cases they 
picked has not all been doom and gloom. In their terms, Northern Ireland has moved from 
majority domination closer to the competitive configuration and now appears to have a stable 
power-sharing system.216 Belgium has morphed from a consociation in a unitary state to a 
consociational federation and it has not yet broken up. Power sharing has, however, sometimes 
worked, even among the grim cases Rabushka and Shepsle looked at in 1972, but it is not clear 
                                                 
214 Cf. Rebouche and Fearon, “Overlapping Identities: Power Sharing and Women’s Rights” in O’Flynn&Russel 
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that their approach can explain why, though it can help explain instability in power-sharing 
bargains. 
According to O’Leary (2013), future rational choice-driven comparative work on power sharing 
in deeply divided places should generate novel insights from modelling the dynamics of power-
sharing successes and failures in deeply divided places (varying the institutional and ethnic 
configurations more systematically).  
The allegations against power-sharing - on stability, effectiveness and justice - merit serious 
attention but, as John McGarry (2017) demonstrates blanket critiques of power-sharing are 
unsustainable. Rather, we should focus on the variables that explain the variance in power-
sharing practice. He highlights four factors that account for power-sharing’s mixed record: the 
role of external actors, provisions on security matters, the treatment of self-determination claims 
and the precise institutional rules in place. 
 
II.1.6 Conclusion: Consociationalism, Majoritarianism and Control  
It should be clear by now that consociational democracy is by and large the very opposite of a 
majoritarian democracy. Nevertheless, for the comparative research to be conducted and 
serving as an explicative tool to our analysis I considered necessary to include the following 
box underlining the differences between power-sharing and majority rule political systems. 
 
Table 3: The Characteristics of Majoritarian and Power-Sharing Democracy – a 
Toolbox217 
 Majoritarian Democracy  Consociational Democracy  
Ethos 
Classic winner-take-all Westminster-style democracy. 
Two broadly based political parties alternating in 
government and opposition. Government includes the representatives of all 
significant groups and revolves around interethnic 
cooperation. Minority rights are protected through 
minority vetoes. 
or 
Winner-take-all democracy moderated by PR (making 
coalition governments more likely), rectifying minority 
exclusion through affirmative action remedies and 
providing multi-access points to political power. 
Systems in which legislatures have the final word on 
the consitutionality of their own legislation 
Systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review 
of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional 
courts 
Institution 
 
Unicameralism, i.e. concentration of legislative power 
in an unicameral legislature 
Parliamentarism, grand coalition 
Majoritarian and disproportional electoral system proportional representation 
Unitary, centralized government 
Federal and decentralized government; Segmented 
society 
Flexible constitution, can be amended by simple 
majorities 
Constitutions that can be changed only by 
extraordinary majorities 
Dependent central bank, i.e. Central banks that are 
dependent on the executive 
Independent central banks 
                                                 
217 Adapted from Lijphart, 2008, Chapter: Majority Rule in Theory and Practice, pp. 111-124; Reynolds, (2002). 
Majoritarian or Power-Sharing Government, p.156; Andeweg, 2000, p. 513; Armingeon, 2002, p. 150 and Sisk 
1996(a), p.6. 
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Heavily drawing on majoritarian practices is the “control” approach I mentioned in the 
Introduction. According to Lustick, democratic stability in deeply divided societies could be 
reached when the majority segment “democratically” and effectively controls the minority 
segment.218 The conceptual distinctions between consociational and control approaches are 
shown in the Table below: 
 
Table 4: Control vs. Consociational System (Ian Lustick 1979)219 
Criteria  Consociational System Control System 
Effective govern of the 
authoritative allocation o f  
resources 
The common denominator of the interests 
of the two segments as perceived and 
articulated by their respective elites 
The interest of the majority 
segment as perceived and 
articulated by its elite. 
Linkages between the two 
sub-units or segments 
Political or material exchanges: 
negotiations, bargains, trades, and 
compromises. 
Penetrative in character: the 
majority segment extracts what it 
needs from the minority segment 
and delivers what it sees fit. 
The significance o f  
bargaining 
Hard bargaining between sub-unit elites as 
a necessary fact of political life; bargains 
are concrete signs that consociationalism is 
operating successfully. 
No bargaining between elites of 
the majority and minority 
segments. It would signal the 
breakdown of control as the means 
by which the political stability of 
the system is being maintained. 
The role o f  the State 
(i.e. civil service 
bureaucracy, law 
enforcement agencies, the 
courts, the public educa-
tional system, and the 
armed forces) 
Consociational societies develop regimes 
that are in the nature of "umpires."220  
In its role as umpire, the official regime in 
the consociational system must translate 
the compromises reached between sub-unit 
elites (or leaders) into appropriate 
legislation and effective administrative 
procedure.  
Official regime as legal and 
administrative instrument of the 
majority segment or group. 221 
The type o f  normative 
justification for the 
continuation o f  the 
political order  
The political status quo is likely to be 
legitimized by vague and general 
references to the common welfare of 
segments, and by specific and detailed 
warnings of the chaotic consequences, for 
each segment, of consociational 
breakdown. 
Legitimacy is reached by an 
elaborate and well-articulated 
group-specific ideology; specific, 
that is, to the history and perceived 
interests of the majority segment. 
Visual metaphor222 “a delicately but securely balanced scale” 
“puppeteer manipulating his 
stringed puppet” 
 
As stated above, according to Lijphart, “[f]or many plural societies of the non-Western world 
[…] the realistic choice is not between the British [majoritarian] model of democracy and the 
consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all.”223 
                                                 
218 Lustick, 1979, p.325. 
219 Idem., pp.330-2; Carciumaru, 2012, p. 3. 
220 “Most of an umpire's time is spent in seeing that the existing rules are obeyed and that deviant competitors are 
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arena.” In Lustick, 1979, p. 330; Carciumaru, 2012, p. 3. 
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Apart from the above schematic juxtaposition there is another theoretical approach to power-
sharing in plural and deeply divided societies—integrative approach, propagated by and 
associated with Donald L. Horowitz.224 The main difference between consociational and 
integrative approaches225 is that the latter overtakes some majoritarian principles, i.e. 
presidential system, albeit president elected by a “super-majority and unicameralism. The main 
weakness of the integrative approach is the lack of whole-country empirical examples of 
working systems and the assumption that “citizens will vote for parties not based on their own 
group.”226  
Categorically dismissing Abba’s lines “the winner takes all” for deeply divided societies, 
O’Leary suggests an appropriate poetic alternative: 
The wise winner shares 
Those who want it all must postpone their cares 
It’s complex, and yet elegant and plain, 
If you are not included you should certainly complain.227 
 
                                                 
224 See Bibliography: Horowitz, 1993 and 2000. 
225 Apart from the criticism Horowitz expressed vis-à-vis the problem of “elite-initiated conflict” and some 
consociational institutions such as mutual or minority veto – see subchapter II.4 Consociation: Critics and 
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II.2 Negotiation 
II.2.1 Conflict, Negotiation, De-escalation, Agreement 
As Biswas (2006) pointedly argues both negotiations and agreements are impacted by the same 
factors, due to the fact that both of them undergo the same process. Some of these factors are 
found in the Table 5 and will be analyzed further in text.  
 
Table 5: Factors encouraging negotiations and agreements228 
Negotiations Agreements 
Democracy (+) Democracy (+) 
Military intervention (-) Military intervention (-) 
Security guarantees (+) Security guarantees (+) 
Mediation (+) Mediation (+) 
 
Following up on Biswas (2006a), I posit that democracy, security guarantees and mediation 
have a significant positive impact on the dependent variable - negotiations. On the other hand, 
military intervention, in most cases, will hinder negotiations. A sample review of the factors 
influencing agreements revealed that security and democracy assurances equally affected the 
outcome of agreements and negotiations. Literature on negotiation229 unequivocally concludes 
that mediation plays a substantial positive role in negotiations and reaching a peaceful 
agreement. Biswas determines that whilst negotiations are determined to substantially affect 
dialogues, their role in determining outcomes of agreements is insignificant  
 
Factors facilitating or hindering negotiation and agreement: Security guarantees and 
mediation  
Mediation has a significant positive influence on the likelihood of dialogue. Nonetheless, 
mediation plays a lesser role in the approval of an agreement between the involved parties. 
Mediation and security assurances were determined to be largely correlated, demonstrating that 
in most cases, the variables act simultaneously. In most cases, security assurances strongly 
                                                 
228 Cf. Biswas, 2006(a), p. 117. The table will be applied at the end of the case studies section. 
229 See Pfetsch, F. R. (2007). Negotiating political conflicts. Basingstoke England; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan; Zartman, I.W. and Faure, G.O. (2005). Escalation and negotiation in international conflicts. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Zartman, I.W. and 
Touval, S. (2007). International Mediation. In Crocker, C. et al. (ed.) Leashing the Dogs of War. Conflict 
Management in a Divided World, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, to name just a few 
seminal monographies or edited books.  
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influence the possibility of agreement. Although mediation may not be as strong a determinant 
as security promises in effectuating agreements, its role is vitally important.230 
Mediation aids dialogue, which is the first step to agreements. However, other additional factors 
potentially affect the outcome of dialogues and agreements, and therefore, a process-based 
approach of controlling and preventing violent conflicts should not overlook these factors. As 
mentioned earlier, mediation is a necessity and occurs more often than security assurances, 
possibly since security guarantees are relatively expensive. It is also plausible that security 
assurances are only sought after once there is a likelihood of adoption of an agreement. The 
cost of these assurances therefore becomes inordinate, and necessitates implementation of other 
alternative measures such as mediation from a policy perspective. In most cases, security 
assurances occur simultaneously with mediation, indicating a strong interactive impact that has 
yet to be quantitatively expressed.231 
Presuming that negotiations are a gateway to legal agreements, their determinants are therefore 
important elements of the peace process Wilkenfeld et al. note that in global predicaments, 
activities such as manipulative mediation may not necessarily offer a long-term solution to 
conflicts in comparison to mediations.232 A similar occurrence is observed in domestic disputes. 
The involved parties must all be mutually convinced that the agreement they seek will be 
beneficial to them for the peace process to work. Moreover, it is potentially more productive 
for an agreement to be suggested from the parties in conflict as opposed to it being imposed by 
external international sanctions. 
In order to explicitly comprehend the role of mediation and security assurances on the 
agreement process, Biswas requests us to consider a case of military intervention. Military 
intervention, in her opinion, contradicts security assurances, and is always unfavorable to 
negotiations; and by extension, agreements.233 Military action can also be conducted without 
the participation of the host government, and as a result, exacerbate mistrust. In most cases, 
military action is a product of a third party that aims to benefit from the clashes. An example 
of this is in Moldova and Bosnia, where the military intervened in an attempt to prevent the 
government from exploiting the minority groups. In both cases, however, conflict was resolved 
through forced intervention, and may not have necessarily catered for the needs of all 
conflicting parties. Similarly, in both situations, the military was used as an agent of controlling 
uncertainties in conflict. The factors that impel the military to get involved (or not to) are 
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diverse, and they strongly determine the outcome of the activity. Needless to say, forced 
intervention hinders negotiations and agreements.  
According to Biswas, in some cases, alternative means of negotiation have to be developed.234 
To what extent does military intervention alter the process of negotiations? Is military action 
such a necessary evil that some parties are willing to overlook how it exacerbates mistrust, even 
if for a short period? Do some circumstances necessitate military action to ameliorate further 
instability? These are some of the critical issues that need to be addressed in future research in 
order to ensure that whenever military intervention is carried out, it is for the right reasons and 
under the right circumstances. 
 
Democracy 
As convincingly hypothesized by some authors,235 democracy is a foundation that facilitates 
successful agreements and dialogues. Sovereign regions appreciate this specific property of 
democracy, and present explicitly defined tools and principles of power-sharing. Additionally, 
autonomous states are more likely to respond or be willing to address any grievances arising 
from their citizens. However, the association between democracy and agreements is not always 
forthright. Autonomous states are not always immune to clashes and conflicts: In fact, self-
governing countries are as susceptible to disputes as regions that are not independent. Consider 
the case of the Indian nation, which is an autonomous developing country. Most of the disputes 
in the region have consistently shown a significant influence on the relationship between 
agreements and the democratic system of the country. The Indian government has been 
impressively successful in managing issues raised by the minority groups. Other nations of the 
world, particularly third world countries, should be ready and willing to study the response of 
the Indian administration to conflict, and if possible, implement similar measures in their 
conflicting communities.236 Additionally, it is worth looking into as to why a stronger 
relationship is not being exhibited between official agreements and systems of democracy in 
the world today, particularly since researches have put forward that democracy helps in 
alleviating civil disputes.237  
At this stage, the argument being raised is that the interaction between democracy and conflict 
resolution is complex. Findings of the review indicate that social equality or rather equity is, 
potentially, a stronger driver of dialogue in comparison to weak or no democratic systems and 
                                                 
234 ‘principled’ negotiation. 
235 Biswas, Carciumaru, Dahl, Gurr, Mitra. 
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even when the Indian circumstances are not in operation.238 Although states with social equality 
have a higher incidence of signing agreements, social fairness is weakly related to dialogue. 
This creates further concern: Why is this relationship weak? What makes a nation with a 
democratic system desist from committing to power-sharing agreements regardless of 
participation in dialogue? Does international intervention play a part in such a peace process? 
In response to these questions and as mentioned above, I will focus on six case studies from 
South Asia and Eastern Europe. South Asian case studies have a vast background in 
negotiations and less in agreements, whereas in the case of the Eastern European countries vice-
versa is true (i.e., they have a vast background in (imposed) agreements and less in 
negotiations). 
In some situations, official agreements between conflicting parties are not a necessity in 
democratic systems.239 In some cases, for instance, the Indian administration solved hostility in 
regions that exhibited militancy by assuring the militant leaders of the opportunity to join 
politics.240 The assurance is credible, keeping in mind that the Indian democratic system allows 
integration of opposing political views into the national structure. Occasionally, the move has 
enabled militant leaders to join politics and, in some cases, this did not happen. However, the 
conflict will have already been solved even in the absence of a formal agreement. Additionally, 
most democratic systems have decisional constraints that may make militant leaders refrain 
from signing a formal agreement with the government. Therefore, it is important to determine 
how peace processes with no formal agreements succeed, including the determinants of a 
genuine affirmation. The progression from negotiations to agreements is complex in nature, as 
will be demonstrated by the findings of my case studies. The table below gives a list of non-
democratic states where security assurances were used to facilitate peace contracts.  
 
 
Table 6: Non-democracies that signed agreements with external security241 
Country Group 
Sudan Nuba 
Sudan Southerners 
Angola Ovimbundu 
Angola Bakongo 
Democratic Republic of Congo Tutsis 
Sierra Leone Temne 
Bosnia Croat 
Bosnia Serb 
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Biswas argues that a non-democratic system limits the government’s role in creating fair and 
just power-sharing methods to minority groups, and the listed countries demonstrate this 
property.242 As a result, security guarantees from foreign countries are the alternative courses 
of action. Non-democratic countries require interventions different from those required in states 
that have strong and well-functioning democratic and political systems. 
 
II.2.2 Types, Strategies and Actors 
Table 7 shows the advantages and disadvantages of different types of negotiation (i.e., hard, 
soft, principled and communicative) forms. In my thesis, I argue that ‘principled’ negotiation 
is the best suited, most successful, pro-active type of negotiation. Both hard and soft types of 
negotiation are characteristic of asymmetric relations between conflictual parties, whereas the 
“communicative negotiation” while having its merits, is too passive and might lead to 
stalemates. 
  
Table 7: Strategic vs Communicative Negotiation243 
Strategic Negotiation Communicative 
Negotiation  
(“Luke Cold Hand” 
Approach) 
also Culture (Cohen, Faure, 
Zartman) 
Positional Negotiation Principled Negotiation 
Hard Soft 
Participants are 
adversaries 
The goal is victory over 
adversary 
Participants are friends 
The goal is agreement 
Participants are problem-
solvers 
The goal is a wise 
outcome reached 
efficiently and amicably 
Participants are 
communicators 
The goal is understanding 
and respect 
Demand concessions as a 
condition of the 
relationship 
Be hard on the problem 
and the people 
Distrust others 
Make concessions to 
cultivate relationship 
  
Be soft on the problem 
and the people 
Trust others 
Separate the people from 
the problem 
Solving problem through 
people’s communication 
                                                 
242 Biswas, 2006(a), p. 127. 
243 Adapted from Liyanage, S. (2006). Negotiating Identity-Based Conflicts: Discourse Theoretic Approach. In 
Amal Jayawardane (ed.) Perspectives on National Integration in Sri Lanka. Colombo: NIPU, pp. 112-113; Fisher 
& Ury, 1999, p. 13. 
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Dig into our position 
Make threats 
Change your position 
Make offers 
Be soft on the people and 
hard on the problem 
Proceed independent of 
trust 
Be respectful for people and 
treat position criticisable  
Proceed with respect 
Mislead as to your 
bottom line 
Demand one-sided gains 
as price of agreement 
Disclose yours bottom 
line 
Accept one-sided losses 
to reach agreement 
Focus on interest not 
positions 
Explore interests 
Avoid having a bottom 
line 
Focus on mutual respect 
Recognize differences 
Search for single answer: 
the one you will accept 
Search for the single 
answer: the one they will 
accept 
Invent options for mutual 
gain 
Accept criticizability of 
positions 
Invent options that ensure 
mutual respect 
Insist on your position Insist on agreement Develop multiple option 
to choose from; decide 
later 
Develop and promote 
mutual respect 
Try to win a contest of 
will 
Try to avoid contest of 
will 
Insist of using objective 
criteria 
  
Yield to pressure Apply pressure Try to reach a result 
based on standards  
independent will 
  
Reason and be open to 
reason;  
yield to principle, not 
pressure 
  
 
II.2.3 Multilevel Principled Negotiation244 
According to Gurr, contemporary research concurs that autonomous structures with strong 
democratic systems have the potential to facilitate easier and simpler negotiations.245 
Intervention or mediation efforts are also a vital part of the peace process, provided they 
                                                 
244 See Mitra, S.K. and Carciumaru, R. (2015). Beyond the ‘Low-Level Equilibrium Trap’: Getting to a ‘Principled 
Negotiation’ of the Kashmir Conflict. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 26, pp. 1-24., where the authors 
experimented with the a very incipient idea of multilevel principled negotiation that ripened to its full-fledged 
form in my thesis. 
245 Gurr, T.R. (2000). People versus States. Minorities at Risk in the New Century. Washington D. C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press. 
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alleviate the concerns of the minority groups and the state in general.246 The literature also 
contains research on how endogenous and exogenous factors and actors can be used to resolve 
disputes. Contemporary research has also addressed the role of third-party intervention and 
mediation in regions that have functional internal units. The political field stands to gain if 
research proposes methods to create clearly-defined internal units that favor the participation 
of both domestic and exogenous parties towards conflict resolution. A high proportion of 
current research focuses on one area of analysis and overlooks the challenges that domestic and 
foreign parties face when managing, and if possible, preventing ethnic conflicts. The thesis 
acknowledges existence of the gap and seeks to address this problem through a levels-of –
analysis approach that examines the comparable and integrative elements of different levels247. 
Thus, Cordell & Wolff split the two levels suggested by Singer into four. They highly 
recommend to perform the analysis on each level, with respect to activities and impacts of both 
actors and systems during the onset, duration and resolution of cultural disputes. The four levels 
are given below: 
 
1. The Local (Sub-State) Level: 
 This is the first level, and the local leaders, economic and social activities, laws and 
regulations of a country among others are crucial players. The local ethnic and religious 
groups (and their leaders), members of the private sector, local NGOs, delinquents and 
rebel groups constitute the non-state actors and systems, and their operations have a 
significant influence on the conflict. 
 
2. National (State) Level:  
The state level is the second classification. Although all major activities at a national 
level may seem inconsequential to some local conflicts, they play a considerable role. 
Local activities are usually a low-level manifestation or expression of nation-wide 
systems, and therefore, changes at a national level have the power to positively or 
adversely affect localized processes. Examples of these deterministic national level 
                                                 
246 Cf. Walter, 2002; see also Biswas 2006(a) and Biswas, B. (2006b). The Challenges of Conflict Management: 
A Case Study of Sri Lanka. Civil Wars, 8(1), 46-65. 
247 I am grateful to Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff for updating & upgrading Stinger’s two levels-of-analysis 
approach. Cordell & Wolff’s approach is much more comprehensive and helpful a tool to examine, understand, 
explain and predict ethnic conflicts as well as their resolution. See Cordell, K. and Wolff, S. (2009). Ethnic conflict: 
causes, consequences, and responses. Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity.  
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processes include economic, political, social and cultural activities, power of the 
administration, threats by opposing political groups, and threats of territory invasion. 
 
3. Regional Level:  
Region is the third level of analysis.  A region is made of the country in question and its 
neighboring states, regional international organizations (IOs), regional administrations 
and leaders, and accredited facilities and organizations. The region in which a county 
exists strongly determines the structuring of a nation’s laws and regulations, business 
activities, organized crime, ethnic groups and societal standards. The relationship 
between a country’s leaders and leaders of the neighboring countries may also influence 
the level of cooperation in a region, which may in turn affect the willingness of the 
region to maintain harmony in a given country. 
 
4. International/Global level:  
International governments are the fourth level of analysis. For instance, most national 
governments, especially in the developing countries, receive substantial financial aid 
from allied governments that exist outside the regional level. International trade is also 
facilitated by numerous international alliances that in most cases, fall outside the 
regional trading blocs. Therefore, it follows that in the similar manner that IOs and 
NGOs exert influence, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are 
significant non-state players. In particular, INGOs, diaspora lobbies, TNCs, 
international crime networks, and their respective leaders are considered as noteworthy 
none-state actors and systems. 
In addition to performing analysis of systems and actors, it is important to examine the impact 
of factors that are challenging to group as to whether they arise from the system or from the 
actors. Some of these factors include environmental degradation, food and energy security, and 
(over)utilization of resources. The following tables gives an overview of the multilevel analysis. 
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Table 8: The levels-of-analysis approach 
 State structures and 
actors 
Non-state structures and 
actors 
Issues  
Local Local leaders or 
distinguished individuals, 
governance, national 
icons, recognized 
institutions, social 
elements, economic 
elements 
local religious/ethnic 
groups, communities and 
their leaders, community 
icons, members of the 
private-sector 
stakeholders, local 
NGOs, delinquents and 
rebel groups 
(over)utilization of 
resources, energy and 
food security, 
environmental 
degradation 
 
State  National leaders and 
icons, state 
administration, 
acknowledged 
institutions, social 
elements, economic 
elements 
National religious/ethnic 
groups, communities and 
their leaders, national 
icons, state NGOs, 
private-sector 
stakeholders, nation-wide 
delinquents and rebel 
groups.  
 
Regional  Neighbouring countries 
and their governance, 
regional IOs, regional 
leaders, regional icons, 
regional economic and 
political relationships 
Multinational ethnic, 
trade, religious groups, 
organized crime, rebel 
groups 
 
Global  Powerful governments 
and their IOs, world-
famous leaders and 
global icons international 
relationships, certain 
powerful institutions and 
their leaders 
diaspora lobbies, NGOs, 
TNCs and internationally 
structured crime 
networks alongside their 
corresponding elites or 
leaders 
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Exogenous and Endogenous Factors  
Biswas asserts that if “uncertainty and mistrust are among the principal causes of conflict, they 
also form the major barriers to finding solutions.” 248 Thus, the factors that cause conflicts to 
emerge and escalate are the same factors that pose challenges in finding solutions for their 
resolution. In particular, exogenous and endogenous factors may determine the course of a 
conflict. For instance, exogenous factors may attenuate uncertainties in conflicting parties and 
at the same time affect the major conflicting agents, the rebels and the state. According to the 
rebel group’s viewpoint, a compromise may enhance the legality of the group and quite possibly 
reduce destruction of property and loss of lives. On the other hand, the state may view a 
compromise as an expensive venture and an indication of vulnerability and weakness. 
Thus, for example, the minority group demands can be managed with the use of local 
organizations and facilities that enable the minority groups to interact with policy makers and 
be involved by participating actively in formulation of policies that directly affect them. 
However, if a conflict occurs, the necessity of a third party mediator should not be downplayed 
or ignored. The third party should be impartial and seek to solve conflict through equitably 
treating the parties, fair approach, but also sanctions and incentives that thus facilitate 
negotiations. However, an impartial third party mediator is difficult to agree upon. As a result, 
the chances to come to the negotiating table may be hindered or even compromised. Walter 
indicates that in such cases, only an active external party can facilitate productive and 
meaningful negotiations.249 For example, international mediators may act as channels of 
communication between the opposing parties, schedule dialogs, suggest penalties for failing to 
honor the agreement, and similarly, rewards for honoring the contract.250 Moreover, Walter  
points out that a genuine peace agreement is difficult to structure; in her opinion, an 
international system overseeing power-sharing arrangement at national level and ensuring that 
the involved parties fully deliver on their commitments and promises is the only way through 
which peace agreements during civil wars and ethnic conflicts can be effectively 
implemented.251 
In some cases, conflicts arise due to change. Therefore, mediation should be included in every 
process that alters the familiar political structure of a region to ensure that all stakeholders 
                                                 
248 Biswas, 2006(b). 
249 Walter, 2002, p. 63. 
250 See Bercovitch, J. (ed.) (1994). Mediation in international relations: multiple approaches to conflict 
management. Basingstoke: Macmillan, in particular the Chapters: “The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in 
International Relations,” by Jacob Bercovitch, pp. 1-29, and “Conclusion: International Mediation in Context” by 
Rubin, Jeffrey Z., pp. 249-272. 
251 Walter, 2002, p. 64. 
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recognize and acknowledge their functions. Governments of collapsed states lack the power, or 
authority, rather, to trigger and sustain change. The governments do not operate at a full 
potential and are prone to numerous weaknesses of administration: In such situations, strong 
international intervention compensates for the deficiency in an authoritative governing 
structure. Third-party interventions such as deployment of soldiers to the affected regions may 
also be considered, and such measures have proved to be important in facilitating dialogues 
between the warring parties, and as a result, adoption of genuine peace agreements. For 
instance, the civil wars that occurred in Bosnia, Moldova, Mizoram and Sri Lanka took place 
either under weak or non-institutionalized government structures or during a systemic collapse 
and a structural change. The Bosnian and Moldavian governments were virtually non-existent 
at the time of the conflict, and there was a considerable lack of administrative legality and 
authority. Interestingly, the conflicts in these countries were solved through active international 
mediation. On the other hand, third-party involvement in conflict resolution in Sri Lanka and 
Mizoram was not as dominant as in the Bosnian and Moldavian case, and as a result, conflicts 
in these countries continued to intensify. 
The government has a responsibility of ensuring that it does not discriminate when delivering 
its promises, particularly to the minority populace. If a government is made up of democratic 
and resolute political parties, leaders of these parties should also see to it that the government 
delivers. On the other hand, a government that is biased or poorly delivers its obligations is 
more likely to witness more protesting groups than an effectively functioning executive. Armed 
rebel groups are a strong indication of a government that discriminates against its minority 
groups and weak institutions. In such a case, the government should acknowledge it requires 
international assistance, and be willing to waive its mediatory function in favor of international 
intervention. Collapsed states require abolition of current systems and the creation of new 
systems of governance. However, functioning governments that face opposition from rebel 
groups need only to restructure and gain control of the crisis. Similar circumstances have been 
evident in countries such as Sri Lanka, Mizoram and India. However, current literature fails to 
provide an in-depth analysis of these scenarios and thereby limits the enhancement of 
intervention strategies. Intervention is a cost effective conflict management tool that is most 
suitable in circumstances where there is no threat of loss of authority to the domestic 
government. Sometimes, autonomous states are affected by civil wars. In such cases, 
international intervention is more effective if it works in unison with the functional structures 
and establishments of the host government. The host government may then readily welcome 
mediation since the peace process does not conflict with its operationalization. According to 
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Biswas, “high-impact intervention” should be avoided at all costs, especially since genuine 
security assurances are not so particularly forthcoming.252 
 
II.3 Conclusion: Towards a Comprehensive Power-Sharing Based Model of 
Multilevel Principled Negotiation 
Du Toit infers that the meaningfulness of using bargaining theories in explaining interethnic 
relations has been pointed out before.253 He posits that a basic challenge with the attempts to 
combine both theories is that the previous approaches viewed “bargaining theory and 
consociational theory as contrasting rather than complementary perspectives.”254 Following up 
on du Toit, I hypothesize that these two theoretical perspectives can be integrated into a 
coherent, meaningful way. The conceptual link, according to du Toit, lies in the nature of the 
executive power-sharing (i.e., grand coalitions) in deeply divided societies. Thus, the elites who 
represent the interests of different segments, and might be essentially incompatible with those 
of other segments, participate in a coalition in the hope of settling these conflicts of interest, but 
at the same time, being segmental leaders, they hope to achieve a settlement most favorable to 
their supporters. The extent of the concessions every coalition member will have to make in 
order to reach common ground is dependent upon the concessions every other participant is 
prepared to make. This is what Young describes as “strategic behavior.” According to Young: 
 
“strategic behavior is the behavior of any individual member of a group involving a choice of action 
contingent upon that individual’s estimates of the actions (or choices) of others in the group, where the 
actions of each of the relevant others are based upon a similar estimate of the behavior of group members 
other than himself.”255 
 
A bargaining party’s alternatives depend upon whether it can obtain similar or substitutable 
resources from other relationships. Commitment is determined by the importance of the 
outcome and/or issue about which the conflict arose in the first place. From this perspective the 
                                                 
252 Biswas, B. (2006). The Challenges of Conflict Management: A Case Study of Sri Lanka. Civil Wars, 8(1), pp. 
63-65. 
253 Covell, M. (1981). Ethnic Conflict and Elite Bargaining: The Case of Belgium. West European Politics, 4, pp. 
197-218; and Covell, M. (1982). Agreeing to Disagree: Elite Bargaining and the Revision of the Belgian 
Constitution. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 15, pp. 451-469. 
254 Young, O.R. (1975). Strategic Interaction and Bargaining. In Oran R. Young (ed.) Bargaining: Formal 
Theories of Negotiation. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 5-6; Cf. Du Toit, P. (1991). Bargaining power: 
dependence capabilities and tactical options in South African politics. Politikon: South African Journal of Political 
Studies, 18(2), pp. 74-90; see also Du Toit, P. (1989). Bargaining about Bargaining. Inducing the Self-Negating 
Prediction in Deeply Divided Societies-The Case of South Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(2), pp. 210-
230. 
255 Ibid, p. 5. 
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following propositions emerge. (2) “A party’s bargaining power should be greater, the lower 
the opponent’s alternatives and the higher the commitment of the opponent to the outcomes at 
issue in the relationship.”256 
The fundamental assumption is that bargaining as a means of conflict settlement can be initiated 
once all those contestants involved in a conflict acknowledge that none of them can emerge 
from the conflict as an outright winner who has conceded nothing and gained everything at the 
expense of his opponents. This is the crucial threshold which has to be crossed before 
bargaining about the substantive issues in a conflict can proceed.257 
According to du Toit, “bargaining about bargaining” is the first and most important stage om 
the process of consociational power-sharing conflict settlement.258 
Power sharing and consensus politics do not have to be justified only by the negative 
consequences of their alternative (that is, group domination, internal strife, and civil war), but 
on a more positive basis as well.  
Consociational engineering, aimed at achieving the elusive goal of elite cooperation, should not 
just concentrate on drawing up constitutional coalitions, mutual vetoes, proportionality, and 
segmental autonomy, but should also adopt a wider perspective and concentrate on institutional 
mechanisms which create, maintain, and reinforce mutual dependence between societal 
groups.259 
This chapter set the analytical framework of my thesis, by discussing both negotiation and 
(consociational) power-sharing (both liberal and corporate) theory. It analyses and explains 
what is ‘power sharing’, how does it work and not work sometimes, and whether favourable 
conditions to achieving as well as maintaining power sharing system matter. With regard to 
negotiation, it started with analysis of two principles of negotiation process - positional and 
principled negotiations. The chapter looked at how one comes to the negotiation table and, 
eventually, to an agreement based on power-sharing institutional arrangements. It 
deconstructed the process of negotiation by showing how to ‘negotiate negotiation’ and what 
the conflicting groups have to give up in order to be able to negotiate and reach a durable 
solution. It started from the premises of the ‘principled’ negotiation, which state that one can 
negotiate anything as long as the principles are followed, and critically examines their validity 
in a non-western, post-conflict, transitional setting. The chapter also showed why the parties 
should be interested in negotiating an ‘amicable solution’ in the first place, what are the 
                                                 
256 Ibid., p. 180.; see also the concept of BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). 
257 See the concept of MHS (Mutually Hurting Stalemate). 
258 Du Toit, P. (1987). Consociational Democracy and Bargaining Power. Comparative Politics, 19 (4), p. 423. 
259 Idem, p. 426. 
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incentives, who negotiates (regimes, rebels, etc.) and what are the parties prepared or willing to 
give up in order to reach an agreement. In the following chapter, the reader will be presented 
with a comprehensive narrative of my case studies, my hypotheses will be tested and the 
dependent variables for each case study measured.
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III. Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and 
Evaluation 
In what follows I will analyze the case studies. Each case study will consist of three subchapters: 
1) background; 2) conflict management or resolution 3) outcome and assessment of the 
negotiation process. Each case study will have a timeline, which will not be comprehensive, 
but will offer a good overview of the conflict stages and its resolution or management. 
 
III.1 South Asia 
Figure 5. Map of India260 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
India’s Constitutional Provisions 
According to Weiner: “India contains such a medley of religious, caste, and linguistic groups 
that the sense of belonging to a minority depends upon where one lives, how much power and 
status one has, and one’s sense of community threat [...] to regard oneself as part of minority in 
India is to suggest that one ought to take group action to remedy one’s situation. To declare 
one’s group a minority is, therefore, a political act.”261 To a minority community symbol 
sharing is as equally important as power sharing.262 
                                                 
260 Source: India political map copyright mapsofindia.com 
261 Weiner, 1989, pp. 101-102; Carciumaru, 2012, p. 7. 
262 Idem, p. 102. 
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The Constitution of India does not define the word “minority” anywhere. It uses the word 
'minority' or its plural form in some Articles – 29 to 30 and 350A to 350 B. The National 
Commission for Minorities Act, 1992, avoids such a definition either. Nonetheless, under this 
Act the Government through its Social Welfare Department issued a list of Minority Groups on 
23.10.1993, which included all-religious groups (Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and 
Zoroastrians) except Jains. Jain community opposed this decision and demanded to be included 
into the list of Minority Religious Group. The demand was granted and Jains are also part of 
the list now.263  
In terms of political rights, the Constitution of India adopted two methods for protecting the 
minorities: (1) the guarantee of what might be described as negative quality, which protected 
them from the possibility of discriminatory treatment. (2) granting of positive rights, also 
known as affirmative actions, to members of minority groups.  
Some of the special provisions of the Constitution are presented shortly in what follows264: 
Article 14 confers equality before law; while Article 15 prohibits of discrimination on grounds 
of religion, caste, sex or place of birth; Article 16 provides equality of opportunity in matters of 
public employment.265 according to the Misra Report “do take adequate cognizance of the fact 
that there had been a wide disparity in the social and educational status of different sections of 
a largely caste-based, tradition-bound society with large scale poverty and illiteracy.”266 
Therefore, the Constitution permits positive discrimination in favour of the weak, the 
disadvantaged and the backward. In this sense, Article 15 permits the State to make "any special 
provisions" for women, children, "any socially and educationally backward class of citizens" 
and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. According to Misra, Article 15 speaks of "any 
socially and educationally backward class of citizens" and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes without qualifying backwardness with social and educational attributes and without a 
special reference to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, Article16 speaks of "any backward 
class of citizens, " whereas Article 16’s provisions enable and permit the State to act proactively 
in terms of positive discrimination initiatives in public sector for "any backward class of citizens 
                                                 
263 “Shri Rajesh Balia, the Rajasthan High Court Justice accepted the demand and declared that Jains to be included 
into the minority group.” see Jain, B. (2006). Jain Community a Shift from Majority to Minority. In Joseph 
Benjamin (ed.) Minorities in Indian Social System. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, p. 194. 
264 This section draws heavily on the Constitution of India up to 94th Amendment Act, available at: 
https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india. 
265 However, the provisions of these two Articles (Art. 15 and Art. 16) do take adequate cognizance of the fact that 
there had been a wide disparity in the social and educational status of different sections of a largely caste-based, 
tradition-bound society with large scale poverty and illiteracy. Therefore, the Constitution permits positive 
discrimination in favour of the weak, the disadvantaged and the backward. 
266 Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs (2007) Report of the National Commission for Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, Volume I, p. 10. 
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which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State".267 
Article 17 abolishes “Untouchability”; Article 19 spells out seven rights of freedom. Article 23 
speaks about prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour and prohibition of 
children in factories. Under freedom of religion provision Article 25 enumerates right to 
freedom of consciousness and free profession, practice and propagation of religion; Article 26 
speaks about freedom to manage religious affairs given to religious denominations or sections 
thereof, Article 28 speaks of freedom of attendance at religious instruction or religious worship 
in certain educational institutions. Article 347 stipulates the special provisions relating to language 
spoken by a section of the population of a State, whereas Article 350 defines the language to be used in 
representations for redress of grievances; Article 350A assures facilities for instruction in mother tongue 
at primary stage. Article 350B provides for appointment of a Special Officer for linguistic minorities by 
the President. 
Cultural and Educational Rights are secured in Articles 29 and 30. Article 29, also known as 
protection of interests of minorities, declares in its first clause that “Any section of the citizens 
residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture 
of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.” Clause 2 of the same Article states: “no 
citizens shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or 
receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language, or any of 
them. (emphasis added)” Article 30 Clause 1 states that “all minorities, whether based on 
religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of 
their choice.”, whereas clause 2 prohibits the discrimination against any educational institution, 
on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or 
language.268 Article 32 speaks about remedies for enforcement of right conferred to move 
Supreme Court for seeking justice. Thus, there are rights given to all the citizens, and there are 
some rights that are exclusively for the minorities. 
Thus, in fact, the Constitution, does give, albeit indirectly, a definition of minorities (!) in 
Article 29, protection of interests of minorities: in the first clause it speaks about the minorities 
based on language, script, or culture; in clause 2 of the same Article it does extend the 
                                                 
267 Misra Report findings state that “the words 'class' and 'caste' are not synonymous expressions and do not carry 
the same meaning. While Articles 15 and 16 empower the State to make special provisions for backward "classes", 
they prohibit discrimination only on the ground of 'caste' or 'religion'. In other words, positive discrimination on 
the ground of caste or religion coupled with other grounds such as social and educational backwardness is 
constitutionally permissible and, therefore, under a given circumstance it may be possible to treat a caste or 
religious group as a “class”.”, see Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs (2007) Report of the National 
Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Volume I, p. 10. 
268 See also Alam, A. (2007). Political Management of Islamic Fundamentalism. A View from India, Ethnicities, 
7(1), pp. 30-60. 
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definition. Respectively in India there are, or there could be, minorities based on religion, race, 
caste and/or language. 
These correspond precisely to Myron Weiner’s typology of minorities in India. Weiner 
distinguishes between linguistic, religious, caste and tribal minorities; and further divides them 
along three dimensions, depending on whether they have a conception of territorial homeland; 
the extent of their sense of cohesion within the community; and whether community regards 
itself as disadvantaged or as an achieving minority.269 
 
Linguistic Minorities 
As already mentioned, the term linguistic minority or minorities has not been defined in the 
Constitution. If the country is taken as the unit, all who speak a language other than Hindi can 
be treated as linguistic minorities. However, this cannot be deemed true if the State is taken as 
the unit. Within a State, there may by minorities speaking a language or languages other than 
the language spoken by the majority in that State. However, it is settled in T.M.A. Pai v. Union 
of India (reservation in private educational institutions) that a linguistic minority is 
determinable with reference to the State as a unit.270  
Since each of India’s states has an official language, those who speak another language as their 
mother tongue regard themselves as belonging to a linguistic minority.  
Based on the multi-lingual profile of the states, these can be grouped into five broad categories, 
from A to E. The ten Sates in set “A” namely Kerala, Punjab, Gujarat, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, 
Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh have negligible 
percentage of minor speech groups in terms of population, with the majority language spoken 
by more than 85 per cent inhabitants of the State. Under set “B” namely Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, 
Orissa, Mizoram and Maharashtra, the majority language groups are over 70 per cent of the 
total population. Set “C” has States namely Goa, Meghalaya, Tripura and Karnataka that 
experience language tensions because they have a dominating linguistic minority group, i.e. 
Bengali in Tripura, Telugu speaking in Karnataka and Marathi speaking in Goa. In set “D” 
States namely Assam, Sikkim and Manipur, the linguistic tensions have been quite volatile due 
to their linguistic composition as well as their intergroup attitudes. Assam, for example, 
although better integrated as most of the North-eastern States, has been segmented number of 
times and has also witnessed large scale migration of outsiders. Set “E” comprising States of 
                                                 
269 Weiner, 1989, p. 103. 
270 Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs (2007). Report of the National Commission for Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, Volume I, p. 10. 
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Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland is the most diverse geo-space in India with numerous 
tongues.271 
 
Table 9: India: The multi-lingual profile of the states272  
Set States 
Major 
Language 
Minor 1 Minor 2 Others 
Languages  
(Major + Two Minor) 
A. 
Kerala 96.6 2.1 0.3 1.0 Malayalam (Tamil, Kannada) 
Punjab 92.2 7.3 0.1 0.4 Punjabi (Hindi, Urdu) 
Gujarat 91.5 2.9 1.7 3.9 Gujarati (Hindi, Sindhi) 
Haryana 91.0 7.1 1.6 0.3 Hindi (Punjabi, Urdu) 
Uttar Pradesh 90.1 9.0 0.5 0.4 Hindi (Urdu, Punjabi) 
Rajasthan 89.6 5.0 2.2 3.2 Hindi (Bhili/Bhilodi, Urdu) 
Himachal Pradesh 88.9 6.3 1.2 3.6 Hindi (Punjabi, Kinnauri) 
Tamil Nadu 86.7 7.1 2.2 4.0 Tamil (Telugu, Kannada) 
West Bengal 86.0 6.6 2.1 5.7 Bengali (Hindi, Urdu) 
Andhra Pradesh 84.8 8.4 2.8 4.0 Telugu (Urdu, Hindi) 
B. 
Madhya Pradesh 85.6 3.3 2.2 8.9 Hindi (Bhili/Bhilodi, Gondi) 
Bihar 80.9 9.9 2.9 6.3 Hindi (Urdu, Santali) 
Orissa 82.8 2.4 1.6 13.2 Oriya (Hindi, Telugu) 
Mizoram 75.1 8.6 3.3 13.0 Lushai (Bengali, Lakher) 
Maharashtra 73.3 7.8 7.4 11.5 Marathi (Hindi, Urdu) 
C. 
Goa 51.5 33.4 4.6 10.5 Konkani (Marathi, Kannada) 
Meghalaya 49.5 30.9 8.1 11.5 Khasi (Garo, Bengali) 
Tripura 68.9 23.5 1.7 5.9 Bengali (Tripuri, Hindi) 
Karnataka 66.2 10.0 7.4 16.4 Kannada (Urdu, Telugu) 
D. 
Sikkim 63.1 8.0 7.3 21.6 Nepali (Bhotia, Lepcha) 
Manipur 60.4 5.6 5.4 29.6 Manipuri (Thadou, Tangkhul) 
Assam 57.8 11.3 5.3 25.6 Assamese (Bengali, Boro/ Bodo) 
E. 
Arunachal Pradesh 19.9 9.4 8.2 62.5 Nissi/Dafla (Nepali, Bengali) 
Nagaland 14.0 12.6 11.4 52.0 AO (Sema, Konyak) 
 
Religious Minorities 
Based on Census data from the Table below, Hindus form a clear majority. Nonetheless, 
because Hindus are divided by language and caste they do not have a clear political majority.273 
Although Muslims, Christians and Sikhs are on the national scale minorities, Muslims form a 
majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as they are concentrated in selected districts 
of the states (Kerala, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka);274 Sikhs form a majority 
                                                 
271 Idem, p.38. 
272 Source: Census of India 1991, in Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs (2007). Report of the 
National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities, Volume I, p. 37. The Table does not include data 
on Jammu & Kashmir, as well as States established in the year 2000, namely Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and 
Uttarakhand. Moreover, considering the fact that Chhattisgarh was carved out of Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand 
out of Bihar, the content of Sets “A” and “B” could change. 
273 See also Mahajan, G. (2005). Can Intra-Group Equality Co-exist with Cultural Diversity? Re-examining 
Multicultural Frameworks of Accommodation. In Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff. Spinner-Halev (ed.) Minorities 
within Minorities. Equality, Rights and Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 93. 
274 Weiner, 1989, p. 106. 
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of the Punjab; whereas Christians form a majority in Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland, but 
also have sizeable pockets in southern states (Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Gujarat), and 
in the main are converts from tribes or low castes;275 Buddhists form a plurality in Sikkim – 
30%.  
Moreover, considering multiple-identity variable of communities both stratified and internally 
diverse, Asghar Ali Engineer in his Article “The Minority Question in India” 276 rightfully 
observed that Christians and Muslims do differ within their communities in India. The Kashmiri 
Muslims claim separate ethnic identity from rest of Indian Muslims. The Muslims of Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu are of Dravidian origins too and so are Muslims of Karnataka and Andhra 
Pradesh. The Christians of North East do not share same ethnic identity with Christians of North 
or South India. Thus in Kashmir Muslims are double minority religious as well as ethnic and 
Christians of North East are, similarly, double minority religious as well as ethnic. 
The Muslims of North India in states like U.P. Bihar or Madhya Pradesh share same ethnicity 
as that of Hindus but are minority in religious sense. The Christians and Muslims of Kerala and 
Tamil Nadu share same ethnic identity with rest of Hindus there yet they are religious minority. 
 
Table 10: India: Religious Minorities, in %277 
Religions 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 
Hindu 83.45 82.73 82.30 81.53 80.46 79.80  
Muslim 10.7 11.21 11.75 12.61 13.43 14.23  
Christians 2.44 2.6 2.44 2.32 2.34 2.30  
Sikhs 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.72  
Buddhists 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.77 0.77 0.70 
Jains 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.41 0.37 
Others 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.43 0.6 0.66 
 
Last but not least important is the continuously superior growing rate of Muslim community as 
opposed to Hindu community. According to the last Census, Muslims had a growth rate of 34.5 
per cent, between 1981 and 1991 and 36 per cent between 1991 and 2001; whereas for the same 
period of time Hindus had a growing rate of 25.1 and 20.3 per cent respectively.278 This fact 
does play a role in the “Hinduism is in danger!”-Right-wing-discourse as well as does not 
necessarily make the work for the proponents of separate personal law (segmental autonomy) 
any easier.279 
                                                 
275 Idem, p. 109. 
276 Engineer, A.A. (2005). The Minority Question in India. Centre for Study of Society and Secularism. 
277 Census 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011 (Religion). 
278 Source: Census of India 2001, Growth Rate of Population by Religious Communities. 
279 See Khan, Z.-I. (2006). Hindu Fundamentalism in Contemporary India: A Muslim Perspective. In Ibrahim M. 
Abu-Rabi' (ed.) The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 
509-526. 
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Tribal Minorities  
According to Stuligross, scholars and policy-makers have never agreed on a definition of a 
“tribal person” or “tribe”. Most commonly, the “tribal” category has been conceived as an 
“amalgam of otherness”: the tribespeople traditionally do not practice high-tradition Vedic 
Hinduism, they are not Muslim, not economically or ritually stratified, and not integrated into 
the “modern economy or civilization” that surrounds them. The National Commission for 
Scheduled Tribes basic approach has been to devise lists rather than definitions. Those 
communities whose names appear on the schedule of tribes, which varies by State, are 
scheduled tribes; those whose names do not appear are not.280  
The six largest tribes are the Gonds of central India; the Bhils of western India; the Santals of 
western Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa; the Oraons of Bihar and West Bengal; the Minas of 
Rajasthan; and the Mundas of Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa. These tribes constitute nearly 
one-half of India’s tribal population.281 While tribals are a minority nationwide, they constitute 
a majority of the population in the north-eastern States of Nagaland (89%), Meghalaya (80%) 
Arunachal Pradesh (63%) and form a plurality in Manipur (43%), outside of the north-east they 
constitute a majority in 19 districts.282 
 
Caste Minorities  
Table 11: The Distribution of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes283 
State 
Union 
Territory 
Total/ 
Rural/ 
Urban 
Scheduled Castes (%) Scheduled Tribes (%) 
1981 1991 2001 2011 1981 1991 2001 2011 
INDIA 
T 15.75 16.48 16.20 16.60 7.76 8.08 8.20 8.60 
R 17.34 18.04 17.91 18.50 9.54 10.08 10.41 11.30 
U   10.63 11.99 11.75 12.6 2.03 2.32 2.44 2.80 
 
 
According to Weiner, “none of India’s several thousand castes is in the majority in any region 
of the country.  “284  To speak of a minority caste, Weiner continues, is to refer to its status not 
number. Unlike tribes, Sikhs, or linguistic groups, scheduled castes do not identify themselves 
with any homeland or have any territorial demands.285  
                                                 
280 “Today, 4,635 tribes are included on the schedule. This number overstates the number of tribal communities 
because the list is a composite of 25 States lists and several tribes have populations that cross State boundaries and 
are recognized as scheduled tribes in several States”, see Stuligross & Varshney, 2002, p. 446. 
281 Weiner, 1989, p. 111. 
282 Idem, p. 112. 
283 Government of India, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (2007). Annual Report 2007-2008; 
Chandramouli, C. (2013) Scheduled Tribes in India. As revealed in Census 2011. Government of India, Ministry 
of Home Affairs. 
284 Weiner, 1989, p. 114. 
285 Idem. 
Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and Evaluation 
77 
Besides Scheduled Castes (Dalits), another self-proclaimed minority caste should be 
mentioned— “other backward classes.” According to most estimates, the OBCs constitute 
about half of the Indian population, so that along with the scheduled castes and tribes they form 
about three-quarters of the country’s population.286  
III.1.1 Punjab 
Table 12: Chronology – Sikh nationalism287 
1799 Ranjit Singh establishes a kingdom in the Punjab with its capital in Lahore and 
borders extending from Kabul  in the west to the river Sutlej in the east and from 
Ladakh  and Lhasa  in the north to Rajasthan in the south. 
1849 Punjab becomes the last kingdom in India to be annexed by the British. 
22 October 1909 India's British rulers pass the Anand Marriage Act, thereby reinforcing a distinct 
Sikh identity. 
1920 Gurdwara Reform Movement (G.R.M.) is formally launched to regain control 
of gurdwaras from mahants (hereditary custodians). 
1925 G.R.M. is concluded with the Sikhs regaining control of their major gurdwaras 
via the passage of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, the formation of the Akali Dal and 
the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (S.G.P.C.), an elected body 
responsible for the management of major Sikh gurdwaras. 
1946 The Akali Dal floats the idea of an independent Sikhistan or Khalistan but is 
unable to gain the attention of the British. 
15August 1947 India's independence is accompanied by its partition into India and Pakistan. 
Lahore goes to Pakistan, Amritsar to India. 
1966 The Indian state of Punjab is reconstituted along linguistic lines  
1969 Former finance minister of Punjab and medical doctor Jagjit Singh Chauhan 
proclaims the 'Sovereign Republic of Khalistan.' 
1969 Darshan Singh Pheruman fasts to death to secure the award of Chandigarh to 
Punjab. 
16-17 Oct. 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution (A.S.R.) is authored. 
28-29 October 1978 The 18th All India Akali Conference of the Shiromani Akali Dal (S.A.D.) held 
in Ludhiana (Punjab, India) adopts a softer version of the A.S.R. 
September 1979 The Akali Dal splits into two factions, one led by Harchand Singh Longowal 
with support from Prakash Singh Badal, and the other led by Jagdev Singh 
Talwandi with support from Gurcharan Singh Tohra, president of the Shiromani 
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (S.G.P.C.). 
20 March 1981 The flag of the 'New Republic of Khalistan' is hoisted at Anandpur Sahib 
(Punjab, India). 
September, 1981 New Delhi receives a list of forty-five demands from S.A.D. 
16 October 1981 The first round of talks between Delhi and S.A.D. The top demand is the 
unconditional release of the arch extremist Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. 
5 April 1982 The third round of talks between Delhi and S.A.D.The Akalis unilaterally 
announce that the talks failed. 
                                                 
286 Weiner, M. (2001). The Struggle for Equality: Caste in Indian Politics. In Atul Kohli (ed.) The Success of 
India’s Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 202.; see also Varshney, A. (2000). Is India 
Becoming More Democratic? The Journal of Asian Studies, 59(1), p. 8. 
287The data for the chronology of Sikh nationalism is available as open-source, internet public space, on several 
websites. The one present here was taken entirely from THE SIKH TIMES, available at: 
http://www.sikhtimes.com/sikhism_timeline.html, accessed on July 1, 2018; see also Mitra, 2016. 
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26 April  1982 Two severed heads of cows are found hanging at two Hindu temples at Amritsar. 
(Cows are sacred to Hindus.) The Dal Khalsa issues a statement claiming 
responsibility. 
1 May 1982 India bans the Dal Khalsa and the National Council of Khalistan. The Dal Khalsa 
had been formed as a counterweight to the Akali Dal in 1978 with the support 
of Zail Singh, then a senior cabinet minister in the Indira Gandhi-led Congress 
(I) government in New Delhi. 
4 August 1982 The Akali Dal launches the DharamYudhMorcha (religious war). An Indian 
Airlines flight from Delhi to Srinagar with 126 passengers on board is hijacked 
to Lahore by a Sikh.  
19 November 1982 The inaugural day of the Ninth Asiad (Asian Games) in New Delhi. The S.A.D. 
vows to protest. All Sikhs attempting to enter Delhi are searched and, in many 
cases, humiliated, especially in the state of Haryana. 
29 August 1983 S.A.D. launches the KamRokoMorcha, an entrenchment/agitation aimed at 
obstructing work (i.e. a call for a general strike) in Punjab. 
6 October 1983 Punjab's Congress (I) government, headed by Darbara Singh, is dismissed and 
replaced with President's rule, a euphemism for direct rule from New Delhi. 
6 June 1984 The Indian Army stormsDarbar Sahib (Amritsar) resulting in the deaths of 
hundreds including extremist leader Bhindranwale, Lt.-Gen. Shahbeg Singh, 
and president of the All India Sikh Students Federation (A.I.S.S.F.), Amrik 
Singh. The action is labelled Operation Bluestar. 
7 June 1984 About 500 soldiers belonging to the 9th Battalion of the Sikh Regiment stationed 
at Ganganagar (Rajasthan) mutiny upon hearing reports about Operation 
Bluestar. Smaller revolts involving Sikh soldiers are reported.  
31 October 1984 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is assassinated by two Sikh members of her 
security staff. In the anti-Sikh riots that follow 5,000 die in pogroms led by 
members of Indira Gandhi's Congress party and aided by the complicity of local 
security forces.  
December, 1984 The Congress party led by Indira Gandhi's son Rajiv Gandhi, campaigns on the 
issue of India's territorial integrity. 
24 July 1985 Harchand Singh Longowal and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sign a 
Memorandum of Settlement awarding, among other things, Chandigarh to 
Punjab. 
20 August 1985 Harchand Singh Longowal is assassinated while speaking at a gurdwara (Sikh 
place of worship). 
25 September 1985 Akali Dal wins elections in Punjab. Surjit Singh Barnala becomes chief minister 
with a sweeping majority (73 / 117). 
26 January 1986 Khalistan, an independent Sikh state, is proclaimed amidst a SarbatKhalsa 
gathering (a large gathering of Sikhs, figuratively representing the entire Sikh 
community) at Darbar Sahib (Amritsar).  
11 May 1987 The S.A.D. government is dismissed. President's rule is imposed. 
August 2008 High factionalism of S.A.D: six groups claiming to be the ‘real’ Akali Dal 
 
Background: Conflict stages 
The conflict started escalating with Akali Dal losing the elections of 1972.288 As a consequence, 
Akali Dal returned to a one-issue ethnic party acting as the sole representative of Sikh interests. 
Respectively, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution was drafted in 1973, defining Sikhs as quasi-
                                                 
288 See Mitra, S.K. (2006). The Puzzle of India's Governance: Culture, Context and Comparative Theory. London: 
Routledge, pp. 87-95.  
Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and Evaluation 
79 
(nation) and demanding a radical decentralisation. The following seven demands and objectives 
were outlined by the Resolution: 
 The transfer of the federally administered city of Chandigarh to Punjab. 
 The transfer of Punjabi-speaking and contiguous areas of Haryana to Punjab. 
 Decentralisation of states under the existing constitution, limiting the central 
government's role. 
 The call for land reforms and industrialisation of Punjab, along with safeguarding the 
rights of the weaker sections of the population. 
 The enactment of an all-India gurdwara (Sikh house of worship) act. 
 Protection for minorities residing outside Punjab, but within India. 
 Revision of government's recruitment quota restricting the number of Sikhs in the armed 
forces.289 
The Sikh religious leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale entered the Punjab politics at the end of 
1970s. Indira Gandhi, the INC party leader, instrumentalized Bhindranwale, using him as a 
‘countervailing force’ to Akali Dal, INC’s main adversary in Punjab. INC was responsible of 
making Bhindranwale a strong political leader, advocating Sikh self-determination. Initially, 
Akali Dal were suspicious of Bhindranwale true intentions, accusing him of being “an agent for 
the Congress party.”290 However, given his overwhelming popularity, Akali Dal decided to join 
forces. Consequently, securing the support of Bhindranwale, Akali Dal started Dharam Yudh 
Morcha ("Assembly for the Fight for Justice") in August 1982.291 The main objective of the 
movement was to implement the demands of Anandpur Sahib Resolution.292 As a consequence, 
Indira Gandhi categorized Akali Dal a secessionist party, though the Resolution did not 
explicitly demand Khalistan (a separate own state for Sikhs). 293 
Indira Gandhi viewed the Anandpur Resolution as a secessionist document and evidence of an 
attempt to secede from the Union of India. Thus, Akali Dal was classified as a separatist party 
and the decision was taken to use force and suppress it.294 The Akali Dal officially stated that 
Sikhs belong to India and the Anandpur Sahib resolution did not foresee an autonomous Sikh 
                                                 
289 See Khalistan movement, available at: http://research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/Khalistan_movement, 
accessed on July 1, 2018. 
290 Desai, A.R. (1991). Expanding Governmental Lawlessness and Organized Struggles. Popular Prakashan, pp. 
64–66.  
291 See Dharam Yudh Morcha, available at http://www.sikhiwiki.org/index.php/Dharam_Yudh_Morcha, accessed 
on July 1, 2018. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 For example, within two months security forces arrested over 30,000 Sikhs! See Deol, H. (2000). Religion and 
nationalism in India: the case of the Punjab. New York: Routledge. 
Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and Evaluation 
80 
State of Khalistan.295Very fast, the whole situation escalated into a major violent clash between 
Bhindranwale followers and the GoI.  
It was widely known that the rebels who conducted the bombings and killings were hiding in 
gurdwaras. The Congress-run administration, however, refrained from entering into the 
gurdwaras to avoid injuring Sikh feelings.296 This strategy changed in October 1983, after six 
Hindus, traveling by bus, were killed. As a consequence, the emergency rule was imposed in 
Punjab. The emergency rule lasted for more than a decade.297  
After this occurrence, in February 1984, the Akali Dal escalated the agitation disputing the 
Article 25 of the Constitution of India (section (2) (b)). Akali Dal demanded the amendment of 
the constitution to eliminate any confusions, such as applying the term Hindu when referring to 
Sikhs. Thus, for example, a Sikh couple who were united in conformity to the rituals of the Sikh 
belief were expected to register either under the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special Marriage 
Act, 1954. The Akalis pressed for the replacement of these laws with Sikhism-based laws. 
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, in the meantime elevated to one of the uncontested leaders of the 
movement for Khalistan, relocated into the Harimandir Sahib (mainly referred to as the Golden 
Temple – unequivocally the holiest Sikh shrine) followed by many of his supporters. The 
fortification of the temple and the installation of heavy machine guns as well as self-loading 
rifles started instantly. In June 1984, Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister then, launched 
the Operation Blue Star to kick out Bhindranwale and his followers from the temple. The 
Operation involved the Punjab Police, Border Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force and 
Indian Army. Though Bhindranwale was killed, the costs, both in terms of civilian and military 
casualties as well as the destruction of the temple were immense. Most Sikhs strongly 
condemned the Operation and viewed it as a desecration of the holiest Sikh sanctuary.  1984 
and as a direct result of the impact the Operation Blue Start had on the Sikh community, Indira 
Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards. As a consequence of Indira Gandhi’s 
murder, thousands of Sikhs were slaughtered in Delhi by anti-Sikh insurgences thought to be 
Congress activists and mobs.298 
The implementation of Operation Blue Star that the Sikhs responded using the murder the anti-
Sikh riots and of Indira Gandhi that was brought about by her demise, allowed for the upsurge 
of Sikh aggressiveness not counting terrorism actions. The level of violence of the conflict that 
lasted a decade and a half might be seen from the fascinating and pointed perspective of what 
                                                 
295 Deol, 2000, pp. 102–106.  
296 Ibid.  
297 This section draws heavily from Khalistan movement, available at: 
http://research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/Khalistan_movement, accessed on July 1, 2018.  
298 Deol, 2000, p. 109. 
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Mark Juergensmeyer called a “cosmic war”. In his view, the existence of particular conditions 
increases the probability of violence based on religious conviction.299 In Juergensmeyer 
opinion, the following three features are responsible for religious terrorism to take place in a 
cosmic war:  
a) The conflict is viewed as essential in upholding dignity as well as in affirming identity  
b) The pain and trauma of defeat are incommensurable   
c) To hinder a struggle defeats the purpose exposed in the first point a), which views the 
conflict as essential.300 
The 1984 attack of the Temple, as well as the killing of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the 
movement leader, might be perceived as the most crucial developments in categorizing the Sikh 
struggle in terms of a cosmic war. The fact that GoI’s operation presupposed an attack on a 
sacred Temple was deeply distressful and humiliating to the majority of Sikhs, who felt 
alienated from the Indian state.301 
The demonstrations against Sikh, which followed after the assassination of Indira Gandhi, only 
intensified their sense of discrimination. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people died as a 
direct consequence of violence hitting Punjab after Gandhi’s murder, whereby several Sikhs 
were afflicted and executed by gangs led by the Congress leaders.  Ultimately, the civil 
population (the bystanders) that was initially indifferent to the rebels was forced to retaliate and 
join in, in particular, after their families were directly impacted by the violence.  
Thus, the events analyzing the stages of escalation of the conflict fit into Juergensmeyer's 
framework and characteristics of a cosmic war.  
 
Conflict Management & Negotiation Process 
According to Gill, the Khalistan movement represented one of the most violent terrorist 
movements in the world. 302  
Consider the flowing excerpt from a 1981 New York Times article entitled “In India, Sikhs 
Raise A Cry For Independent Nation”303: 
 
                                                 
299 Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Vol 13 edition. 
University of California Press, p. 164. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Compare to two different cases a similar one - the Tamils in Sri Lanka and a dissimilar one - the Russians in 
Transnistria. 
302 This subchapter draws extensively on Gill, K.P.S. Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993, available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume1/fault1-kpstext.htm, accessed on July 1, 2018.  
303 Kaufman, M.T. and Special to The New York Times (1981). In India, Sikhs Raise a Cry for Independent Nation. 
New York Times; see also Sathian, S. The Nation That Declared Independence in The New York Times. OZY. 
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Gajender Singh spends his days in the Sikh hostel attached to the Golden Temple, Sikhism's holiest shrine. 
It is from this sanctuary that they maintain contact with the 1,500 activists they say belong to their two 
groups. 
''We are maturing,'' said Gajender Singh. ''We have finished with the organizational stage and are now 
involved in propagation. Next will come direct action and then, finally, full-scale confrontation. Like the 
P.L.O., we are seeking international recognition, and at home we are prepared to use terror, the political 
language of the 20th century.'' 
 
Furthermore, consider another activist interviewed by NYT asserted the following: 
  
''The British were willing to provide us with our homeland, but we were talked out of this by Nehru and 
Gandhi,'' said Mr. Sandhu, who calls himself the secretary general of the national council of Khalistan. 
''The Hindus said that we would share with them in the Government, but they lied. What we are facing 
is Hindu imperialism, which threatens our integrity.'' 304 
 
As a direct consequence of the violent clashes an estimated 21,469 people were killed (see 
Figure 6). The intervention by the GoI and subsequent bilateral negotiations (the two-track 
strategy GoI ever so often uses) that followed led to the decrease in violence, decline of the 
secessionism movement and resolution of the conflict. movement declined and the conflict was 
regulated in 1993.  
 
Figure 6. Force Casualties in Punjab305 
 
 
Outcome and Assessment 
According to the United States Department of State, there was a notable decline in Sikh 
radicalism between 1992 and 1997, although the 1997 report noted that "Sikh militant cells are 
active internationally and extremists gather funds from overseas Sikh communities." 
                                                 
304 Idem. 
305 Gill, K.P.S. Endgame in Punjab: 1988-1993, available at 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume1/fault1-kpstext.htm, accessed on July 1, 
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Punjab case study confirmed all my hypotheses,306 including intervention hypothesis, which 
showed beyond any doubt that military intervention will exacerbate rather than settle a conflict. 
The negotiated territorial and political power sharing arrangements and existing representative 
institutions led to a considerable decrease in militancy and secessionist ambitions.  
 
III.1.2 Mizoram 
According to Goswami, since 1956 the northeast of India has been under armed conflict started 
by the Naga National Council (NNC). The armed struggle was considered the only means that 
NNC could achieve their political objective of independence. Like in a domino effect, armed 
clashes and violent conflicts followed in Manipur, Mizoram, Assam and Tripura. The 
environment of physical insecurity that has been perpetuated by armed conflict has not led to 
consolidation of governing structures, making economic development a fallacy. The GoI 
perceived these movements, conflicts and escalations as aggravations derailing the agenda of 
integrative nation building and views them as an obstacle to economic development in the 
northeast region.307   
Goswami points out to an interesting aspect stating that for Gandhi conflicts gave a window of 
opportunity for change.308 Her argument is that occasionally conflicts are intentionally incited 
with the goal that issues that are troublesome, severe, and disruptive or to a great extent 
overlooked yet which have profound importance for a specific culture are brought to the public 
limelight and in this way they are addressed in a rash manner.309 This brings about a transparent 
and speedy handling of disruptive issues and sets base where the protagonists can address the 
issues without fear nor favour. Such a procedure prompts consolidation and gives the systems 
through which the contention elements can be changed. For Gandhi, conflict is likewise a 
method for communicating that one is not a victim of a specific situation; that protection from 
it can change and change things. Gandhi himself had faith in provoking conflict (non-violent 
civil resistance) against British colonialism with a goal of ensuring that people are not governed 
in their own territory in a way that was considered unfair and inhuman.310 
                                                 
306 Hypothesis 1: The probability of negotiations in democracies is higher compared to autocracies; Hypothesis 2: 
In federal systems, chances of negotiations are higher; Hypothesis 3: In general, intervention will increase the 
chances of negotiations; Hypothesis 3.1: Military intervention decreases the probability of negotiations; 
Hypothesis 3.2: Mediation will increase the likelihood of negotiations; Hypothesis 4: Democracies increase the 
likelihood of negotiation, occurring after intervention. (see Biswas 2006a and p.27, before) 
307 See Goswami, N. (2013). Transforming Conflicts. Economic and Political Weekly, 48, pp. 45-46. 
308 Ibid.  
309 Ibid. 
310 Ibid. 
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At the root of most of the armed ethnic conflicts in the northeast is an assumption that these 
societies have been handed out an unfair deal by India. Be it on issues of social empowerment, 
political representation, participation in the visual arts, respect for specific histories, and sense 
of self-worth, societies in the northeast genuinely believe that they have been left at the margins 
of Indian polity and society. While the Indian state has responded to the various armed ethnic 
conflicts by granting separate statehoods and offering legal protection under the Constitution, 
the feeling of being somehow deprived of respect, dignity and honor continues to exist. 
One of the reasons for the continuing violence in the northeast is that most of the efforts at 
conflict resolution have been short term and transactional, rather than transformational. Since 
the conflicts in the northeast are of an asymmetric variety, a framework of showing respect to 
the weaker side is critical to changing the dynamics of the conflict. 
Goswami unequivocal recommendation is for policymakers and to travel deep inside remote 
areas where most of the armed groups draw their support and cadres from, in order to observe 
and discern the needs of those societies.311 Too many of the policy engagements with the 
northeast appear patronising, telling people that they are well off with India and scolding them 
for being unpatriotic instead of simply listening to them. Clues on how to change this can be 
drawn from Gandhi’s life and work. In Goswami’s opinion, instead of lecturing people about 
what they should do, and what was good for them, India’s present policymakers should emulate 
Gandhi who travelled across India for a year after he returned from South Africa, listening, 
investigating and understanding the pulse of India.312  
The main reason for choosing Mizoram as my next case study is that the Mizos were in a strong 
position to secede from India in the 1960s. Not only did they give up secessionist claims, the 
conflict was successfully managed in 1986 with Mizoram continuing to enjoy peace. This 
outcome makes it stand out among the other "seven sisters” (as the States in north-east India 
are called) and most other ethno-regional conflicts. Analysis of this case is vital as it can provide 
lessons for the future. 
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Table 13: Chronology – Mizoram313 
Time Key events 
1960 The Mautam of 1959, is particularly violent, not only in the damage that it 
causes, but also because of its political repercussions, thousands dying or 
starving.314  
The non-political organisation, Mizo National Famine Front, transforms into 
Mizo National Front. 
1964 Assam Regiment disbands its 2nd battalion, composed predominantly of the 
Hill people. The soldiers who lost their jobs join the MNF to form its military 
wing: the Mizo National Army. 
1966 MNF releases a twelve-point declaration stating why India is unfit and 
unworthy of ruling the Mizo people and declares independence from the 
Indian Union. 
Aizawl comes under air-strikes (first and only time the military bombs an 
Indian city) 
1967  The Mizo National Front is outlawed. 
1967-69 Regrouping of hill population in ‘protected and progressive villages’ is 
adopted to supplement counter-terrorism measures. 
1969 Laldenga sends his emissary, Vanlalngaia, to assess the climate for 
negotiations with the Union government. 
1969-70 Army carries out counter-terrorism operations against the MNF. 
1970 November (to 
February 1971) 
Laldenga visits China along with 'foreign minister' Lalhmingthanga. The 
Chinese reportedly assure him of continued help, training facilities and 
supply of arms. 
1971 February Laldenga sends emissaries to explore the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement with the Government of India 
1971 August Union government offers general amnesty and economic help such as a 
rehabilitation package to surrendering MNF cadres. 
1971 December MNF 'foreign secretary' Lalhmingthanga, 'finance minister' Lalkhawliana 
and 'education secretary' Thangkima and 14 other top-ranking MNF cadres 
surrender to the Indian authorities. 
1972 January The Union Territory of Mizoram comes into being. 
1972 April  Mizo Union Party forms the first government in Mizoram after elections are 
held to the 30-member Mizoram Union Territory (UT) Legislature. The party 
wins 21 seats. 
1974 Mizo Union Party merges with Indian National Congress. 
1975 Differences surface between Laldenga on the one hand and MNF 'vice 
president' Tlangchhuaka, MNA 'chief' Biakchhunga and MNF 'president' K. 
Chawngzuala, on the other, in Cologne, Germany, over the matter of talks 
with the Union government. The meet decides Laldenga would seek the 
mandate of an MNF convention in Arakan. 
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1976 At a secret meeting with Indian authorities, an MNF delegation led by 
Laldenga agrees, among other things, to lay down arms and to seek resolution 
of all existing problems within the framework of the Indian Constitution. 
1976 February MNF delegation led by Laldenga and comprising of Tlangchhuaka, 
Chawngzuala and Biakchhunga holds discussions with Union Home 
Secretary S.L. Khurana, Lieutenant Governor S.K. Chibber, and Joint 
Secretary (North East) M.L. Kampani. The MNF delegation, among other 
things, acknowledges that Mizoram is an integral part of India. 
1976 July Union government and MNF issue a Joint communiqué based on the January 
1976-secret talks. 
1977  Union government asks Laldenga to leave India by November 21. He, 
however, manages to stay on in Delhi and pursues further dialogue with 
Home Minister Charan Singh through informal channels. 
1978 MNF's informal talks with the government are discontinued as Laldenga 
refuses to give up the demand for an interim government to be headed by him 
and his 'party'. Laldenga continues to stay on in Delhi. On the other hand, he 
allegedly asks the MNA to step-up subversive activities against India. 
 
MNA asks non-Mizos employed in Mizoram to leave area by July 1979. 
1979  Laldenga is arrested. Subsequently, Biakchhunga and his followers also 
return to India and surrender arms. 
1980 April Laldenga holds talks with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. All charges against 
him are dropped. Laldenga also orders an MNF ceasefire and publicly 
disavows terrorism. 
1980 June Laldenga is released from prison. Charges against him are also withdrawn. 
Government suspends counter-terrorism operations in Mizoram. 
1982 MNF and MNA are banned under Unlawful Activities Act. Laldenga is asked 
to leave the country. 
 
April 21:  Laldenga leaves for London. 
1984 Mizo National Front, Mizo National Army declared unlawful, once again. 
1984 April Indian National Congress wins 20 of the 30 seats in the Legislative Assembly 
elections. 
 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declares her intention to negotiate with the 
MNF. 
December 20: Talks are held between MNF and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
held. 
1986  June 26: Mizo National Front chief Laldenga formally renounces terrorism. 
 
June 30: Mizo Accord signed between Union government and MNF. The 
document is signed by Laldenga, on behalf of the MNF, and Union Home 
Secretary RD Pradhan, on behalf of the Government of India. Mizoram Chief 
Secretary Lalkhama, too, signs the agreement. 
 
August 5: Constitution Amendment Bill to confer Statehood on Mizoram is 
passed in the Lok Sabha, India’s Lower House of Parliament. 
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August 20: Ban on Mizo National Front is lifted. 
 
August 21: Laldenga sworn in as Chief Minister of Mizoram. 
 
Chief Minister Laldenga announces general amnesty for all MNF cadres who 
came over-ground. 
1987 Elections to the first Mizoram State Legislative Assembly are held. 
 
Background: Conflict stages 
Two main and three subsidiary incidents in the late 1950s and early 1960s represent the turning 
point of the Mizo case. The indifference with which the government treated the 1958 famine 
coupled with the introduction of Assamese as the official language of the Mizo Hills were the 
principal events that steered the Mizos to support secessionist ideas. Internal politics, the 
creation of Nagaland due to the violent struggle by the Nagas and external support from China 
and Pakistan, also played a crucial role. 
Two main events directly contributed to the increasing intensity of Mizo separatist aspirations. 
The indifference of the Assamese government during the famine of 1959, and the passage of 
the language bill despite Mizo protests, are the most crucial episodes that pushed the Mizos to 
support secessionist ideas. These incidents together represent the turning point of the conflict, 
since they propelled the Mizo movement in a risky direction, which culminated in the 
proclamation of independence315 by the Mizo movement. 
 
Event 1: Famine hits the Mizo Hills in 1958 
The Mautamp (rat famine) that ravages the Mizo Hills every fifty years was expected in 1958. 
These famines begin with the flourishing of the bamboos, whose seeds provide an abundant 
supply of protein to rats.316 As a result, the rats multiply faster than the amount of bamboo seeds 
available for consumption. After devouring the bamboo seeds, the rats destroy the crops in the 
fields, and then proceed to min the granaries. 
On noticing the flowering of bamboos and anticipating its consequences (famine), the leaders 
of the Mizo hills (mainly members of the District Council) asked the Assamese government for 
stocks of rice as a precautionary measure. In the event that sufficient rice was not stockpiled in 
advance, the lack of proper roads between the plains and the hills would make famine 
unavoidable. However, the government dismissed the warnings as exaggerations and ignored 
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the situation.317 By the time the Assamese government realized that the anxieties of the Mizo 
leaders were not unfounded, famine was pervasive in the hills. 
While the Mizos were angry with the Assam government for their inadequate response, 
relations between the Mizo Union and Assam government were also strained. 
The Mizo Union was a close ally of the state government but now its faith in the Assam 
administration was shaken. In fact, the leaders of the Mizo Union were embittered by the 
behavior of the state government. The Mizo Union leadership had supported the Assam 
government in shaky times, yet in this crucial period, the attitude of the state was fraught with 
indifference and callousness. By not receiving relief from the Assam government, not only did 
the Mizo Union's relationship with the state leadership sour, the Mizo Union also lost the 
confidence of the people. The (in)actions of the state government led to the realization that the 
union of the Mizo Hills with Assam was neither meaningful nor useful.318 
It is true that the Mizo Union officials pressured the Assamese government to provide relief. 
However, since they did not physically interact with the villagers, the Mizo Union leadership 
gave the impression that it was only making formal protests, which were not serving any useful 
purpose. It is here that Laldenga scored and won the support of the Mizos. 
Laldenga converted the Mizo Cultural Society into a famine relief organization, and christened 
it the Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF- The MNFF carried out relief work in the hills, and 
its volunteers crossed into the Chin Hills (Burma) to collect rice. The work of the MNFF also 
won favour with the Church, which was a crucial body in Mizoram. 
The only way to surmount this threat was to create a Greater Mizoram, wherein the Mizos 
determined their own destiny. The MNFF led by Laldenga adopted the slogan. "Mizoram for 
Mizos,” and alongside relief work painted a rosy future for a separate Mizoram. Laldenga was 
seen as the protector of Mizo identity and the promoter of Mizo interests, and became the 
symbol of Mizo struggle against the plains administration. 
As a consequence of the famine, there was a rupture in relations between the Mizo Union and 
the State government because the Mizo Union blamed the administrators of Assam for the 
abysmal situation. Moreover, since the people identified the Mizo Union with the state 
government, the pro-Indian Mizo Union’s popularity waned. To win back support, it was 
imperative that the Mizo Union be seen as a body independent of the Assam administration. If 
there could be a winner in a famine situation, it was Laldenga. He took advantage of the conflict 
between the Mizo Union and the Assam government to consolidate his position in the hills, and 
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spread anti-Indian propaganda. While the Mizo Cultural Society succeeded in attracting Mizos, 
Laldenga's work during the famine pushed him into prominence. 
 
Event 2: Assam Language Bill 
The Mizos vociferously opposed the introduction of Assamese in schools. The Mizos (along 
with the other hill people and the Bengalis) demanded the withdrawal of the proposition to 
institute Assamese as a state language. In spite of opposition, the Assam Pradesh Congress 
Committee passed a resolution on April 20, 1960 demanding the immediate introduction of the 
Assamese State Language Bill, which was immediately complied with by the Assam 
government.319 
In the Mizo Hills, the impact of the passage of Assamese as a state language was three-fold. 
First, the language act came close on the heels of the famine, and reinforced the belief that 
Mizos must chart out their own destiny, if they were to prosper. Both these events interacted 
with each other in such a manner that the alienation of the Mizo populace was absolute. Second, 
the break between the Mizo Union and the Congress-run state government, which began during 
the famine, was now final. The Mizo MLAs resigned from the state legislature, and made it 
clear that they could not work with the Assam government in the prevailing circumstances. 
Instead, the Mizo Union began to re-build its support base in the Mizo Hills, and won the village 
council elections in I960. This victory demonstrated that despite the resentment harboured 
towards the Mizo Union and the simultaneous growth in popularity of the MNFF and Laldenga 
due to the famine, they were not recognized as political contenders in the Mizo Hills. Finally, 
the MNFF played a crucial role in ensuring the success of the relief operations during the 
famine, although its utility was coming to an end. However, Laldenga wanted to continue, and 
even increase, his involvement in the hills. The developments in the region (his successful role 
in famine- relief operations and the language act) made it propitious to transform the MNFF 
into a political party. Thus, on 22 October 1961. the MNFF dropped the word "famine" from 
its name, and became the Mizo National Front. While the real objectives of the MNF was to 
create a state independent of India. Laldenga positioned the MNF as a political party, which 
like the Mizo Union would work for the improvement of the hills.320 
Other events also helped strengthen the Mizo movement. External events, in the form of Indo-
Pakistan rivalry and the ensuing Pakistani support to the Mizo cause, the Indo-China war and 
the subsequent Chinese aim of creating disturbances in northeast India, and the dismemberment 
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of Assam (Nagas were given a separate state), also provided an impetus to the pace of the 
conflict. 
To prevent the balkanization of India, the centre hurriedly agreed to give the Nagas their own 
state. However, in the process, the Indian government set in motion the disintegration of Assam 
as it encouraged separatism among the hill tribes. The impact of the creation of Nagaland was 
felt most strongly and immediately in the Mizo Hills. 
Though the MNF was preparing for violent confrontation as a long term strategy, so far it had 
relied on non-violent methods. However, it was increasingly convinced that insurgency paid 
huge dividends since the Nagas received special attention and assistance for development only 
after their revolt. According to Verghese and Thanzawna, the Mizos perceived themselves as 
being more educated than the Nagas, and thus expected to be able to extract many more 
concessions from the Indian government, by means of violence, which became an attractive 
option.321 In general, the violent methods employed by the Nagas and the subsequent creation 
of Nagaland played a crucial role in inspiring the Mizos for armed revolt.322 
 
Role of External Actors 
The Mizo National Front received funds, training, weapons from Pakistan and China, both 
hostile to India.323 
The Pakistani authorities gave Laldenga large amounts of cash for propaganda work, so as to 
tempt an increasing number of Mizos to join the MNF. These recruits formed the basis of the 
Mizo National Volunteers (MNVs), and were organized along the lines of a regular army. 
Laldenga,. with the support of the Pakistani military commanders, organized regular training 
sessions for the Mizo National Volunteers, along the border of East Pakistan and Burma. Based 
on discussions with the army officials of the Directorate of Military Intelligence of the Pakistani 
army, Laldenga selected the most competent personnel to serve as instructors for imparting 
training in the Mizo villages. To boost the morale of the MNVs. the Pakistani military generals 
visited the training camps and reassured the Mizos of continuous aid.324 
After attaining victory in the Indo-China war of 1962, China took advantage of India's 
vulnerability in the northeast by encouraging the destabilization of the northeast, and expressing 
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its willingness to help internal groups in their fight against the Indian government. Since the 
MNF was the most organized insurgent group in the northeast, it was best able to take advantage 
of Chinese benevolence. Besides receiving moral and material support, the MNF also became 
the primary beneficiary of Chinese-Pakistani enmity with India. Pakistan and China developed 
close ties mainly because they shared a common enemy, and were determined to accelerate 
simmering disturbances in India. The Chinese spread anti-India propaganda in the hills, and 
assured the MNF of all the possible assistance for their cause. Most of the Chinese aid came to 
the MNF through East Pakistan (training in guerrilla warfare, arms and funds for the 
movement), and further strengthened the MNF. Thus, guarantees of Pakistani and Chinese 
financial assistance coupled with assurances from ex-army personnel (one of the twin sources 
of support of the MNF) of their ability to secure independence, convinced Laldenga that a take-
over of Indian administration in the hills was possible. 
 
The Rise of the Mizo National Front (MNF) 
The formation of the MNF is a crucial chapter in the history of the Mizo Hills since it marks 
the launch of the secessionist movement. The birth of the MNF also represents an important 
step in the political evolution of Laldenga, from a clerk in the Mizo Union-led District Council, 
via the Mizo Cultural Society and the Mizo National Famine Front (co- founder of both). to the 
undisputed leader of the Mizo Hills.325 
The founders of the MNF were extremists, who were convinced that the union with India was 
detrimental to Mizos interests, and, hence, made the creation of an independent Mizoram (i.e. 
Mizo Hills) the foremost priority. Consistent with this goal, the MNF outlined the party's 
objectives in their manifesto. The principal aim of the MNF was to secure a separate state of 
Mizoram.  
First, once the goal of Mizoram was attained, the next step was to create a "Greater Mizoram" 
by including the Mizo-dominated areas of Assam and Manipur. With Mizos under one political 
umbrella, prosperity and development was a certainty. Interestingly. Second, Christianity was 
the official religion of the future independent Mizoram, and maximum efforts would be made 
to ensure its protection. Giving Christianity a special status was a direct function of securing 
support of the powerful clergy and the common people, who were deeply religious. Third, it 
was crucial that the MNF acquired support from a foreign power. The leadership realized that 
it was not possible for the MNF to achieve its goals, unless it could depend on an external actor 
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for financial assistance, ammunition and training. Hence, some officials were assigned the 
specific task of establishing contacts and acquiring support of third-parties. Next, to achieve 
their final goal of secession, it was initially imperative that the MNF capture the District 
Council, and the seats in the Assam Legislative Assembly. This would enable the MNF 
representatives to introduce polices that made the transformation to independence easier. 
Finally, while the MNF primarily relied on non-violence, it would simultaneously prepare for 
a violent movement as a long-term strategy, to achieve a separate state. Almost immediately, 
divisions over the methods to be employed in the struggle for independence arose in the MNF. 
Some MNF officials proposed the use of violence, and unity with the Naga rebels to fight the 
Indian Army.326 
Although the MNFs actions (manifesto and propaganda) were clearly secessionist, the Assam 
government chose to ignore them on the assumption that the MNF was using extremist language 
to increase its popularity and win the support of the Mizos. The Chief Minister of Assam. B.P. 
Chaliha dismissed suggestions of a hidden agenda on part of the MNF. He only focused on the 
last two objectives of the MNF charter (victory in local elections and use of non-violence), and 
rejected claims of the Mizo Union (centred around the MNFs separatist tendencies) as efforts 
to discredit the MNF. Even though the MNF propaganda was explicitly anti-Indian, the Chief 
Minister overlooked it and stressed that Laldenga's only aim was to strengthen his support base. 
Internal politics motivated the Assam government not only to overlook the anti-national 
activities of the MNF, but to deliberately encourage Laldenga so as to subvert the Mizo Union. 
Simultaneously, the army, which had all along suspected and warned the Chief Minister that 
preparations for revolt were underway, found huge amounts of arms hoarded in the hills. 
Finally, in February 1966, the Chief Minster realized his folly of trusting Laldenga. , and 
realised the gravity of the situation. The Assam government decided to induct another battalion 
of the Assam Rifles as a reinforcement to contain, and if necessary, overcome, the challenge of 
the MNF. Even at this time, Laldenga tried to compel Chaliha to withdraw the military force 
from Mizoram on the grounds that the Mizos detested violence. The Chief Minister was no 
longer fooled by Laldenga's pleas and refused to retract his order. However, it was too late, and 
before the Assam Rifles could reach the hills.  
In response to the outbreak of the Mizo insurgency, the Indian government used the army and 
air force to quell the rebellion, which increased use of violence by the Mizos and intensified the 
conflict. Fortunately, the Indian government recognized the folly of its strategy and switched 
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to the carrot-and-stick method, the other alternative to coercion outlined in the scheme.327 The 
change in strategy gradually impacted the response of the Mizos. As portrayed in the scheme, 
over time, the number of Mizos, including those belonging to the MNF, willing to change their 
position from a reliance on violence to negotiations increased.  
Though the Indian government did not declare martial law for the Mizo Hills, it did not interfere 
in the actions of the army. The army high command issued instructions that the armed forces 
were to function strictly in "aid of civil power". Next, it was crucial to assist the Assam Rifles 
regiments in the Aizawl headquarters and other posts, so that they did not surrender to the 
MNVs (Mizoram National Volunteers). However, the MNF continued to inflict losses on the 
army battalions such that they were forced to retreat. The situation was so completely out of 
control that Indian Air Force bombers were requisitioned to strafe the MNF positions. The 
bombings created deep resentment against the Indian government because the Indian Air Force, 
that is usually deployed for inter-state conflicts, was used to deal with an internal situation. The 
bombings did play a critical role in forcing the MNVs to abandon captured posts and take refuge 
in the hills.328 
The Indian government’s carrot and stick strategy was based on development, amnesty and 
regrouping of villages, created a positive environment. As a result, an increasing number of 
Mizos felt that the government was serious about improving the situation in the Mizo Hills. 
Two other government decisions played a critical role in helping India secure an advantage. 
First, in accordance with the directives of the central government, the Chief Minster of Assam 
declared in December 1966 that Mizo rebels who surrendered with arms, within three months 
(March 1967), would be granted amnesty. Despite no large-scale surrenders, the government 
persisted with its policy. In November 1967. , amnesty was again approved for a period of three 
months. The government expanded its offer and announced that rebels who voluntarily 
surrendered would be granted amnesty as well as rehabilitation benefits.329 In contrast, rebels 
captured by the security forces would be severely punished and would not avail of any 
rehabilitation facilities. Alongside amnesty, the Indian government decided to hold by-elections 
for the three seats to the Assam Legislative Assembly. 330 
Finally, grouped villages would accelerate economic development. Since the terrain of the 
region made it difficult to construct a communications network between villages, by grouping 
distant villages together, development schemes and social services could be provided to 
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villagers. Invoking Rule 57 of the Defense of India Rules, from 1967, the grouping of villages 
was implemented in three phases, with priority given to areas that were badly affected by the 
activities of the MNF. The government hoped that the Mizos would take advantage of these 
facilities and achieve economic development in the long-term, i.e. they could produce crops, 
and easy access to the plains would lead to profitable sales. 
 
Negotiate or Fight 
Army operations and the regrouping of villages led to a decrease in motivation among MNVs. 
The MNVs saw that former colleagues (who surrendered as opposed to being captured) and 
friends in the Mizo Hills were reaping the benefits of government development, while they 
spent their time escaping the security forces. As the Mizos331 in the hills began to prosper, they 
in turn considered the MNVs as impediments to progress and no longer "hero-worshipped" 
them. 
In an independent Mizoram, Christianity was to be the official religion. By according 
Christianity special protection, the main motive of the MNF was to win the support of the clergy 
and the masses, who were extremely religious. The lower clergy supported the MNF and 
refused to lose faith in the MNF, which was a descendent of the Mizo Cultural Society, a by-
product of the Church. The upper clergy, on the other hand, realized that the employment of 
violence would not help the MNF achieve its goals. 
Though it made several efforts to encourage negotiations, it was not successful. One possible 
explanation for this is that though the Church was the most dominant institution in Mizo society, 
and over 86% Mizos were Christians, yet in the Mizo Hills, tribal identity was so strong that 
religion could not serve as a binding force.332 
As the conflict went on the Church leaders became increasingly critical of the methods of the 
MNF and even issued a declaration to this effect. The MNF leadership was extremely angry 
and insisted that violence was imperative to counter the "indiscriminate" bombings and coercive 
tactics of the Indian armed forces. They further ordered the Church to detach itself from the 
political affairs of the Mizo Hills. At this stage, the Mizo villagers also extended loyalty to the 
MNF rather than the Church, since they believed that the MNF would lead them to prosperity 
and sovereignty. 
To conclude, several developments intersected to lead to the outbreak of the Mizo rebellion in 
February 1966. The military wing of the MNF, consisting of former members of the Indian 
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Army, planned Operation Jericho so meticulously that for a short period Indian authority lapsed 
in the Mizo Hills. The Indian government assigned the armed forces with the responsibility of 
restoring law and order in the hills. Unfortunately, in the early stages, the armed forces 
depended solely on coercion and bombings to manage the situation. Instead of leading to any 
kind of management, the situation in the Mizo Hills exacerbated. Not only did the Mizos 
increasingly sympathize with the MNF and become more conscious of their distinctive identity, 
there was a surge of anti-India sentiments. Fortunately, the Indian government reviewed the 
situation and changed its strategy to deal with the MNF. As per the new strategy, plans for the 
economic development of the Mizo Hills were introduced, amnesty and rehabilitation benefits 
for those who surrendered were announced, and a harsher policy of regrouping villages to 
isolate the MNF was initiated. As the benefits of this combination of carrot and stick began to 
trickle down, an increasing number of Mizos appeared willing to accept a settlement within the 
Indian Union. In fact, the educated leaders of the MNF also felt that negotiation with the Indian 
government was in the best interests of the Mizos. Moreover, they realized that though Pakistani 
and Chinese financial support was abundant, neither appeared inclined to officially recognize 
an independent Mizoram. However, Laldenga and the military wing were against any form of 
settlement, and were committed to securing a separate state. At this point, the armed wing was 
stronger than the civilian wing, and refused to follow their recommendation of surrender and 
negotiation. Thus, a change in government strategy led to a willingness to accommodate among 
a large section of the Mizos, including some crucial leaders of the MNF. 
 
Outcome 
In the 1960s, the Indian government realized its folly of depending on coercion to bring about 
a peaceful arrangement with the Mizos. Its tactic of ‘hitting hard over the head with a hammer 
and then teaching how to play the piano’ (i.e., punishing aggression while rewarding 
cooperation) yielded positive results. Many Mizo rebels, including some crucial leaders, 
renounced violence since they believed that the GoI was committed to its policy of 
rehabilitation and forgiveness. Development projects in the Mizo Hills also had a trickle-down 
effect such that the local population began to withdraw support from the MNF. The Mizos were 
willing to give the Indian government the opportunity to improve the situation in the hills. 
 
Critical Juncture 
From late 1970, three main events gradually pushed the conflict towards regulation. First, while 
the GoI persisted with its three-tiered strategy of amnesty, rehabilitation and development, it 
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upgraded the status of the Mizo Hills to Union Territory because this was in the best interest of 
the Mizos. This action demonstrated that the Indian government was determined to improve 
relations with the Mizos. Second, the support that the concessions evoked also encouraged 
Laldenga to consider negotiations but fear of the hard-liners prevented him from pursuing talks 
with the Indian government in a straightforward fashion. Finally, the break-up of Pakistan (an 
external event) and the consequent loss of sanctuary and funds, had an effect on the internal 
situation in the hills. These three events represent the critical juncture of the Mizo movement 
because they had a decided influence on the direction of the conflict.  
 
Event I: Mizo Hills converted into the Union Territory of Mizoram 
As a result of an increasing number of surrenders, the Indian government seriously considered 
separating the Mizo Hills from Assam, and converting it into the Union Territory of Mizoram. 
The Mizo Union, the District Congress, and other liberal groups (church leaders) in the hills 
encouraged this move. The belief was that the Mizos would be better able to integrate into the 
Indian polity, if the Mizo Hills were independent of Assam. Subsequently, discussions between 
the Indian government and the Mizo representatives commenced, and the likelihood that the 
Union Territory of Mizoram would soon become a reality was high. 
Since such an action was detrimental to the struggle for secession, the hard-liners in the MNF 
were determined to sabotage it. Though they attacked government targets and killed civilians 
in an attempt to spread fear and panic among the Mizos. , they were unsuccessful. More 
importantly, the Government of India refused to be intimidated by the MNF threats and 
continued with its plans to confer Union Territory status on the Mizo Hills. It also stepped-up 
its offers of amnesty (reward and rehabilitation) and encouraged "Mizos living as fugitives" in 
East Pakistan to surrender. In addition, the government made efforts to win over MNF rebels 
and assuage the fears of the Mizos.333 
Given the improved situation in the hills, the Indian government confirmed its resolve to elevate 
the Mizo Hills into the Union Territory of Mizoram, and implemented this decision on 21 
January, 1972. The new Union Territory of Mizoram was completely independent of Assam 
and was administered by a Council of Ministers with a Lt. Governor as the administrative head. 
It also had its own Legislative Assembly (30 elected and 3 nominated members) and one seat 
in the lower chamber of Parliament (Lok Sabha). Though the formation of the Union Territory 
of Mizoram did not meet the early Mizo aspirations for independence, this arrangement was 
accepted as a temporary measure by the Mizo parties and the Mizo people. Union Territory 
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status conferred greater decision-making power to the Mizos and a higher level of autonomy to 
Mizoram. For the time being, the Mizos were satisfied with an intermediate compromise 
between a (Mizo) District Council and the creation of a separate state (Mizoram within the 
Indian Union). In general, the formation of the Union Territory of Mizoram played an important 
role in increasing support and allaying the insecurities of the Mizos, and pushed the conflict a 
step closer to management. 334 
 
Event 2: Laldenga's double-role weakens the movement 
The Indian government's success with development schemes, increasing support in the hills, 
the rapid rise in surrenders, and the fall in Pakistani support due to the rebellion in the East, 
compelled Laldenga to review his decision to continue the violent struggle for Mizo 
independence.  
Laldenga wanted to negotiate with the Government of India but did not want this known to the 
hawks in the MNF and the Pakistani government. Hence, he made secret advances to Indian 
intelligence, while simultaneously vetoing proposals calling for political negotiations. This 
double-role of the chief certainly created confusion among the MNF cadre as well as the over-
ground Mizos (who were serving as Laldenga’s emissaries), and played a vital role in gradually 
weakening the movement.335 
 
Event 3: External (Break-up of Pakistan) factors 
The rebellion in the East Wing of Pakistan had simmered since the mid-1960s and full-fledged 
conflict erupted in 1970. The Pakistani army arrested and killed East Pakistani (Bengali) 
intellectuals and crushed civilian dissension brutally. As a result, the Pakistani authorities 
shifted the MNF rebels, including Laldenga, from their luxurious sanctuary in Dhaka to the 
Rangamati forests. The MNF cadre were disappointed by the transfer, and worried about the 
consequences of a complete withdrawal of Pakistani support. Hence, many of them took 
advantage of the Indian offer of amnesty and slowly returned to their old villages. 
With the support of the Indian Army, the revolutionary forces of East Pakistan (Mukti Bahini) 
defeated the Pakistani army in 1971 and the new state of Bangladesh came into being. The 
Bangladeshi leadership had close ties with the Indian government and did not allow the MNF 
to continue operations in its territory. This compelled several batches of the MNF cadre to 
surrender to the Indian security forces and seek amnesty from the Indian government. 
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The concessions (rehabilitation, amnesty, development, increased political autonomy) of the 
Indian government led many Mizo rebels to recognize the futility of armed conflict and they 
surrendered in large numbers. The deteriorating situation in East Pakistan, and the likely loss 
of a base and funds, if Pakistan was defeated, further urged Mizo rebels to surrender. Finally, 
the defeat of Pakistan and its surrender to the Indian army accelerated the return of Mizo 
rebels.336 Thus, while the Indian government's commitment to improve the condition in the 
Mizo Hills and pardon past offenses of the Mizo rebels encouraged surrenders, the (expected 
and actual) loss of an external benefactor expedited this process. 
The three events discussed above created a favorable environment that set in motion the process 
towards conflict resolution. The formation of the Union Territory of Mizoram, involvement of 
ex-MNF rebels in over-ground politics, continuance of the amnesty policy and a rise in the 
number of surrenders thereof, and emphasis on development signaled new beginnings but they 
also had adverse repercussions. First, to demonstrate that normalcy was returning to Mizoram, 
the government held elections, which met with considerable success. Though many MNF 
returnees joined politics, their loyalties were still with the MNF such that they used their newly-
acquired political power to harass the functioning government. Second, the government also 
decided to expand its amnesty policy and withdraw security forces from Mizoram. The MNF 
grabbed this opportunity to regroup and engage in severe violence. The situation worsened and 
it seemed that the situation in Mizoram would continue to exacerbate.337 
With the election of Lawrence Chal Chhunga. , a respected visionary of the Mizo Union, as 
leader of the Mizoram Assembly, the First elected government of the Union Territory of 
Mizoram began functioning. However, from the onset, the government was plagued with 
problems. The MNF let loose a reign of terror in Mizoram, which the government could not 
contain. As the weakness of Chhunga government became apparent, the Congress leadership 
suggested that a merger between the Mizo Union and the Congress party was in both their 
interests. As a result, at the 36th Session of the Mizo Union, its leaders explained the advantages 
of merger. They argued that peace and stability in Mizoram were of foremost importance, and 
hence, a merger would bridge the divide between the Mizo Unionists, ex-chiefs and their 
descendants, and ex-MNF members. Moreover, a successful merger would lead to the 
emergence of a national party, which would win the confidence of the government more easily 
and be able to negotiate more effectively than a regional party. Consequently, the resolution tor 
dissolving the Mizo Union was passed, and the Mizo Union and Congress merged to form the 
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Mizo Congress party.338 Thus, to prevent political instability in Mizoram, a major political party 
which was in power (for almost 27 years) abandoned its identity and united with a minor party. 
With the formation of the Union Territory of Mizoram and the establishment of an elected 
government, the Mizos were optimistic about the future of their region. This reemergence of 
democracy made them more conscious of their rights and privileges as citizens. Gradually, 
government development and rehabilitation projects started producing huge benefits such that 
normalcy began returning to Mizoram. However, the selective killing of Mizo (particularly ex-
MNF) officials, harassment and random attacks by a revived MNF made the Mizos extremely 
upset.339 Considering that the government was making an effort to bring peace and progress to 
Mizoram, the Mizos believed that the MNFs violence was ruining this possibility and Laldenga 
was prolonging the misery of the Mizos, in the hope that the MNF would receive support from 
Communist China. As a result, the Mizos increasingly opposed the MNF cadre, who were 
regarded as impediments to order and prosperity. 
 
Role of the External Actor 
The loss of a sanctuary as well as the creation of a state (Bangladesh) antagonistic to the MNF 
cause was a severe blow to the Mizo movement. While Pakistan could no longer support the 
MNF directly (training camps, shelter), it continued to abet the MNF by providing asylum and 
financial assistance to its leaders. The Pakistani authorities helped Laldenga escape from its 
former East Wing via Burma into Pakistan, where he was provided with refuge and aid to keep 
the movement alive. With the assistance of the Pakistani government. Laldenga maintained 
links with MNF hard-liners in the Arakans and also traveled to London so as to gain 
international recognition and support for the MNF.340 
The Chinese government played a more active role in assisting the MNF struggle against India. 
It set up camps in its border areas to train new volunteers in the art of subversive activities but 
gradually impressed on the Mizos that it was imperative that they became independent of 
foreign support.341 Moreover, though the Chinese government supplied funds and substantial 
consignments of weapons and equipment to the MNF through the pro-Chinese Communist 
Party of Burma (based in the Arakan Hills), it was not willing to officially recognize the MNF. 
The Communist Party of Burma, like the MNF. challenged the authority of the state and was 
engaged in an insurgency against the Burmese government. However, at no stage did Burma 
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help the MNF. instead, the Burmese army regularly launched anti-guerrilla offensives, which 
forced the MNA to flee into the Mizo Hills. 
Thus, after the fall of East Pakistan, the MNF was in dire need of sanctuary, funds, arms and 
training to continue its struggle against the Indian government. While direct Pakistani support 
waned due to the new geographical situation, enmity with India pushed it to continue helping 
Laldenga develop plans and spread anti-Indian propaganda. By providing refuge (Arakan 
Hills), weapons and funds, the Chinese and the Communist Party in the Arakans played a more 
direct role in helping the MNF sustain its struggle against India. A reexamination of the external 
dimension leads one to argue that if Pakistan and China had withdrawn their support for the 
MNF in the aftermath of the creation of Bangladesh, the movement may have slowly faded 
away, or Laldenga would have been forced to operate from the Arakans (which he did not want 
to do), seek exile abroad, or more likely negotiate with the Indian government. 
 
Response of the Indian Government – two-track strategy 
Fortunately, the government realized the mistakes associated with employing either 
negotiations only—played into hands of hawks who did not want any agreement— or coercion 
alone—indiscriminate harassment of Mizos alienating the ordinary man—and adopted an 
approach of carrot and stick, which pushed the autonomy-seekers towards management. 
First, the MNF and MNA were declared unlawful organizations. The government adopted a 
tough policy to deal with the MNF underground and a more sympathetic attitude towards ex- 
MNF members. Law and order was strictly enforced and policemen caught supporting the MNF 
were punished. The new policy began to pay dividends such that large quantities of arms and 
ammunition were seized and MNA insurgents apprehended. Second, the government made the 
utmost efforts to win over the moderates (Dumpawls) among the MNF and persuade them to 
return to normal life. 
Laldenga renewed efforts to talk peace with the Indian government in mid-1975. two months 
after Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency. The Indian government flew top MNF hard-liners to 
Cologne, where Laldenga conveyed his failure to secure foreign assistance for the Mizo cause, 
and more importantly, for the first time, broached the topic of negotiations. Laldenga persuaded 
the hawks to enter preliminary discussions with the Indians. 
The discussions in Cologne formed the basis for formal negotiations conducted in Delhi from 
24 January, 1976. From the onset, the talks were marred by disagreements within the MNF 
representation. Differences in opinion arose over the question of the timing of the talks, as well 
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as the validity of the MNF being the sole representative of the people.342 However. Laldenga 
argued that the Indian government was in a precarious position (state of emergency), and the 
MNF could extract major concessions from it. Furthermore, though elections were held after 
the formation of the Union Territory of Mizoram, Laldenga asserted that the MNF won a 
mandate in the last fair and free elections in 1962. Hence, he said that the MNF automatically 
had the endorsement of the Mizos.343 Laldenga seemed to forget that the political scenario and 
the level of development in the region had undergone a significant change since the outbreak 
of conflict. In the end. Laldenga prevailed and convinced other MNF officials to cooperate in 
negotiations with the Indian government. 
The Government of India used Laldenga's letter to Indira Gandhi, confirming the MNFs 
intention to work out an agreement within the Indian Constitution, as the reference for peace 
talks. However, other MNF leaders had no clue of this letter and thought that the Indian 
government was referring to the MNF Declaration of Independence. March 1 1966. Still, the 
government and MNF reached a tentative verbal agreement, which both parties mutually agreed 
to keep secret, till the re-election of Laldenga as President of the MNF.344 Finally, a peace 
agreement, soon thereafter termed by Laldenga as a press communique and not an accord, was 
signed on 1 July, 1976. 
The "agreement" consisted of four main elements. First, the MNF acknowledged that Mizoram 
was an integral part of India and expressed its willingness to accept a settlement within the 
Indian Constitution. Second, the MNF vowed to abjure violence, and agreed that underground 
personnel would surrender with their arms and ammunition in mutually acceptable camps. Next, 
the Indian government resolved to cease all security operations in Mizoram, except those at the 
international borders. Finally, talks were to be continued between representatives of the Indian 
government and MNF.  
The "accord" was received with enthusiasm in Mizoram; the Mizoram government declared a 
"thanksgiving” day to offer prayers in churches all over the region. The Chief Minister also 
publicly announced that MNF rebels would be welcomed and given the necessary assistance 
for rehabilitation. However, the hard-liners were furious with the agreement and the betrayal of 
the Mizo cause by Laldenga. Hence, in a total volte face. six days after the announcement of 
the "accord,” Laldenga denied entering into any agreement with the Indian government, and 
instead claimed that it was only a press communique. He further retracted the entire agreement, 
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stressing that the Indian government and the media misinterpreted the points of the 
communique to discredit his reputation in the MNF.345 Laldenga repeated his commitment to 
secure an independent homeland for the Mizos and continue the struggle to achieve this goal. 
Thus, to prevent losing a grip on the MNF and to demonstrate his commitment to the goals of 
the MNF, Laldenga instructed the rebels to step up hostilities against the Indian government. 
He hoped that violence would lead to the dismissal of the elected Chhunga ministry and his 
ascension to power through constitutional means. This did not happen. Instead, the Centre 
imposed Presidents Rule and then held elections, which led to the Peoples Conference gaining 
power.  
In May 1984, elections to the Mizoram Legislative Assembly were held. The Congress (I) 
contesting on the slogan of "peace at any cost” defeated Sailo's Peoples Conference. The victory 
demonstrated that the Mizos were keen to achieve peace as a step towards higher economic 
development.  
In general, a combination of the inability of the MNF to resist the Indian army, the reduced 
morale of the MNF and MNA, the increasing number of MNF rebels wanting to return to a 
normal life, the economic growth of Mizoram, and the mandate of the Mizos indicating their 
desire of peace, convinced Laldenga that it was imperative that he worked out an agreement 
with the Indian government, if he wished to capture legitimate political power. The MNF 
announced a cease-fire but this time the Indian government did not reciprocate by suspending 
counterinsurgency operations. It made clear that the talks in Delhi were to be accompanied by 
security operations in Mizoram. Formal talks between the Indian government and the MNF 
were scheduled for 31 October, 1984. Despite Mrs. Gandhi's assassination on that day. Rajiv 
Gandhi, the new Prime Minister of India, took over the negotiation process and talks proceeded 
steadily.”346 Four features stand out in the period leading upto the formal signing of the accord 
and are useful lessons for successful management. First, the government agreed to sign the 
accord only 347 when it was certain that Laldenga had regained control of the MNF and believed 
that there was consensus in the MNF on accepting statehood within the Indian constitution, i.e. 
no stray group was left behind.348 At the same time, the government warned that if there was 
violence despite the peace accord, it would crackdown brutally on the dissidents. Second, 
instead of the accord being signed by the government and Laldenga, the government thought it 
more prudent to involve the Congress, which agreed to share power with the MNF in the 
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settlement. Hence, Laldenga first entered into an agreement with the All India Congress, to 
which the ruling Congress in Mizoram belonged. This indicated the acceptance of the MNF as 
an Indian political party as well as the acknowledgment of the Constitution of India by the 
leader of an outlawed party. Finally, the usual custom of surrender of arms involves a public, 
formal ceremony where each rebel presents his arms and then promises to abide by the Indian 
Constitution. Many rebels prefer to continue conflict since they find this means of laying down 
arms humiliating. To avoid this form of disarming rebels in the Mizo case, the Home Secretary 
of India and Laldenga's lawyer, Swaraj Kaushal worked out a new mode of surrender. There 
was to be no public ceremony, instead, each MNF rebel would deposit his weapons in a hut on 
the Indian border and then be greeted by Indian army personnel. Laldenga as well as the MNF 
members appreciated the consideration shown to them by the Indian government, and accepted 
the laying down of arms in privacy.  
The stage was set for the formal signing of the Accord, and on 30 June, 1986, Laldenga for the 
MNF, Lalthanhawla for the Mizoram government, and Home Secretary R. D. Pradhan on behalf 
of the Government of India signed the "Memorandum of Settlement,”349 In accordance with 
this accord, the Indian Parliament passed the 53rd Amendment Bill of the Constitution and the 
State of Mizoram Bill upgrading Mizoram to a state within the Indian Union. In the end, Indian 
federalism provided Mizoram real autonomy while Laldenga achieved the authority he always 
desired; i.e. the Mizos got statehood while India maintained its territorial integrity. 
 
Conflict Management & Negotiation Process 
The MNF began as a political party in 1960, went underground and fought for secession from 
India, and finally, due to the flexibility of the Indian political system, returned to national 
political life in June 1986. Soon after signing the Memorandum of Settlement in 1986, the MNF 
amended its Constitution, and promised to abide by the Constitution of India. Laldenga assumed 
leadership of the Interim Assembly of the Mizoram government. Elections were held in the 
following year, and the MNF led by Laldenga became the first regional guerrilla organization 
to win elections in an Indian state after having challenged Indian rule for two decades.350 The 
MNF lost the next elections held in January 1989, but did not resort to violence and insurgency. 
Laldenga died soon thereafter, and was accorded a state funeral, demonstrating that the Indian 
government forgave him for past offenses. Since then, the MNF has split, with the dissidents 
forming their own party or joining the Congress (I), but personality problems rather than goals 
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(secession or not) of the party have motivated divisions. In the most recent elections to the 
Mizoram Legislative Assembly, the MNF-led coalition returned to power. 
Mizoram is a case of successful management, for over thirty years after the signing of the 
accord, there are no indications of a return to insurgency in the region. Politicians use elections 
as the means to acquire power and implement their agendas. The rebels are successfully turned 
into stakeholders,351central assistance to Mizoram has increased, the minorities (Pawis, Lakhers 
and Chakmas) are protected, and it can be argued that Mizoram is the most peaceful state in 
India's conflict ridden northeast. 
 
Outcome and Assessment 
According to Goswami, the Mizo case of conflict management has certain important lessons 
for conflict resolution policies for other ongoing peace processes in the northeast and beyond.352 
Furthermore, it is essential to address the roots of a conflict, its causes, to be able to try to 
negotiate and, eventually, met the demands. The Mizo peace process was successful due to the 
fact that the demands of Mizos were met by the GoI. The significance of the consensus reached 
at by a ‘principled’ negotiation is the key lesson drawn from the Mizo conflict settlement. When 
the negotiations started, the positions of GoI and MNF were different (e.g., the GoI position to 
preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state and MNF’s demand for 
independence) and there seemed to be no little chance to reach a mutually acceptable 
agreement. However, the GoI was able to distinguish between the MNF’s position and its 
interests, which included autonomy from Assam, self-regulation of its internal affairs as well 
as the preservation of its cultural heritage (language, holidays, education, etc.) Meeting these 
demands by establishing a Mizo state within India exemplarily shows a successful case of both 
negotiations done on lines of multilevel ‘principled’ negotiation as well as accommodation of 
demands and integration based on consociational power-sharing (executive power-sharing, 
segmental autonomy, proportionality and minority veto). Furthermore, Mizo case study shows 
us the importance of political will and elite level politics (i.e., the leadership of Rajiv 
Gandhi).353 
Another vital aspect of Mizo peace process is the significance of civil society and other non-
government agencies in settling the ethnopolitical conflicts, underlining the ‘multilevel’ 
approach to conflict settlement. The Mizo case study exemplarily shows how rebels like 
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Laldenga and other separatist and secessionist leaders become stakeholders354, choosing ballots 
instead of bullets.  
Another positive aspect, the “overarching identity” factor facilitating power-sharing, can be 
observed through the establishment of a “strong and inclusive pan-Mizo identity”.355  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the Mizo peace process shows the two-track strategy pursued by the GoI in 
similar cases – first, sending in the military and then organizing elections and thus, sharing 
power. What is new is almost ideal type pattern of Mizo conflict resolution with regard to the 
multilevel principled negotiation. Furthermore, one can learn several lessons from the Mizo 
case study, such as the importance of both political elites as well as leaders of the civil society 
in trying to solve or prevent an ethno-political conflict (i.e., top-down and bottom-up 
approaches); the significance of timing in politics and, in particular when trying to solve an 
ethnic conflict.356  
It was an open framework of the negotiations which facilitated ‘room to maneuver’ both for the 
rebels as well as GoI, to enable both parties to reach amicable agreement.  
  
                                                 
354 Mitra & Singh, 2009. 
355 Goswami, 2009, p.585 
356 More on the importance of timing in politics in the case study on Sri Lanka. 
Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and Evaluation 
106 
III.1.3 Sri Lanka 
Figure 7. Map of Sri Lanka357 Figure 8. The area of Sri Lanka claimed 
by the LTTE as Tamil358 
 
 
 
 
Table14: Chronology Sri Lanka359 
Time Key events 
1948  Ceylon gains full independence 
1949  Indian Tamil plantation workers disenfranchised and many deprived of 
citizenship. 
1956  Solomon Bandaranaike elected on wave of Sinhalese nationalism. Sinhala 
made sole official language and other measures introduced to bolster 
Sinhalese and Buddhist feeling. More than 100 Tamils killed in widespread 
violence after Tamil parliamentarians protest at new laws. 
1958  Anti-Tamil riots leave more than 200 people dead. Thousands of Tamils 
displaced. 
1959  Bandaranaike assassinated by a Buddhist monk. Succeeded by widow, 
Sirimavo, who continues nationalisation programme. 
1965  Opposition United National Party wins elections and attempts to reverse 
nationalisation measures. 
1970  Sirimavo Bandaranaike returns to power and extends nationalisation 
programme 
1972  Ceylon changes its name to Sri Lanka and Buddhism given primary place as 
country's religion, further antagonising Tamil minority. 
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1976  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed as tensions increase in 
Tamil-dominated areas of north and east. 
1977  Separatist Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) party wins all seats in 
Tamil areas. Anti-Tamil riots leave more than 100 Tamils dead. 
1983  13 soldiers killed in LTTE ambush, sparking anti-Tamil riots leading to the 
deaths of several hundred Tamils. Start of what Tigers call "First Eelam 
War". 
1985  First attempt at peace talks between government and LTTE fails. 
1987  Government forces push LTTE back into northern city of Jaffna. Government 
signs accords creating new councils for Tamil areas in north and east and 
reaches agreement with India on deployment of Indian peace-keeping force. 
1990  Indian troops leave after getting bogged down in fighting in north. Violence 
between Sri Lankan army and separatists escalates. "Second Eelam War" 
begins. 
Thousands of Muslims are expelled from northern areas by the LTTE. 
1991  LTTE implicated in assassination of Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi in southern 
India. 
1993  President Premadasa killed in LTTE bomb attack. 
1994  President Kumaratunga comes to power pledging to end war. Peace talks 
opened with LTTE. 
1995  "Third Eelam War" begins when rebels sink naval craft. 
1995-2001 War rages across north and east. Tigers bomb Sri Lanka's holiest Buddhist 
site. President Kumaratunga is wounded in a bomb attack. Suicide attack on 
the international airport destroys half the Sri Lankan Airlines fleet. 
2002  February - Government and Tamil Tiger rebels sign a Norwegian-mediated 
ceasefire. 
 
De-commissioning of weapons begins; the road linking the Jaffna peninsula 
with the rest of Sri Lanka reopens after 12 years; passenger flights to Jaffna 
resume. Government lifts ban on Tamil Tigers. Rebels drop demand for 
separate state. 
2004  Suicide bomb blast in Colombo - the first such incident since 2001. 
2005 Row over deal reached with Tamil Tiger rebels to share nearly $3bn in 
tsunami aid among Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims. 
2005  Mahinda Rajapaksa, prime minister at the time, wins presidential elections. 
Most Tamils in areas controlled by the Tamil Tigers do not vote. 
2006   Attacks begin to escalate again. 
2006  Tiger rebels and government forces resume fighting in the north-east in worst 
clashes since 2002 ceasefire. Government steadily drives Tamil Tigers out of 
eastern strongholds over following year. 
Peace talks fail in Geneva. 
2008  Government pulls out of 2002 ceasefire agreement, launches massive 
offensive. 
2009 January Government troops capture the northern town of Kilinochchi, held for ten 
years by the Tamil Tigers as their administrative headquarters. President 
Mahinda Rajapakse calls it an unparalleled victory and urges the rebels to 
surrender. 
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2009 March Former rebel leader Karuna is sworn in as minister of national integration and 
reconciliation. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi 
Pillay accuses both sides of war crimes. 
2009 May Government declares Tamil Tigers defeated after army forces overrun last 
patch of rebel-held territory in the northeast. Military says rebel leader 
Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed in the fighting. Tamil Tiger statement says 
the group will lay down its arms. 
2010  President Rajapaksa's ruling coalition wins landslide victory in parliamentary 
elections. 
Parliament approves a constitutional change allowing President Rajapaksa to 
seek unlimited number of terms. 
2011 April - UN says both sides in the Sri Lankan civil war committed atrocities against 
civilians and calls for an international investigation into possible war crimes. 
Sri Lanka says the report is biased. 
2011 July  Sri Lanka's largest ethnic Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance, wins two-
thirds of local councils in the former war zone in the north and east. 
2012 November The government dismisses a UN report that it intimidated UN staff 
investigating abuses at the end of the civil war in 2009. 
2013 September  Tamil National Alliance opposition party wins first elections to semi-
autonomous provincial council in the north, with 78% of the vote. 
Commonwealth observers say army intimidation compromised the vote's 
environment. 
2013 November  Sri Lanka hosts the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM). The leaders of Canada, India and Mauritius refuse to attend amid 
calls for a boycott over Sri Lanka's human rights record. 
2015 January  Maithripala Sirisena becomes president. 
2015 September  Sri Lanka rejects a UN call for international involvement in an investigation 
into war crimes. 
2015 October  Sri Lanka co-sponsors a UN Human Rights Council resolution calling for a 
special judicial mechanism to prosecute war crimes. 
2016 June Sri Lankan government acknowledges for the first time that some 65,000 
people are missing from its 26-year-long war with Tamil Tiger rebels and a 
separate Marxist insurrection. 
2016 July The government announces its aim for Sri Lanka to become completely 
demilitarized by 2018, a significant development which would see the end of 
the army's involvement in civilian life after decades of ethnic war. 
2016 August Parliament passes a law to establish an office to trace the thousands of people 
who disappeared during the war and separate Marxist insurrection. 
2017 February  Government implements Right to Information Act meant to curb corruption 
and provide timely information to the public. 
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“Minorities” of Sri Lanka  
Ethnic groups  
The Constitution of Sri Lanka does not give a definition of “minority”.360 The constitutional 
provisions or any other legal stipulations lack the concept of “minority” in any form altogether. 
Tables 15 and 16 show the ethnic and religious composition of the country:  
 
Table 15: Population of Sri Lanka by ethnicity, 1921 – 2011, in %361 
Ethnic Group 1921 1931 1946 1953 1963 1971 1981 2001* 2012 
Sinhalese 67.0 65.3 69.4 59.3 71.0 72.0 74.0 74.5 74.9 
Sri Lankan Tamil 11.5 11.2 11.0 10.9 11.0 11.2 12.7 11.9 11.2 
Upcountry Tamil 13.4 15.4 11.7 12.0 10.6 9.3 5.5 4.6 4.2 
Sri Lankan Moor  6.3 5.6 5.1 6.3 6.5 6.7 7.0 8.3 9.2 
Others 1.8 2.5 1.6 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 
*estimated population. Census was not completed in the Northern and Eastern Provinces except for 
Ampara District 
 
 
Table 16: Population of Sri Lanka by Religion, in %362 
Religion 2001 2012 
Buddhists 69.3 70.2 
Hindus 15.5 12.6 
Muslims 7.6 9.7 
Christians 7.5 7.4 
Others 0.1 0.05 
 
The majority community in Sri Lanka is Sinhalese consisting of 74.9 per cent of the population, 
which is predominantly differentiated by the language it speaks (i.e., Sinhala). 
According to Russell and Matles, the solidarity of the Sinhalese ethnic community is fortified 
by the Buddhist religion.363 The data presented by the authors show that in 1988 approximately 
the overwhelming majority of the Sinhala speakers were Buddhists (93 percent), and that almost 
all Buddhists in Sri Lanka were Sinhala speakers (99.5 percent).364 Furthermore, authors’ 
observations point to the “long relationship between Buddhism and the culture and politics of 
the island, focused on “the importance of preserving this fragile cultural inheritance.” 365   
                                                 
360 This chapter builds upon Carciumaru, 2012, pp. 8-10. 
361 Source: Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, 1921-1981; Sri Lanka Population and Housing Census, 
2001, in Bandarage, 2009, p. 3; Census of Population and Housing 2012 - Final Report. 
362 Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book-2009. 
363 Ross, R.R. and Savada, A.M. (2002). Sri Lanka: A Country Study. In Walter Nubin (ed.) Sri Lanka: current 
issues and historical background. New York: Nova Science Publishers, pp. 77-220. Cf. Ross, R.R. et al. (ed.) 
(1990). Sri Lanka – a Country Study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
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Björkman shows that even sharing a language and religion, the Sinhalese, in the nineteenth and 
first half of the twentieth centuries, “self-consciously divided and defined themselves as either 
"Kandyan" or the "low-country" Sinhalese.”366 However, the Sinhala linguistic nationalism has 
made the importance of such cleavages as the one described above (i.e., between Kandyan and 
low-country Sinhalese) irrelevant, prioritizing exclusively the linguistic identity, through which 
all Sinhala speakers defined themselves against those speaking Tamil.  
The largest ethnic minority, and the only national minority in Sri Lanka, based on Kymlicka’s 
categorization367, is Sri Lankan Tamils, also called “Ceylon”, “Jaffna” or “indigenous” 
Tamils.368 They formed a majority in Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, especially 
in the Northern Districts of Jaffna where they represented 99.9 per cent, 369  
According to Ross, the overwhelming majority (almost 80 percent) of the Sri Lankan Tamils 
were Hindus and the rest are Christians. They were brought up and educated to be and feel 
different from their Sinhalese counterparts. Ross points out that the entire cultural and social 
sources (e.g., myths, legends, caste structure, etc.) of the Sri Lankan Tamils were distinctive 
from the Sinhalese.370 
Sri Lanka Moors commonly referred to as Muslims, Sri Lanka's second-largest minority after 
Tamils, share close linguistic and cultural ties with Tamils and speak Tamil language.371 
However, the Muslim community perceives itself as a separate ethnic community, distinct from 
the Sinhala, Tamil and other ethnic groups. Religion, rather than language or history linked to 
territory, forms the basis of their identity.372 
 
 
 
                                                 
366 Björkman, J.W. (1996). On Lions, Tigers and Peacocks: Indo-Lankan Ethno-Political Relations. In Paul A. 
Groves, (ed.) Economic Development and Social Change in Sri Lanka. A Spatial and Policy Analysis. New Delhi: 
Manohar. p. 332 as well as de Silva, K.M. (1981). A History of Sri Lanka. London: C. Hurst. 
367 Kymlicka speaks about “national minorities”, which are: “[…] groups that formed complete and functioning 
societies on their historic homeland prior to being incorporated into a lager state. The incorporation of such national 
minorities has typically been involuntary, due to colonization, conquest, or the ceding of territory from one 
imperial power to another, but may also arise voluntarily, as a result of federation. The category of national 
minorities includes both “state-less nations” (like the Québécois, Puerto Ricans, Catalans, Scots) and “indigenous 
people” (like the Indians, Inuit, Sami, Maori).” 
368 See Daniel, E.V. (1996). Charred Lullabies. Princeton University Press, pp.16-19. 
369 Source: Department of Census and Statistics – Sri Lanka, Population and Housing Statistics Special 
Enumeration 2007, Basic Population Information of Jaffna District 2007.  
370 See Ross, 1990. 
371 Imtiyaz, A.R.M. (2009) The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka: Special Problems and Solutions. Journal of Asian 
and African Studies, 44(4), pp. 407-427. 
372 In this sense see Raheem, M. (2007). Muslims and the Peace Process. In Alok Bansal et al. (ed.) Sri Lanka. 
Search for Peace. New Delhi: Manas Publications, p. 86. 
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Table 17: Number and Percentage of Muslim Population, 1963 - 2007373 
Year 
Districts 
Trincomalee Ampara Batticaloa 
No. % No. % No. % 
1963 40,775 29.4 97,621 46.1 46,038 23.5 
1971 59,924 31.8 126,365 46.4 60,889 23.7 
1981 75,039 29.3 161,568 41.3 78,829 23.9 
2007 151,692 45.4 268,630 44.0 128,964 25.0 
 
Daniel tells us that the ancestors of Upcountry Tamils, also referred to as “Estate Tamils”, 
“Tamils of Indian Origin” or simply “Indian Tamils”,374 were predominantly laborers, working 
on coffee and (subsequently) tea plantations in Sri Lanka.375 According to Valentine E. Daniel, 
“notwithstanding many cultural changes that followed after their arrival from South India, 
upcountry Tamils never lost their sense of continuity with village India,” which was one of the 
factors leading the Sinhalese to perceive Upcountry Tamils as foreigners.376 
As could be observed from the Census data presented in the Table on ethnic groups, the total 
number of upcountry Tamils is continually decreasing. At its peak (1953) this group constituted 
12 per cent of the island’s population, 1 per cent more than the number of Sri Lanka Tamils at 
that time.377 Presently, upcountry Tamils constitute a majority of 47.3 per cent in the Central 
Province District Nuwara Eliya.378 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitutional Safeguards – from Soulbury Constitution to present day379 
                                                 
373 Source: Department of Census and Statistics – Sri Lanka, Population and Housing Statistics Special 
Enumeration 2007, Basic Population Information of Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee Districts 2007. 
374 Daniel, 1996, p. 16. 
375 For the origins and causes of Indian immigration see de Silva, 1981, pp. 282-296.  
376 “[t]he multiple crops characteristic of villages in India were replaced by a single cash crop. Whereas in their 
ancestral Indian villages most of what was grown was consumed by the residents, on the estate almost entire yield 
of this single crop was to be exported. Caste distinctions that might have been kept clear by distinct residential 
patterns in village India were threatened and often effaced as all workers were compelled to live in identical, 
barracks-style line rooms, regardless of caste.”, in Daniel, 1996, p. 75. 
377 Daniel, 1996, pp. 74-75. 
378 Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census of Population and Housing 2001. 
379 This section draws extensively from Carciumaru, 2012.  
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The Sri Lanka’s Independence Constitution, based on the recommendations made by the 
Soulbury Commission, sought to protect the ethnic minority rights. Thus, under Article 29(2) 
it contained provisions that Parliament was not competent to pass laws that: 
(a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion; or 
(b) make provisions of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons or other 
communities or religions are not made liable; or 
(c) confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons 
of other communities or religions; or 
(d) alter the constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the governing authority of that body.380 
 
Although Article 29 (2) represented certain cast-iron guarantees given to the minorities by the 
departing colonial government as a quid pro quo for their accepting a constitution establishing 
a unitary State for independent Sri Lanka, de Silva rightfully observed that the lack of the en-
trenchment in the Constitution of guarantees of fundamental rights, on the lines enacted in the 
constitutions of India, Malaysia, and other post-colonial states, enabled the Sinhalese decision-
makers to ignore it, passing laws most of which adversely affected the minorities.381  
Within a few months of Independence, the government of Sri Lanka (Ceylon) enacted the Citizenship 
Act of 1948, eliminating the vast majority of Indian plantation workers (upcountry Tamils) from the 
electoral registers by the simple device of defining the right to citizenship far more rigidly than 
previously;382 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949, both of which 
completely changed the representational picture. Quoting the Sinhalese political scientist I.D.S. 
Weerawardena, Wilson writes that the disfranchisement of the Indians was “a broken pledge to all the 
minorities”, adding that: “[t]he moral basis of the Soulbury Constitution has been wiped away”383  
Thus, it is shown that constitutional “ironclad guarantees” were not an obstacle as long as the restrictions 
were interpreted to be viewed as applicable to all sections of the people and not to a specific ethic 
community. Just to give one example, Marasinghe pointedly observes why was it not difficult to 
understand the reason the Official Language Act of 1956 was never challenged.384 The Act did 
not violate Article 29(2) of the Soulbury Constitution simply because it was not viewed as a 
constitutional amendment and therefore required only a simple majority. 
                                                 
380 See the full text of Ceylon Constitution Order in Council 1946, which at Sri Lanka’s independence became the 
country’s first Constitution, at: http://www.tamilnation.org/srilankalaws/46constitution.htm. Consider also 
Marasinghe, L. (2004). Constitutionalism: A Broader Perspective. Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic 
Studies., p.14; also de Silva, 1981, pp. 510-539; see also Carciumaru, 2012. 
381 De Silva, 1981, p. 511; it should be added that the Constitution was a heritage from the British, and it made no 
mention of fundamental rights because, “according to the British tradition, the protection of such rights is left to 
the due process of law.” in Rothermund, D. (2010). The Republic. In Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund. 
A History of India. Fifth Edition, London: Routledge. 
382 De Silva, 1981, p. 511. 
383 Wilson, A.J. (1988). The break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. London: C. Hurst, pp. 18-19. 
384 Marasinghe, 2004, p. 19. 
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Compared to Soulbury Constitution, the present Constitution, promulgated in 1978,385 does 
guarantee fundamental rights to every citizen, such as every person the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Articles 10), the freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Article 11), Article 12 secures the right to equality, whereas Article 13 speaks about 
the freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and punishment, and prohibition of retroactive 
penal legislation. The Constitution of Sri Lanka also guarantees, under Article 14(1)(a-i), the 
freedom of speech and expression to every citizen, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the 
freedom of association including the freedom to join a trade union, the freedom to manifest his 
or her religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, the freedom to promote 
his or her culture and to use his own language, the freedom to engage in any lawful occupation, 
profession, trade, business or enterprise, and the freedom of movement, residence including the 
freedom to return to Sri Lanka. 
Moreover, Chapter IV – Language, proclaims under Article 18(1) that while the Official 
Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala, “Tamil shall also be an official language” (Article 
18(2)). The Constitution also regards English as the “link language” (Article 18(3)) 386. In this 
Chapter, there is express provision permitting the use of Tamil language in Parliament, local 
authorities, courts, universities, schools and in official correspondence (Articles 20-24). Under 
Article 25 the State obliges itself to provide adequate facilities for the use of the languages 
provided in this Chapter. 
Nonetheless, there are several issues in the Constitution that both fail to guarantee the security 
of the minorities and arouse their concern in terms of equal rights and justice for all.387 Article 
9 of the Constitution, for example, proclaims that “the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to 
Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and 
foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 
14(1)(e).”388  
                                                 
385 Next section draws heavily on Constitution of Sri Lanka (as amended up to 17th Amendment, 3rd October 2001), 
revised edition 2008, available at: http://www.parliament.lk/about_us/constitution.pdf, accessed on September 1, 
2018; see also Carciumaru, 2012. 
386 Article 18(1-3) where amended by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka in 1987. 
387 See Carciumaru, 2012.  
388 According to Stepan “this stipulation was already introduced in 1972 Republican Constitution. Compare this 
to India, where “secularism” is one of the major principles of the Constitution, meaning both equal and due 
respect for all religions and faiths as well as separation of the state from the church. The preamble of the 
Constitution of India declared one of the objectives to be to secure to all citizens of India the freedom of faith, 
belief, and worship. The chapter on fundamental rights provided a constitutional guarantee to minority groups, 
incorporating a separate group of rights in Articles 25-28 focusing on the right to freedom of religion.”, in Stepan, 
2006, p. 7; also see the Constitution of India (updated up to 94th Amendment Act), available at: 
https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india. 
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According to Bandarage, the purpose of including this Article into the Constitution was not to 
discriminate against other minorities, but to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana’s unique 
cultural heritage.389  
Though the provision allowing each religious group to manage its own affairs390 was included 
in the Soulbury Constitution Article 29(2)(4), prohibiting the enactment of legislation 
restricting the free exercise of any religion or altering the constitution of any religious body 
without the consent of that body, this is not present in the current Constitution anymore.  
 
Sinhalese – a majority with a minority complex391 
The minority complex of the Sinhala majority and the majority complex of the Tamil minority 
in Sri Lanka can be understood only by taking into account the regional, demographic and 
political dimensions.392 The Sinhalese represent an overwhelming majority on the island. 
However, some, including the elites, see themselves as a minority endangered by the larger 
Tamil community in southern India as well as Jaffna and Trincomalee (north and north-east of 
Sri Lanka).393 The Indian state of Tamil Nadu is almost double the geographic area of Sri Lanka 
and also more than three and half times its population (72,147,030 versus 20,359,439)394. 
This minority complex led the Sinhalese elites to portray the conflict with Tamils as a 
primordial conflict based on mutual distrust and violence spanning over more than two 
millennia. According to the Sinhala nationalist position, pre-colonial Sri Lanka prior to the 
advent of European invaders was a mono-ethnic and mono-religious Sinhala Buddhist state 
where the Tamils were migrant aliens. This position emphasizes that even today; Tamil Nadu 
                                                 
389 See Bandarage, op.cit., 2009; Roberts, M. (2001). The Burden of History: Obstacles to Power Sharing in Sri 
Lanka. A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Recollection, Reinterpretation & Reconciliation. Monograph 
No. 21. Sri Lanka: Marga Institute; Wilson, A.J. (1988). The break-up of Sri Lanka:The Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. 
London: C. Hurst, – particularly interesting his point of view, because between 1978-1983 he acted as an unofficial 
constitutional adviser to the President of Sri Lanka. 
390 Cf. Article 26 of the Constitution of India. 
391 Consider Kishore Dash’s pointed analysis: “Since ethnic minorities in all states of South Asia have close 
affiliation with their kinfolks in neighboring states, cross-border ethnic identities widely prevail in South Asia. 
There are majority groups-apart from the Sinhalese-of other small South Asian states that suffer from a minority 
complex, e.g. the Indian Nepalese of the Tarai region together with their co-ethnics in the Indian states of Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh outnumber the Nepalese in Nepal; Bhutan’s Nepalese groups together with Indian Nepalese 
outnumber Bhutan’s majority Drukpas,” in Dash, K. (2008). Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, 
Institutional Structures. Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series. Routledge, p.126.  
392 See also Korf, B. (2006). Who is the rogue? Discourse, power and spatial politics in post-war Sri Lanka. 
Political Geography, 25(3), pp. 279-297. 
393 See Carciumaru, 2012. 
394 Source: Census 2011, for Tamil Nadu available at 
https://www.census2011.co.in/census/state/tamil+nadu.html; Census of Population and Housing 2012 for Sri 
Lanka, available at http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/Pages/Activities/Reports/SriLanka.pdf. 
Also compare Romanian speaking Moldovans’ “minority complex” to Russian minority’s “majority complex” 
(though, the former is in majority in Moldova, it is in overwhelming minority in the region, i.e., compared to 
Russia, see Chapter III. Case Studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe). 
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is the “country of Tamils” or the “land of Tamil”, not Sri Lanka. Invoking these historical and 
contemporary claims, the 2003 Report of the National Joint Committee of Sinhala 
Organizations (NJC) argued against a federal constitution that would lead to devolution of 
power to the Tamils: 
 
The “Tamil Ethnic Problem” […] is a fiction […] crafted by relatively recent migrants whose historical homelands 
lie in South India. […] A migrant population never qualifies for national status in the host country […] the 5% 
Turks who live in Germany do not make a “nation” – their nation is Turkey. Similarly, the nation of the Tamil 
speaking Dravidian groups exists in South India. So the “nation” thus defined is inconsistent with international 
norms of nation making, nationalism and aspiration to national self-determination. […] Tamil nationalism […] 
makes a logical application in South India and not in Sri Lanka.395  
 
The above cited report exemplarily depicts Sinhala people’s attitude towards the Tamils from 
Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. The latter are perceived by the former as alien conquerors rooted in 
a different culture and with distinct and (foreign, sic!) religious as well as linguistic affiliations, 
who ready to invade and assimilate their country. See the Figures below. 
 
Figure 8. Indo-Iranian vs Dravidian Languages396 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, at the independence, due to historical reasons, the Tamil minority was more favorably 
situated in educational (students), business (entrepreneurs) and professional branches (doctors, 
engineers) than the Sinhalese majority. Stepan depicts a very bleak picture regarding the deplorable 
state of Sinhalese schools, heritage and cultural monuments at the Independence.397  
                                                 
395 A Case Against a Federal Constitution for Sri Lanka: Report of an Independent and Representative Committee, 
Colombo: The National Joint Committee, September 2003, p. 12, cited in Bandarage, 2009, p. 19. 
396 Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Sri-Lanka, accessed on 
01.02.18 
397 “…at the Independence, Buddhist monuments were in a sad state of disrepair. Also, during the British period, 
much of the public expenditures for schooling went to “state assisted” English language privately run schools. 
These schools, the best in Ceylon, often had British and American missionary origins. They were attended 
disproportionately by the minority community of Sri Lankan Tamils, who due to their high quality education in 
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Sinhalese political leaders under the GoSL tried to address and redress the challenges faced by 
the Sinhalese majority through positive discrimination policy initiatives. However, their 
polarizing policies and initiatives led to the exacerbation of the emerging conflict and 
consolidation of two distinct nations, Sinhalese and Tamils.398 
 
Background: Conflict stages 
Sri Lanka-a multiethnic, multi-religious country, in its more than seventy years of independence 
from the British rule, has always had a Sinhala Buddhist as the executive head of government 
or president.399 Does this banal statistical aspect allow me to draw the conclusion that minorities 
did not matter or did not stand any chance in Sri Lanka?  
Compared to India or to any other post-colonial state, for that matter, Sri Lanka was in a much 
better position at the Independence. The Sri Lankan founding fathers and constitution-makers 
were not facing such issues as balkanization of the country (e.g., such secessionist movements 
as Dravida Nadu in the South India). However, despite the favorable conditions at the 
Independence, the country faced a protracted civil war, which lasted for over 25 years. Sri 
Lankan case study exemplifies the path dependency of the policies and actions of its political 
elites, restricting their actions and strategies to prevent the escalation of the conflict and to settle 
it through negotiations.400 
At Independence, the Constitution established a Westminster style two tiered parliamentary 
system, whereas the minorities were protected by the Article 29. Regarding minority politics, 
Jayasuriya characterizes this immediate phase, which lasted until 1956, as “integrative 
secularism,” based on a fruitful collaboration between the Sinhalese and Tamil elites.401 
                                                 
English, won a larger relative share of appointments, via competitive exams, to the highly coveted Ceylonese 
Administrative Service than did the Sinhalese.” Stepan, 2006, p. 7. 
398 See Stepan, 2006, pp. 1-7. 
399 Sri Lanka Freedom Party founder and later prime minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, as well as the former 
president J.R. Jayewardene-originally Christian-later returned to Buddhism as well, see Björkman, 1996, p. 332.  
400 Cf. Uyangoda, J. (2000). A State of Desire? Some Reflections on the Unreformability of Sri Lanka’s Post-
Colonial Polity. In S.T. Hettige and Markus Mayer (ed.) Sri Lanka at Crossroads: Dilemmas and Prospects after 
50 Years of Independence. Delhi: McMillan, pp. 93-118; as well as Wilson, 1988, pp. 86-88; Bandarage, 2009; 
Chadda, M. (2006). Minority Rights and Conflict Prevention: Case Study of Conflicts in Indian Jammu and 
Kashmir, Punjab and Nagaland. Minority Rights Group International; de Silva, K.M. (1997). Sri Lanka: Surviving 
Ethnic Strife. Journal of Democracy, 8(1), pp. 97-110. 
401 Jayasuriya, L. (2005). The Changing Face of Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka (1994-2004). Singapore: Marshall 
Cavendish Academic, pp. 8-10. 
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According to Stepan, notwithstanding 70% of Sinhalese and 22% of Tamil population, at the 
Independence, “there had been no riots, or any form of collective violence, between Sinhalese 
and Tamils for hundreds of years before Independence.”402 
According to Wriggins, in addition to the lack of violent clashes between two major ethnic 
groups, “of the ten newly independent countries of South and South East Asia, Ceylon [had] 
more of the attributes of a modernized social and political system than any other”403 Wriggins 
continues by enumerating some of them such as 60 per cent literacy rate, 404  highest per capita 
income of any country in Asia except for Japan”, the civil service consisting exclusively of 
local experts405 Thus, taking these facts into consideration, the ethnic conflict cannot be 
explained either by “historic hatreds and bloodshed” nor “absolute poverty.” 406 
I argued that a policy based on that majoritarian control system was at the root of the ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka, caused and exacerbated by the rise of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.407 
Furthermore, Westminster style form of parliamentary democracy introduced Sinhalese 
nationalists to an unnuanced, almost crude in a multi-ethnic setting, principle of the democratic 
rule – democracy understood as the winner-take-all rule of the majority.408 Thus, Stepan 
observes that in the second phase, particularly from 1956 to 1983, “the very aggressive nation 
state policies ended up in constructing two warring aspirant nation states in one state,” 409 on a 
“slippery slope” to the rapid deterioration of the democratic system410 Thus, Sri Lankan case 
confirms one of consociationalists’ hypothesis of how easily majoritarian democracy can 
degenerate into majority dictatorship. In reaction to the Sinhalese majoritarian practices, Tamil 
minority have begun to articulate a demand for a constitutional arrangement of power sharing 
since early 1950s. The argument for power sharing was based on the construction that the state 
of Sri Lanka was the home of two nations: Sinhalese and Tamil. Tamil leaders argued that if 
                                                 
402 Stepan, 2006, pp. 1-2; Moreover, the only ethnic riot had been between Sinhalese and Muslims in 1915. For 
“public peace” and lack of riots, as well as future prospects see Wriggins, H. (1965). Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New 
Nation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, and compare it to Harrison, 1960. 
403 Wriggins, 1965, p. 6. 
404 Cf. “Poverty ‘At a glance’”, World Bank Database on India, 2008, however, according to official statistics, 
available at http://india.gov.in/knowindia/literacy.php, the literacy rate in India was almost 65 per cent already in 
2001.   
405 Wriggins,1965, p. 68. 
406 Wriggins, 1965; Stepan, 2006. 
407 Cf. Carciumaru, 2012. 
408 Cf. Uyangoda, 2000, pp.103-107; For Horowitz: “The Sri Lankan language and state religion provisions 
symbolically wrote the Sri Lankan Tamils out of the polity.” Horowitz, D.L. (1989). Incentives and behaviour in 
the ethnic politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia. Third World Quarterly, 11(4), p. 28; Chadda, M. (2004). Between 
Consociationalism and Control. In: Schneckener U. and Wolff, S. (ed.) Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 94-114. 
409 “There were many more Sinhalese votes to be had by being extreme than there were Tamil votes to be had by 
being moderate.” remarks Horowitz, 1989, p. 26. 
410 Stepan, 2006, p. 7. 
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two nations were to peacefully coexist in a single state, sovereignty and state power should be 
organized on the principle of federalism.411 
The Federal Party leaders were the most important spokespersons and supporters of Tamil cause 
for more autonomy within the boundaries of the state, during the second phase of political 
development and escalation of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. This phase lasted until 1983. 
Federal Party’s manifesto of the 1970 general election claimed: “It is our firm conviction that 
the division of the country in any form would be beneficial neither to the country nor to the 
Tamil-speaking people. Hence we appeal to the Tamil-speaking people not to lend their support 
to any political movement that advocates the bifurcation of the country.”412  
According to Chadda, the intervention of Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) while ending 
Eelam War I413 left behind “an unfinished devolution design which acted as a constant reminder 
that Colombo ought to offer power sharing proposals that might end the state of war.”414 
According to Stepan, although there have been various peace efforts since the 1990s, “the 
extreme nation state policies implemented earlier have massively eroded the Sri Lankan states’ 
internal capacity even to communicate to their Tamil speaking citizens. ”415 This points out to 
the importance of timing in politics.  
 
Outcome and Assessment  
External Interventions I 
The Indian Factor: Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 
Due to the geographical location of the island and the cultural, political and economic 
relationship that they have with the Tamil community as well as shared colonial past, India 
could not be impartial in what was happening in the neighboring country. When the Sri Lankan 
Tamils were demanding own home (sovereignty) the Indian government was concerned with 
the impact that it will have on Tamil Nadu, India’s own uneasy southern State. Due to conflicts 
of interest, India did not have a clear position on this matter. This is because of the assertions 
that Tamil militancy would have led to secessionist movements in India’s own troubled 
backyard rather than GoI and the state government of Tamil Nadu ethnically outbidding each 
other. The main political parties in Tamil Nadu (AIDMK and DMK) were jointly supporting 
                                                 
411 Also see Carciumaru, 2012. 
412 Wilson, 1988, p. 86. 
413 For what happened in-between, see the chronicle. The initial stage of the armed conflict between Government 
of Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. 
414 Cf. Chadda, 2004, pp. 94-114. 
415 “[o]ne often also hears in Sri Lanka that, if the government had been willing in 1956, or even in 1975, to offer 
half of what they have been talking of offering in the last few years, the Tamil elected politicians probably could 
have convinced their fellow Tamils to accept such terms as the price of peace and democracy.” Stepan, 2006, p. 
40. 
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LTTE secessionist demands and struggle for own state. The GoI did not actively oppose this 
issue due to their concern with garnering as much votes as possible from the Tamil community. 
The Sri Lankan President Jayewardene’s tenure in office was also an issue of unease for the 
Indian government. Jayewardene was accused for harboring and supporting adversary western 
interest, which GoI did not support.416 As a result of these divergent positions based on conflicts 
of interest, the Indian government adopted a two-track policy, giving first class training  to 
LTTE (as in the case of Mukti Bahini) its intelligence agency RAW (the Research and Analysis 
Wing) as well as condemning the separatism and secessionist endeavors.  
When the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi came to power in 1984, relations between Sri 
Lanka and India improved for the better. Rajiv Gandhi convinced the President, Jayewardene, 
to have a dialogue with LTTE, which at that point was already considered a separatist group. 
The talks were to be mediated by India.   
The concrete outcome of the first meeting was the recommendation to set free 600 Tamil 
Guerilla fighters, which the GoSL agreed to do. The autonomy issues and thus provincial 
councils were also discussed. According to Biswas, there was no consensus in this as it raised 
issues on how the council was to exercise its powers on its subjects in enforcing law and order 
and also in handling land issues which was a very sensitive issue in the area.417 
As the dialogue stumbled Jayewardene restored to nationalist rhetoric to soothe Sinhala 
nationalists. There were public announcements that the government would not condone any 
behavior from terrorists and in his tenure any terrorist activities were to receive the full force 
of the law. The Sri Lankan government was ready and willing to devolve power to district 
councils and nothing more than that (i.e., autonomy and self-rule of Tamil majority provinces 
by Tamils), this did not auger well with the Tamil group.  
During the second phase of the dialogue the GoSL’s position had received a lot of resistance 
from an alliance between Sinhalese rival parties (joining forces for a common cause, sic!), the 
People’s Alliance and the Buddhist priests. The Sinhala nationalists were openly against the 
peace talks threatening to expel Tamils form Kandy - a major centre of Buddhist Pilgrimage in 
Sri Lanka. Following the collapse of talks because every side as focusing on positions and their 
proposals were to be fulfilled unconditionally, more fuel was added to violence. 
According to Tambiah, the Indian government continued with its urge to have reconciliatory 
dialogue, to try and salvage the issue.418 However, it was difficult to have direct meetings with 
                                                 
416 Biswas, 2006(a), pp. 137. 
417 Idem, p. 139. 
418 See Tambiah, S. (1992). Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
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the conflict parties, neither was it possible to try and overcome the wide gap that had developed 
between the two groups.419 On June 1985, Indian negotiators reached a ceasefire agreement 
between LTTE representatives and the government of Sri Lanka and used this window of 
opportunity to at least try to convince the government to accept the demands of the Tamil group 
and have a security team monitor and evaluate the actions of both the Tamil and Sinhala leaders 
for further direction. 
On October 1985, Rajiv Gandhi met Jayewardene during a Commonwealth summit, to persuade 
the president to talk with LTTE. This was followed by the development of a working paper in 
New Delhi to set the rules and steps for a meaningful devolution of power to provincial councils. 
The proposals were rejected by LTTE with claims that these did not incorporate their demands. 
By 1986 the negotiations flopped and violence rekindled in Jaffna. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan 
government blamed the authorities in Tamil Nadu for harbouring Tamil militants. This was 
followed by a rather controversial move of the Indian government to airdrop food to the Jaffna 
region following months of economic blockade by GoSL.420 This unexpected initiative by the 
Indian government led to the signing of the 1987  Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, including the 
recommendation the Indian peacekeeping force should be present in Jaffna region.421 
The move received a lot of resistance from the Tamil militant and the Sinhala nationalist groups, 
both citing issues of exclusion and lack of direct involvement. The Sinhala Nationalists were 
pointing to two problematic aspects of the agreement -  the unitary character of the country, 
which in their view was endangered, and, secondly, the direct Indian involvement was 
perceived with suspicion and as yet another instance of Indian hegemony and dominance in the 
region. The Sinhala hostility reached its apex through the violent backlash of the JVP (Sinhala 
left extremists) against the government.422  
As the result of the Peace Agreement, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) were assigned to 
the northern province of Jaffna to restore normalcy. According to Biswas, from the start the 
operation was mismanaged.423 Consequently, the relationship between the Sri Lankan Tamils 
and IPKF deteriorated and by October 1987 IPKF was considered an enemy and not a security 
guarantor, anymore. The relationship between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene started 
deteriorating too, with the latter insisting on the withdrawal of IPKF. This happened once 
President Premadasa succeeded Jayewardene in office, the IPKF’s withdrawal being sealed by 
V.P. Singh (the successor of Rajiv Gandhi) and Premadasa. 
                                                 
419 Tambiah, 1992. 
420 Biswas, 2006(a), p. 140. 
421 For an excellent analysis of IPKF see Biswas, 2006(b), pp. 46-65. 
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Scholars working on this topic, consider IPKF involvement a failure as it did not lead to de-
escalation of the conflict and its peaceful settlement, but, on the contrary, the involvement 
exacerbated the hostilities between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka.424 The 
withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces ended the truce immediately and, subsequently, 
hardened the commitment of the Tamil’s to fight for their sovereignty and independence – 
Tamil Eelam (a land of their own).  
In conclusion, the lessons learnt from IPKF involvement shows that without a meaningful 
support by both warring parties (GoSL and LTTE), support which would ensure legitimacy to 
the foreign peacekeeping presence, the dialogue has its limitations and is prone to fail. The 
third-party mediation will not succeed if the parties are not fully committed, and, for example, 
use the cease fire to re-group, delay, do not or implement only part of the issues agreed upon. 
Moreover, an intervention is bound to fail, if the local population is perceiving the intervening, 
peacekeeping forces as occupants.425 Finally, the failed mission shows how sensitive post-
colonial countries are with respect to their territorial and policy making sovereignty; and how 
reluctant these states are to solutions imported or recommended by outsiders, which are 
accepted either by imposition426 or after a prolonged process of elucidating and confidence-
building dialogue.427   
 
External Interventions II 
Norwegian Mediation 
By the beginning of the 1990s it became clear that the war was not winnable by military means. 
1994 landslide victory of Chandrika Kumatunga’s People’s Alliance (PA) was possible, due to 
the fact that PA promised to renew the dialogue with LTTE. One of Kumaratunga’s first 
decisions was to lift the ban on LTTE and to initiate the talks. Moreover, as a sign of goodwill 
and to conform the intentions of having a dialogue and try to convince LTTE to come to the 
negotiating table again, the government of Sri Lanka released thirteen LTTE prisoners – a 
gesture welcomed by the international community, too. Finally, the initiative of having a 
dialogue between LTTE and the government enjoyed a wide support amongst the Sri Lankan 
population, tired of war and ready to go on with living their normal lives.  
                                                 
424 See Tambiah, 1992, Biswas 2006(a) and 2006(b), Bose, S. (2007). Contested Lands. New Delhi: Harper Collins, 
in particular the Chapter on Sri Lanka, pp. 6-54. 
425 Compare this to Russian peacekeeping forces, (i.e., 14th Army), in Transnistria (see the subchapter on Moldova).  
426 See the aspect of “imposing consociational power-sharing” in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (next chapter). 
427 More often than not, the misunderstandings, suspicions or irritations leading to conflicts are caused by the lack 
of communication between parties. 
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In July 1995, leaked information disclosed that the GoSL was supposedly willing to accept a 
central LTTE demand and reorganize the country on federal principles, by creating eights 
regions, which would be part of the newly created federation.428 When confirmed, the plan was 
met by fierce opposition coming from Sinhalese parties and Buddhist leaders, in particular. As 
a result of several attacks on Tamils, the military confrontation restarted. However, President 
Kumaratunga pursued a double-track strategy and kept negotiating with LTTE, while the 
intense fighting was going on, parallel to the talks.  
In spite of the peace talks and occasional cease fire agreements, LTTE continued to arm 
themselves, not being really committed to negotiations, whereas the GoSL “flexed its muscles”, 
too, by postponing elections and at the same time continuing the military operations in the north, 
without much success or advancement, however. At this point, neither the Government nor the 
LTTE were showing any commitment or taking credible preventive actions in averting violence 
and finding a lasting solution to the conflict. The stalemate was mutually hurting and ripe for 
yet another effort not tried before.429   
In 1998, as a result of the mutually hurting political and military stalemate, both sides of the 
conflicting parties were more willing to negotiate than ever before. In addition, the willingness 
to negotiate was facilitated by Norway’s readiness to act as a mediator. In addition, between 
1998-2000, the government of Sri Lanka experienced several military defeats against LTTE. 
Though in diplomatic relations GoSL was enjoying a much more positive public opinion and 
international press, compared to LTTE.   
Thus, the mediating intervention by Norway has to be seen as quintessential in succeeding 
bringing the conflicting sides to start the dialogue at the negotiating table. Norway’s initiative 
in mediating the peace process in Sri Lanka was facilitated and encouraged by the support from 
Indian government. Not being a great military power, such as the United States, the Indian 
government did not perceive the intervention of Norway in the region as a threat.430  
Both the GoSL and LTTE agreed on the necessity of changing the constitution with regard to 
the devolution of power and reorganisation of the political structure on federal principles. 
Nevertheless, Sinhalese nationalists, including Buddhist leaders opposed this, stating that it was 
                                                 
428 See Biswas, 2006(a), p. 145. 
429 For the concepts of ‘ripeness’ and ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ see Zartman and Faure, 2005; Zartman, I.W. 
(2001). The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments. The Global Review of 
Ethnopolitics, 1(1), pp. 8-18; and the Chapter 6 on “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond” by I.W. 
Zartman in Committee on International Conflict Resolution; Stern, P.C. and Druckman, D. (ed.) (2000). 
International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, pp. 225-250. 
430 India made no exception from the position of any regional hegemon or major power towards the intervention 
of foreign (adversarial or not) powers in its spheres of interest and influence. In this sense, see the Monroe Doctrine 
(USA). 
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offering too much, too many concessions, to the Tamils. Due to this internal pressures, the 
president and opposition leader decided to postpone the referendum from August 2000, which 
would have cemented the policies mutually agreed upon. President Kumaratunga and the 
opposition leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe, did so to avoid losing the vote based on determined 
opposition for Sinhala nationalists and declared that they would consult nationalist and 
Buddhist monks before a new date is set for constitutional reform vote.431 The growing 
influence of JVP, Sri Lanka’s nationalist party, led both parties to not take adventurous or hasty 
decisions, which were determined to fail.432 
Nevertheless, the LTTE felt irritated by a watered-down proposal (at least in their opinion) and, 
in addition, by the delay in implementing it. Moreover, the initial support from LTTE and other 
Tamil parties, who were benignly inclined towards the agreement, began to decline and the 
opposition to its stipulations was growing. It also became clear that would not get the necessary 
votes (2/3 supermajority) needed for it to pass the constitutional reforms and thus, the initiative 
was put on hold (for better times). These internal impediments notwithstanding, the mediating 
efforts to facilitate a peace agreement were continued. Even for setting the agenda, Norway 
already had to overcome some hindrances and try to appease the parties. On the one hand, LTTE 
insisted the ban should be lifted before the talks begin, whereas on the other, the GoSL insisted 
LTTE should give up its demand for a separate state. In addition, there was some irritation 
caused by the closeness of the Scandinavian mediators to LTTE, suspecting a favourable 
treatment of the LTTE by Norwegian mediators, leading to an unbalanced and thus unfair 
outcome of the negotiations. 
In 2001, two developments endangered the future of the talks. The first development 
threatening the talks was the increase in intensity of military hostilities in Jaffna, and the suicide 
attack carried on by LTTE on the international airport in July 2001. The other threat on the 
peace process was instability of the GoSL. President Kumaratunga lost the parliament majority 
after her allies left the governing alliance. To re-establish her popularity, president 
Kumaratunga attacked the opposition party, UNP, for being too close to LTTE. There was also 
disagreement between UNP and the PA regarding lifting the ban imposed on LTTE. The 
tensions within the government and between UNP and PA, transformed negotiation process 
into a “blame game” and giving ultimatums to LTTE.433  
                                                 
431 See DeVotta, N. (2000). Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic 
Conflict in Sri Lanka. Pacific Affairs, 73(1), pp. 55-76; and DeVotta, N. (2005). From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic 
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432 See Biswas, 2006(a), p.148. 
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Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and Evaluation 
124 
To conclude, the Norwegian efforts were destined to fail because of Sri Lanka’s domestic 
political instability and disagreement on a common negotiating position the GoSL should have 
had.  
However, the negotiations continued and the efforts by the international community (USA, 
India, Canada) were still being taken to try and solve the conflict by peaceful means and at the 
negotiating table. Late 2001, the opposition party UNP won the parliamentary election and 
opposition leader Ranil Wickramasinghe was elected prime minister. The most important 
commitment made by UNP to the electorate was to solve the conflict with the LTTE by means 
of a peaceful dialogue. 
After three years, since the Norway acted as the mediator between the conflicting parties, a 
breakthrough was achieved, the parties signing a historic ceasefire deal and agreeing to hold 
direct negotiations, to settle the conflict. Furthermore, the deal also included the creation of the 
so called Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).434 The role of the SLMM was to superintend 
the ceasefire initiative ensconced in the agreement.   
Subsequently, in September and October 2002, two meetings of direct discussion between 
warring parties were held in Thailand. The dialogue generated optimism and encouragement by 
both United States and India. However, concerns on the impact of Sri Lanka’s internal politic 
instability on the talks still remained. In particular, the bitter rivalry between president 
Kumaratunga and prime minister Wickramasinghe was a great obstacle and hindering the 
process. Another breakthrough in the negotiation constituted the press conference by 
Prabakharan, the uncontested leader of LTTE, who was addressing the press for the first time 
in more than a decade. As a consequence, and to reiterate his allegiance to a peace deal, 
Wickramasinghe toured Jaffna, together with a delegation consisting of Buddhist priests and 
met US official, Christine Rocca, who emphasized the US support on peace process and 
agreement.  
In December 2002, another talk was held in Oslo, Norway, and the parties agreed in principle 
on Sri Lanka’s federal structure of governance, though, initially, GoSL was unwilling to explore 
the issue of federalism. This was caused by Sinhala nationalists’ concern that federal 
arrangements will lead to the physical division and, subsequent, emergence of two countries. 
However, in spite of this challenges, the parties agreed on the need to reform the constitution 
and thus send their representatives on working visits to countries with a federal system of 
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government to study their models, exchange and be inspired, implementing the changes 
mutually agreed upon.435  
However, setbacks did not hesitate to follow, such as the one in April 2003, caused by the US 
refusal to lift the ban on LTTE, leading to the latter unilaterally suspending the talks. These 
difficulties notwithstanding, Norway set forth its attempts and support of the peace process, 
encouraging the parties to keep dialogue option open.  
There are several incentives for conflicting parties to reach a peaceful resolution to a violent 
military conflict. The first one is the avoidance of bloodshed and escalation of the conflict, the 
second is the mutually hurting stalemate and the third one is the pressure by the international 
community, in particular donor countries. All three reasons led to the parties opting to keep 
returning to the negotiating table.  However, why did the negotiations keep failing? One obvious 
reason was the lack of (courage to) trust form both parties. The GoSL and Sinhala nationalists 
level of mistrust towards LTTE’s ‘real’ agenda was considerable. The LTTE was accused of 
continued violation of terms of ceasefire document and to forcibly recruit children and women 
as soldiers. On the other hand, the LTTE did not trust the interests or intentions of the 
government, like many Tamils, speculating the existence of a ‘hidden’ agenda.  Subsequently, 
both sides had a negative perception of each other’s interests and intentions causing an 
incommensurable obstacle in solving the conflict through a peaceful process.436  
The second hindrance to the peaceful resolution of the conflict was the relationship between 
the two main Sinhalese parties engaged in a process of ‘ethnic outbidding’ (DeVotta) and thus 
competing for Sinhala votes as well as the relationship between GoSL and Sinhalese 
nationalists and Buddhists leaders.  
With regard to external intervention, the failure of IPKF involvement created an atmosphere of 
suspicion towards the intentions of Norwegian mediation efforts, right from the beginning. This 
attitude of mistrust was misused by political elites to suit their needs.  
Sri Lanka case study highlights the some of the difficulties democracies are facing when trying 
to regulate or solve an ethnic conflict. One of my accompanying hypothesis states that 
democracies are more prone on solving a conflict peacefully than autocracies. This is still true, 
given the fact that the democracy is much more than holding elections and does include power-
sharing and accommodation as well as inclusion of all segments of the society (in our case the 
second largest ethnic group).437 Even in a “defective” democracy as Sri Lanka was, the process 
was transparent and encouraged the continuation of dialogue. However, Sri Lanka’s electoral 
                                                 
435 See Bullion, 2001, pp. 70-92. 
436 See DeVotta, 2005; Biswas 2006(a); Carciumaru, 2012. 
437 Sri Lanka is not considered a full-fledged democracy based on the scores from Polity IV, EIU or v-dem. 
Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and Evaluation 
126 
politics played a crucial role in ethnic outbidding from the outset. In addition, the supermajority 
needed for a constitutional reform coupled by the adversarial attitude of the major parties, made 
every peace effort and negotiation almost impossible. The opposition was unwilling to support 
the government to secure a peace deal. Thus, a state of unpredictability became the defining 
and constant characteristic of Sri Lanka’s politics, which largely affected the peace process.438 
  
                                                 
438 DeVotta, 2005. 
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III.2 Eastern Europe 
III.2.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Figure 9. Map Bosnia and Herzegovina439 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Chronology of Bosnia and Herzegovina440 
Time Key events 
1918  Austria-Hungary collapses at the end of the war. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
becomes part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. 
1941  Bosnia-Herzegovina annexed by pro-Hitler Croatian puppet state. Thousands 
of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies are sent to the death camps. 
1945  Bosnia-Herzegovina liberated following campaign by partisans under Tito. 
1945-1991 Bosnia is part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
1991  Following collapse of communism, nationalists win first multi-party 
elections and form coalition government despite having conflicting goals: 
Muslim nationalists want centralised independent Bosnia, Serb nationalists 
want to stay in Belgrade-dominated rump Yugoslavia, Croats want to join 
independent Croatian state. 
1992   Croat and Muslim nationalists form tactical alliance and outvote Serbs at 
independence referendum. Serb nationalists are incensed as constitution 
stipulates that all major decisions must be reached through consensus. 
                                                 
439 Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina, 
accessed on 01.07.2018. 
440 The data for the Chronology of Bosnia and Herzegovina is available as open-source, internet public space, on 
several websites. The one present here was taken entirely from Source: Chronology Bosnia and Herzegovina 
quoted from BBC Bosnia-Herzegovina country profile, available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
17211415, accessed on 01.07.2018. 
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War breaks out and Serbs quickly assume control of over half the republic. 
Ethnic cleansing is rampant in the newly proclaimed Serb Republic but also 
widespread in Muslim and Croat-controlled areas. 
 
1993   As tensions rise, conflict breaks out between Muslims and Croats, 
culminating in the destruction of much of Mostar, including its Old Bridge. 
The bridge had graced the city since it was built by the Ottomans in the 16th 
century and was a symbol of Bosnia's cultural diversity. 
The conflict is extremely complex. Muslims and Serbs form an alliance 
against Croats in Herzegovina, rival Muslim forces fight each other in 
north-west Bosnia, Croats and Serbs fight against Muslims in central 
Bosnia. 
UN safe havens for Bosnian Muslim civilians are created, to include 
Sarajevo, Gorazde and Srebrenica 
 
1995  Safe haven of Srebrenica is overrun by Bosnian Serb forces under General 
Ratko Mladic. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys are separated 
from their families and massacred, despite the presence of Dutch UN 
troops. Nato air strikes against Serb positions help Muslim and Croat forces 
make big territorial gains, expelling thousands of Serb civilians on the way. 
Dayton peace accord signed in Paris. It creates two entities of roughly equal 
size, one for Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the other for Serbs. An 
international peacekeeping force is deployed. 
 
1996  The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia begins work 
in the Hague. Drazen Erdemovic, a Croat who fought for the Serbs and took 
part in the Srebrenica massacres, is the first person to be convicted. He is 
sentenced to five years in prison. 
2000  Moderate parties do well in elections in the Muslim-Croat entity but 
nationalists gain the upper hand in the Serb entity. Results force main Serb 
nationalist party to form a coalition headed by moderate Prime Minister 
Mladen Ivanic. 
2002 October Nationalists win back power in federation presidential, parliamentary and 
local elections. 
2004 July Celebrations mark the reopening of the rebuilt 16th century bridge at Mostar. 
2004 December  NATO hands over peacekeeping duties to a European Union-led force, 
EUFOR. 
2006 October  General elections reflect ethnic divisions, with Serb entity voting to maintain 
split from Muslim-Croat entity. In run-up to vote, Bosnian Serb leadership 
threatens to seek complete secession in event of moves to end autonomy of 
Serb entity. 
2008 October  Nationalist parties do well among all three ethnic groups in local elections, 
leaving Bosnian politics divided firmly along ethnic lines. 
2011 December Bosnia's Muslim, Croat and Serb political leaders reach agreement on 
formation of new central government, bringing to an end 14 months of 
deadlock since 2010 general election. 
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2015 March European Union foreign ministers and Bosnia sign Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement that has been on hold since 2008, raising possibility 
of Bosnia's joining Union if it carries out key political and economic reforms. 
2016 February Bosnia submits formal application to join EU. 
 
As presented in Dayton Peace Accords, the institutional design in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(further in text Bosnia as well as BiH) after the conflict shows a two-fold lesson for the 
constitutional engineering in post-conflict deeply divided societies.  The case study of BiH acts 
as a positive example and an argument for the proponents of consociational power-sharing 
arrangements, such as ending the war and ensuring political stability of a post-conflict and post-
war, deeply divided society. Furthermore, BiH case study demonstrates that such institutional 
arrangements have to be ‘handled with care’ and do not represent a panacea for all challenges 
faced in similar situations, but different contexts. Besides the issue of in-built inflexibility441 to 
various provisions concerning power sharing between ethnic groups, the other significant 
concern is the massive involvement of exogenous actors into the issues of day-to-day running 
of the country as well as shaping of the constitutional design and institutions of accommodation 
and inclusion. The involvement of exogenous actors makes such countries as BiH de facto and 
de jure protectorates. Consequently, Bosnia and Herzegovina represents an instance of complex 
consociational power-sharing system. Due to its institutional engineering and constitutional 
design, the probability of the violence reigniting or that of the conflict re-emerging has been 
significantly reduced.  
Two factors have been responsible for lack of conflict and political stability in BiH. The first 
one is the Office of the High Representative (OHR) the de facto head of the country, an 
international diplomat entrusted with the highest political power and in charge of the 
administration of the country. The second factor represents the consociational power-sharing 
constitutional arrangements. These two factors, the OHR and the consociational constitutional 
design and institutions are considered the primary tools to ending the war, ensuring political 
stability and enabling or enforcing groups’ accommodation in the post-conflict Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
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Background: Conflict stages 
Weller and Wolff indicate that from the very beginning Dayton Agreement was viewed as both 
“a curse as well as a blessing.”442 These accords were commonly referred to as General 
Framework Agreement for Peace and was negotiated together with other relevant documents at 
Dayton, USA. After it has been initialled on 21st Nov. 1995, the Framework Agreement were 
then officially signed 3 weeks later in Paris. After the agreements were signed, the war in BiH 
ended. The agreement caused a general relief amongst the civil population and political leaders 
alike. In particular, after the war was fought with particular brutality, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
experiencing instances of ethnic cleansing as well as genocide. During this conflict, more than 
100,000 citizens had been murdered and half of BiH’s citizens had been displaced.443 Experts 
and observers alike speculated on the duration of BiH’s constitution, which was included into 
the Annex 4 of the Agreement, until it collapses. Consequently, most people believed that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina would definitely fall apart and disintegrate, the very moment the 
exogenous military presence that were deployed to promote peace would leave. The settlement 
was considered politically unviable as well as morally wrong. Nonetheless, the agreement was 
important as it ended the war that was of such magnitude and intensity that Europe had never 
experienced within its borders since the Second World War came to an end.444 
Thus, challenges to the success and chances of reinstating Bosnia and Herzegovina back to a 
politically stable, secure as well as responsible state in the World seemed incommensurable. 
Moreover, the agreement lack credibility as it has been deliberated, negotiated and agreed upon 
in a foreign state and on a foreign soil. In fact, the Dayton agreement never had representatives 
of Bosnian Croats or Bosnian Serbs at the negotiating table, acting as direct parties to the 
accord. Instead, the agreement was formally signed by the leaders of two of the constituent 
entities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic, who 
acted as guarantors of BiH’s peace and stability. Thus, by not involving local, domestic actors 
into the negotiation process and subsequent agreement, a widespread feeling of imposition was 
justifiably present in BiH.  
The agreement’s structure represented a further challenge. This structure seemed to deny both 
sides the objectives they fought for and aspirations they had anticipated to achieve after the 
conflicts ended. For instance, one of the key ethnic Serb entities known as Republika Srpska, 
was never given a chance or allowed to unite with the then Yugoslavian Federal Republic or 
                                                 
442 Weller, M. and Wolff, S. (2006). Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years after Dayton: Lessons for internationalized 
state building. Ethnopolitics, 5(1), pp.1-2. 
443 Ibid. 
444 Idem. 
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become an independent state. Moreover, the Croat ethnic group had been bound though the 
1994 Washington Agreement, to become a part of a problematic federation with the Muslims. 
These communities were consolidated to form a single state, however the resultant state lacked 
strong institutions, legitimacy as well as power to function properly. Thus, Croats and Serbs, 
which are two of the constituent communities, had very little (if any) concern to have Bosnia 
and Herzegovina work as a sovereign and independent state and a reliable member of the 
international community.  
 
Figure 10. Ethnic Composition Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Religious Affiliation Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At Dayton, the international negotiators analyzed Bosnia’s divisions and cleavages. Based on 
their findings, they reached the conclusion that Bosnia required a rigid interpretation of 
consociationalism, which would constitute, eventually, the current political system, institutions 
and constitutional design of BiH. Furthermore, BiH is an instance of complex power-sharing, 
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exhibiting all four basic principles of consociationalism, such as executive power-sharing, 
mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy, but exhibiting additional arrangements, 
which were not originally stipulated by Lijphart (policies regarding the internally displaced 
persons, for example and, the evident factor originally missing from Lijphart – the role and 
direct involvement of the external powers)  
In itself, this design based on Dayton accord was very comprehensive.445 The country consisted 
of three ethnic groups, two entities (i.e., the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Muslims 
and Croats and Republika Srpska for Serbs) and a very complex system of governance. As a 
result of this, the country had the highest number of cabinet ministers, Prime Ministers and 
Presidents in a single state as compared to any country across the world. Also, Bosniaks, 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats are the main ethnic groups and they are actively involved in 
a power-sharing system that has multiple tiers and the power amongst them is shared based on 
consociational arrangements. BiH has a decentralized central government system and a 
presidency shared among all three constituent ethnic groups, with a rotating chair that keeps 
changing after every 8 months between the three ethnic groups’ representatives. This 
arrangement is a clear instance of the first principle of consociationalism – the executive power-
sharing (grand coalition). 
 
Conflict Management & Negotiation Process 
The likelihood for success of the Dayton agreement (i.e., it being implemented fully to 
strengthen the institutions and stabilize BiH) did not seem to be high, in particular given all 
other problems the region was facing (e.g., self-determination conflicts in Macedonia, Kosovo 
and Montenegro; economic crises, higher levels of poverty, organized crime, corruption, as well 
as increasing numbers of IDPs as well as refugees). These pessimistic views given the 
challenges the region was facing were shared by experts working on the region who were trying 
to determine the viability and prolonged suitability of the Dayton accord. The majority of 
scholars were of the opinion that such settlements as Dayton Peace Agreement could have only 
become successful provided they fulfilled the following conditions: First, one of the parties in 
the conflict and to the agreement should have attained a conclusive victory during the war. 
Secondly, it could have been possible to reach a peaceful resolution, in case the parties would 
have experienced a mutually hurting stalemate. Towards the end of 1995, when Dayton 
Agreement was being finalized, the conditions mentioned above were absent. The then 
                                                 
445 See Bose, S. (2002). Bosnia after Dayton: nationalist partition and international intervention. London: Hurst; 
as well as Bose’s chapter on Bosnia in Bose, 2007, pp. 105-153. 
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dominant Muslim government was of the opinion that the settlement came at a time when they 
had gained substantial power and control. For this reason, the settlement could deny them the 
chance to have control over the ethnic Serb community. The Serb community, on the other 
hand, was frustrated too, because it has been denied statehood necessary for its own pursuit of 
the unification with Serbia. Finally, Croat community was frustrated too, as it did not get the 
name unequivocally mentioning their group as the Serbs did (i.e., Republika Srpska).  
However, in spite of putting an end to the brutally violent war, the Dayton agreement 
exemplarily represents an accord between the parties in a conflict that was never fully resolved 
at the time of concluding the peace agreement (i.e., never settled either at the negotiating table 
or on the battleground).  
Dayton agreement is considered to be a transformative conflict settlement.446 The 
transformative character is given by the institutional arrangements, which were agreed upon 
and imposed by the international actors, but acted as a level playing field for all parties involved 
in the conflict, allowing them to solve the conflicts amongst themselves in a democratic and 
peaceful manner within the framework of the agreement. Moreover, the agreement encouraged 
the parties to come up with mutually beneficial solutions and innovative ways to solve their 
issues. Thus, the transformative conflict agreements are different from temporary/transitional 
conflict regulating agreement. Furthermore, in the case of BiH, the transformative conflict 
agreement does not allow for an entity to unilaterally secede. Instead, it establishes institutions 
that are rather permanent in nature and scope. For this reason, this transformative conflict 
settlement provides a guideline for accommodation of demands and interests of conflicting 
parties. In addition, it forms the basis on which constitutional arrangements are established, in 
order to protect the state’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty. 
Unequivocally, Dayton accord can be regarded as a consociational agreement, displaying all 
four basic principle outlined by Lijphart more than forty years ago (i.e., grand coalition, 
proportionality, minority veto and segmental autonomy). However, the institutions and 
constitutional stipulations provided by the accord are remarkably flexible. Moreover, for the 
past few decades, various institutions within BiH have significantly evolved due to the 
implementation of the Dayton accord as well as going beyond the agreement in particular 
essential aspects, underlining the transformative character of the accord. The Office of the High 
Representative played a key role in promoting institutional evolution. It achieved this by 
intensively and meaningfully engaging with the international community. However, based on 
                                                 
446 On transformative conflict settlement see: Weller and Wolff, 2006, pp. 1-13; also see Dayton, B.W. and 
Kriesberg, L. (ed.) (2009). Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving from Violence to Sustainable 
Peace. Routledge Studies in Security and Conflict Management. 
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the assumptions concerning the conflict settlement’s transformative nature, Dayton agreements 
represented a gradual evolution in the constitutional design focused on transformative aspects 
of institutional arrangements, rather than abrupt and prompt changes. 
The presence of international military and military equipment in the area played a crucial role 
in preventing the deterioration of an already fragile state. The military offered effective 
protection to the general public. In addition, the OHR intended to perform both a monitoring 
and advisory functions in relation to the civil war, however it ended performing governmental 
functions. Indeed, some crucial institutional as well as legislative reforms were necessary, 
including security services, customs’ relations, etc. Some of the policies that helped tackle these 
challenges came from and were the direct result of the international actors’ actions, which 
underscores the dual identity and the Janus-faced nature of exogenous actors.447  
The international involvement and the role played in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been 
criticised regularly.  The international community permitted the local leaders and political elites 
to shirk from taking full political responsibility and coerce officials from the OHR to make 
decisions that they deem necessary for the state. As a consequence, in case the decisions were 
not popular and these were not supported by public opinion, they could distance or dissociate 
themselves from such laws. In addition, the absence of both international and local mechanisms 
to establish checks and balances as far as public power is concerned was also frequently pointed 
out. Regarding the OHR, their source of power is something that was legally disputable, since 
it appeared to be based on the key pronouncements of an informal peace implementation 
council, instead of the UN’s Security Council Resolutions as stipulated in the UN charter, 
Chapter VII.448  
 
Outcome and Assessment 
Once the Cold War came to an end, the European security architecture’s key principles had 
been altered: it was no longer simple to achieve collective security, in a wider area, through 
prevention, military alliances or deterrence (i.e., though threats of a mutually assured 
destruction). As the risk of inter-state wars diminished, the numbers of intrastate conflicts 
increased.449 Although the primary institutions of the European cold-war security architecture 
                                                 
447 See Bose, 2007, pp. 105-153 on the role of international actors.  
448 See Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to The Peace, Breaches of The Peace, and Acts of Aggression, 
available at: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/, accessed on September 1, 2018. 
449 See the HIIK (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research) database, available at: 
https://hiik.de/?lang=en, accessed on 01.09.2018, in particular the data from “Conflict Barometer”; as well as 
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)’s Data on Armed Conflict, available at: https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-
Conflict/, accessed on 01.07.2018. 
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(including the Western European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations, 
etc.) were not abolished, but on the contrary, developed more advanced instruments as well as 
policies in order to solve the challenges emerging from and created by the new security 
situation. The European Union, formerly referred to as the European Community, was trying to 
profile itself as one of the key security guarantors, securing its role in the newly created security 
architecture as an institution focused on managing crises and preventing conflicts.  
In the late 1980s as well as circa 1990s, after the failure of communism within Eastern and 
Central Europe, the then so-called Yugoslavia gained popularity as the state that ever 
experienced intense incidents of violence and disintegration as compared to all European 
nations in history. The successive wars experienced in Yugoslavia the entire 1990s (ranging 
from the brief skirmishes to the campaign by NATO against Serbia concerning Kosovo 
conflict), caused thousands of people to lose their lives as well massive numbers of the civil 
population to displace. Indeed, the communism legacy, the wars and ethnonationalistic 
mobilization are memories that can never be lost in this part of the world, and to some extent, 
it has prompted a complex situation in which various factors work together to reconstruct the 
community. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a lot of progress has been reported for 
the past two decades in terms of state-building efforts. This legacy involves: partly resolved 
conflicts on self-determination in Kosovo, Serbia Montenegro, Macedonia, as well as BiH.450  
Furthermore, the legacy also involves such factors and developments as: political as well as 
economic instability in the entire region is caused by partial implementation of economic 
reforms, incomplete democratization process (the institutions only work to a certain extent) as 
well as ‘usual suspects’ in Eastern European transitional societies (from communism to 
capitalism and from an autocratic to a democratic political system) such as a result of brain and 
skills drain in the civil and private sector; organized crime as well as corruption, civil society 
that is not independent and  inadequately developed; over-reliance on actors from the 
international community as well as their personal priorities that are acknowledged deliberately, 
thus decreasing the potential of local leaders in engaging in matters that affect various sectors. 
Regardless of one’s perspective on the role of the EU in Western Balkans as well as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, this body remains the largest organization that provides donations to the affected 
populations. Furthermore, the EU has played a crucial role in promoting peace and democracy 
in these areas as well as overseeing their reconstruction to functional, stable states with full-
fledged political institutions. For the case of Western Balkans, the EU has managed the crisis 
                                                 
450 The Section on the role of the EU draws on the brilliant analysis by Weller and Wolff, 2006, pp. 9-12. See 
also Houten, P. van and Wolff, S. (2008). The Dynamics of Ethnopolitical Conflict Management by 
International and Regional Organizations in Europe. Jemien, 7, European Centre for Minority Issues. 
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situation with a lot of success attributed to it as compared to the 1990s. Policy of conditionality 
is one of the unique advantage that is attributed to the European Union in this region. EU policy 
of conditionality is very effective among various countries where potential accession or closer 
association with the EU is being considered or negotiated.451 Thus, one should look at and 
analyze from a larger perspective the role of the European Union’s crisis management in 
Western Balkans after 1995.  
In the emerging European security architecture, the European Union has a key role. In 2018, 28 
member states were numbered and this strengthened the EU’s political weight via accession, 
on-going enlargement as well as association process (regardless of the Brexit), more capable 
both militarily and diplomatically due to its growth in terms policy, defense identity as well as 
security developments. In fact, the EU is currently a key guarantor to both peace and stability 
at Western Balkans. The roles of EU in this region include economic aid programs, police and 
military missions, as well as the larger processes of upholding democracy as well as market 
economies that are associated to the EU membership.  
The other essential learning lesson is that circumstances are temporal and nothing is permanent. 
Not even the immutable consociational approach that is adopted in the Dayton constitution. 
Together with strong international ties as well as security guarantees, and coupled with 
provision of minority rights, it is apparent that rather than eliminating ethnic identities 
permanently, consociational designs play a crucial role in transformative institutional designs 
that could provide time and space required by the conflicting parties to go beyond the rigidity 
of their institutions. Institutional rigidity is aimed at safeguarding weaker parties when 
implementing conflict settlements.  
Therefore, internationalized state building can only stabilize nations that are emerging from 
wars provided they employ the appropriate consociational approach, which is moderated by 
integrative policies, sustained by skilled and resourceful international participation and 
tempered with the general outlook. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s experience may not have 
recorded the highest scores compared to the other categories, particularly where there was lack 
of appropriate policies to promote internationalized state-building efforts. These lessons are as 
important as they can be employed in comparable contemporary as well as future difficulties 
that may face the international community.  
  
                                                 
451 There is an extensive body of literature on EU conditionality. A very good and thorough introduction to the 
topic is given by Florian Bieber in his edited book: Bieber, F. (ed.) (2017). EU Conditionality in the Western 
Balkans, London: Routledge.  
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III.2.2 Moldova (Transnistria and Gagauzia) 
Figure 12. Map of Moldova452 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19: Chronology of Moldova453 
Time  Key Events 
Soviet years  
1939  Romania carved up in pact between Hitler's Germany and 
Stalin's USSR. Bessarabia is one of the areas to go to the USSR. 
1940  Russia annexes Bessarabia and combines it with most of the 
Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to form 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
1941-1945 Following Nazi attack on USSR a Romanian puppet regime is 
installed in Moldavian SSR but driven out shortly before the 
end of the war when the Soviet Union regains control. 
Late 1980s Resurgence of Moldovan nationalism in the wake of the era of 
'openness' introduced in the Soviet Union by Mikhail 
Gorbachev. 
1989  Romanian is reinstated as the official language. The Latin script 
is adopted to replace the Cyrillic script (Russian). 
1990  Moldova declares its sovereignty. 
The Gagauz people in the southwest declare their 
independence, followed by the Trans-Dniester region. The 
central power in Moldova annuls the declarations. 
1991  Moldova declares its independence. It joins the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, the successor to the Soviet Union. 
                                                 
452 Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Moldova, accessed on 
01.06.18 
453 The data for the Chronology of Moldova is available as open-source, internet public space, on several 
websites. The one present here was taken entirely from Source: BBC Moldova Profile, available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17601579; accessed on 01.07.2018.  
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Post-Soviet era 
 
 
1992 Moldova becomes a member of the United Nations. 
 
An upsurge in fighting in the Trans-Dniester region leads to a 
state of emergency being re-imposed. Hundreds die in the 
fighting. Russian peacekeepers are deployed after a ceasefire 
agreement. 
 
1994  A new constitution proclaims Moldova's neutrality, grants 
special autonomy status to Trans-Dniester and the Gagauz 
region, and declares Moldovan to be the official language. 
1997  Negotiations resumed with Trans-Dniester. Agreement is 
signed granting further autonomy and calling for more talks. 
2001  Trans-Dniester authorities halt withdrawal of Russian arms 
which had been proceeding in accordance with international 
agreements. 
2002  OSCE extends deadline for withdrawal of Russian weapons 
from Trans-Dniester until end of 2003. The deadline is later 
extended into 2004. Russia says its troops will stay until a 
settlement is reached. 
2006  Trans-Dniester referendum VOTE overwhelmingly backs 
independence from Moldova and a plan eventually to become 
part of Russia. 
2007  Government accuses Romania of undermining the country by 
easing Romanian citizenship application procedures for 
Moldovans. Romanian citizenship allows Moldovans to travel 
without visas within the EU. Government reverses decision to 
allow Romania to open two new consulates in Moldova. 
2009  Ruling Communists declared winners of disputed election. 
Result triggers violent protests and political deadlock. 
2009  Four pro-western parties form coalition government. Liberal 
Democratic Party leader Vlad Filat becomes prime minister. 
Mr Voronin resigns as president, and is succeeded by Mr 
Ghimpu on an acting basis. 
2011  Anti-corruption campaigner Yevgeny Shevchuk defeats pro-
Russian candidates in Trans-Dniester's presidential election. 
Pledges to establish "friendly relations" with Moldova while 
continuing to press for the independence of the separatist 
region. 
2013  Moldova initiates an Association Agreement with the EU, 
which says that the move paves the way to establishing a 
privileged trade relationship with the country. The agreement 
is due to be signed in September 2014. 
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2014  President Timofti warns Russia against trying to annex 
Moldova's breakaway Trans-Dniester region in the same way 
as it has taken control of Ukraine's Crimea. 
2014  Moldova signs association agreement with the European 
Union, prompting Russia to impose import restrictions on the 
country's agricultural produce. 
 
Figure 13. Ethnic Composition Moldova 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Religious Affiliation Moldova 
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Background: Conflict stages 
As a result of the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991, new independent nations were formed 
from the Union’s ruins.454 Most of the successor nations as well as their citizens looked forward 
to a future of uncertainty. In various cases, this resulted to prolonged struggles for control of 
military assets, as well as economic, political spoils between the former and the emergent elites. 
The same case was witnessed in Moldova, as the country separated from its former close and 
self-imposed ally from Moscow. Encountering both economic and political power loss, and 
from their perspective threatened by the aggressive Romanization campaigns as well as the 
likelihood of unification with Romania that was facilitated by Moldova’s Popular Front, 
Tiraspol elites, the future-to-become capital of Transnistria, aggressively opposed any such 
policies.  
The Moldova was sought to first ensure that the relations with Moscow did not discontinue as 
well as proceed with its own independence as a state. Eventually, increasing radicalization 
(Moldova and Transnistria) on the two sides caused open conflict. At first assisted by the 
equipment and staff from the Russian Soviet 14th Army situated on the left bank of the river 
Nistru, Transnistrian irregulars defeated the Moldovan security forces and requested them to 
clear he left bank region.455 Though these military confrontations were intense, they ended upon 
the arrival of a Russian General known as Alexander Lebed.456 General Lebed took over as the 
Russian forces commander for the army that was located at Transnistria. In fact, General Lebed 
declared overall authority and control over both the Transnistrian and Russian forces. In July 
1992, during the ceasefire a Moldovan-Russian-Transnistrian peace-keeping force (PKF) was 
established. The PKF was located at the buffer zone region along the river Nistru. Joint-Control 
Commission oversaw the PKF.  
At the roots of the conflict in Transnistria are two interrelated causes: the status of the mostly 
Russian-speaking left-bank region, and, secondly, the presence of the Russian troops in 
Transnistria.  
Furthermore, in spite of being a small republic of just over 3 mln people, Moldova faces a 
second frozen conflict in Gagauzia. Gagauza is a small, unrecognized independent part in the 
southern part of Moldova. In this area, similar to Transnistria, remarkable opposition arose to 
                                                 
454 Malyarenko, T. and Wolff, S. (ed.) (2012). Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention in Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans: Lessons for Ukraine-EU Cooperation. Donetsk: ‘Skhidniy Vidavnichiy Dom’ Publishing House. 
455 Wolff, S. (2011b). The Prospects of a Sustainable Conflict Settlement for Transnistria. Paper presented at the 
University of Birmingham; Malyarenko and Wolff, 2012. 
456 Wolff, S. (2010). A resolvable frozen conflict? The domestic and international politics of self-determination 
in Moldova and Transnistria. Paper presented at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton 
University. “This ceasefire agreement was entitled “Agreement on the Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the 
Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region,” and established Russia as an official party to the settlement process. 
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the Romanisation of Moldova since circa 1980s and onwards. As a matter of fact, the 
unrecognized proclamation of Gagauzia’s independence came prior to that of Transnistria. 
However, contrary to Transnistria, Gagauzia only experienced sporadic violence. Also, it did 
not take even two weeks after the declaration of their own independence when half of the 
Gagauz deputies (out of twelve) in Moldovan parliament cast their vote in support of Moldova’s 
declaration for the independence. The remaining six deputies abstained. The OSCE mediation 
played a crucial role in promoting settlement in 1994 and it became effective in 1995. During 
this period, Gagauzia was accorded with a constitutionally secured autonomy status within the 
larger Moldova. Although significant challenges were experienced during the implementation 
as well as adoption of this autonomy status, Gagauzia acts as the point of reference for 
Transnistrian conflict, which it has links to. Even though Moldovan authorities are keenly 
pointing out that Gagauzia exhibits the viability of mitigating a conflict within Moldova, 
Transnistrian authorities do not agree to any status that would be lower compared to that of 
Gagauzia. For this reason, a number of people that reside in the Gagauzia never, although they 
are limited, acknowledge the state of independence that is lesser compared to the one in 
Transnistria. There are limited links between Transnistria and Gagauzia however both are not 
significant enough to create a well-thought through alliance. 
The various incidents witnessed in all the years that followed Moldovan’s independence, which 
was proclaimed on the 27th August 1991, significantly shaped the Transnistrian conflict’s 
dynamics for the subsequent two decades. They created a local, self-declared Transnistrian 
Moldovan Republic (i.e. Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika) that developed quickly 
and merged its institutions as well as functions like that of an independent state. All the 
functions were consolidated except that of official international recognition. Moreover, from 
1992, Transnistria’ s presence in the neighbouring Ukraine and both parts of Nistru has given 
rise to very powerful economic and political interest groups. These groups’ interest is to 
maintain the status quo, particularly in Transnistria’s political as well as economic interests.457  
Furthermore, there is an identity dimension to the conflict and, most probably, it aggravated 
over the last 20 years of separation. There has been an increasing sense of distinct identities for 
some time: the Transnistrian identity that is more oriented to Russia as well as the Russian 
cultural ways, and the Moldovan culture where Transnistrian identity is perceived as a less 
important as a result of positive orientation towards European Union, because the initiation of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy Union as well as its Eastern collaborations that offer 
various noticeable benefits to Moldova. 
                                                 
457 Wolff, 2011(b). 
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Coming back to identity question, both Romanian as well as Russian languages are popular and 
most Moldovans are raised bilingually. However, the potential of Russian language to serve as 
lingua franca, has been limited generationally. Equally, regardless of the fact that people 
consider Transnistria as an ethnical plural community, consisting of traditional Russians, 
Ukrainians as well as Moldovans with every group accounting for about 30 percent of the 
general population, it did not experience significant inter-ethnic conflicts. 
In fact, since 1993, a report generated by CSCE Mission to Moldova (Report No.13), indicated 
that there is a Transnistrian feeling of identity and it is strongly anchored in geography (the 
natural isolation from the other Moldova by River Nistru), language (Russian), history (i.e. 
Transnistria is considered as being part of Russian empire, instead of the historic Bessarabia), 
as well as perceptions— wrongly or rightly—impacted by Moldovan’s efforts to address the 
conflict by using force in 1992. The shared identity implies that Transnistria’s economic and 
political system has acquired some level of legitimacy. Also, this is based on the fact that people 
perceive Moldova’s general situation as bad if not worse as compared to that of Transnistria. 
All the key political players within Transnistria have remained strong supporters of the 
Transnistrian independence and this objective is extensively and jointly shared among 
Transnistrian people. Compared to the left bank of the river, the right bank is diametrically 
opposed, the population is pro-Romanian, mostly anti-Russian, holding Russia responsible for 
promoting conflict and its duration. Divisions experienced within Moldovan political system as 
well as violent conflicts between the two coalitions after the hotly disputed parliamentary 
elections of 2009, has so far not impeded the significant bi-partisanship in the strategy of 
Chisinau. 
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Figure 15. Gagauzia and Transnistria Conflicts458 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Besides Moldova, conflict in Transnistrian at its initial stages legally as well as firmly 
established Russia’s role as a crucial power broker in conflict as well as arguably the state that 
can single-handedly achieve a permanent settlement. The centrality of Russia in the process of 
settlement is derived from 1992 conditions for ceasefire agreement, its association with 
Transnistria as well as Moldova’s economic dependence on Russia. Equally, Russia has always 
maintained about 1,200 soldiers, who are situated in Transnistria, and entrusted with the 
responsibility to protect the Soviet period military equipment as well as installations. Moreover, 
Russia does not approve the idea of Moldova joining NATO.  In a transatlantic alliance, without 
guarantees in the settlement against the Moldovan membership, there is a low possibility that 
Russia will support a deal. Romania also remains as crucial player, however, in a different 
manner. The associations between Romania and the Moldovan political elites act as a 
‘confirmation’ to alert Transnistria that they lack shield against the Romanization, whereas the 
kind of association with Romania also splits political parties on the right bank thus inhibiting a 
shared approach towards Transnistria. 
The negotiation process was significantly hindered by these factors. OSCE-one of the leading 
international organization-has been involved since the cease fire was initiated in 1992, and its 
                                                 
458 Source: Eastern Partnership, map available at: http://eapmigrationpanel.org/en/news/moldova-starts-de-facto-
take-over-control-over-state-border-transnistrian-region, accessed on July 18, 2018. 
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current mission began on February 1993 when OSCE opened offices in Chisinau and later 
extended them to Transnistria around April 1995. The format of negotiations is in such a way 
that OSCE, Russia and Ukraine serve as co-mediators.459 They all oversee the periodical 
negotiations between Moldova and Transnistria, while the European Union and the US became 
part of the process as observers in 2005. Various proposals for conflict settlement have so far 
yielded tangible results that shows progress towards a permanent settlement.  
As a result of the Russian-German Meseberg Memorandum of 2010,460 there are presently 
encouraging signs the parties are close to an agreement. Thus, from the beginning of 2010 to 
Mid-November the same year, there were 5 meetings held by the parties in the format of 5+2. 
They agreed to take stock of previous agreements that had been signed before and commence 
to elaborate a guarantee system for future settlements. Moreover, in 2010, a substantial progress 
to enhance the relationship among the parties was initiated, involving issues around railway 
transportation (Chisinau-Tiraspol-Odessa railway line reopening), goods movement (across 
Nistru as well as both directions), and procedures of export (particularly Transnistria-based 
companies’ products through Moldova), as well as the re-establishment of the land-line 
telephone communication network between Transnistria and Moldova.  
Between November 9 and 10, 2017, a conference on confidence building measures in 
Transnistria was organized. The conference took place at George Marshall European Center for 
Security Studies that is situated at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and was intended to 
evaluate progress pertaining to confidence-building as well as come up with strategies to 
improve the engagements between various parties in the current working groups. Ever since, 
there has been similar meetings, in order to create opportunities for senior officials and leaders 
from both sides to engage in committed conversations in a formal as well as informal 
environment.461 Making progress on 2010 momentum, a major break-through was witnessed in 
2011 due to the official re-opening of (5+2) talks around September. About three months later, 
Transnistria’s political landscape had significantly changed. The region’s long-time president, 
Igor Smirnov, was thoroughly defeated. He never made it to the second round of the elections.  
The candidate who surprisingly won was not backed by the Russia. However, Yevgeni 
Shevchuk, who was Transnistrian Supreme Soviet’s previous speaker emerged as the winner. 
Shevchuk was following closely the negotiations between Moldova and Transnistria and his 
election created further momentum in the negotiations. Consequently, in April 2012, all the 
                                                 
459 This section draws on Wolff, S. (2011a). Post-Conflict State Building: the debate on institutional choice. Third 
World Quarterly, 32(10), pp. 1777-1802. 
460 Available at https://russiaeu.ru/sites/default/files/user/files/2010-06-05-meseberg-memorandum.pdf, accessed 
on September 1, 2018. 
461 Houten and Wolff, 2008. 
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parties reached a consensus on the OSCE- mediated agreement. This agreement pointed out the 
principles and procedures in the conduct of the negotiations of the comprehensive agenda.  
However, there has not been any actual progress towards settlement since the agreement was 
signed.  
 
Conflict Management & Negotiation Process 
The 1993 OSCE report was clear in its evaluation that in Transnistria, ‘special status’ could not 
address all the challenges.462 . Besides ‘special status’ there was a demand for proportionality 
(e.g., reserved seats in Parliament as well as other important governmental agencies, ministries, 
courts). However, by just relying on representation rules (as to who is responsible for the 
decisions) instead of considering those concerning participation (how various key decisions are 
reached at) would have distorted the extent of their representation in various governmental 
bodies. Moreover, what was needed and should have been explicitly incorporated in Kozak 
Memorandum were the rules that should be applied in making key decisions regarding power-
sharing at the national level.  Concerning the participatory power-sharing dimension in Kozak 
Memorandum, minority veto powers have been proposed in two major areas. Any constitutional 
changes require adoption of the federal constitutional laws by four-fifths majority within the 
upper-house and two-thirds majority at the lower-house. Also, appointed of official to oversee 
executive bodies in Transnistria and Gagauzia necessitates the latter’s consent. Certainly, in 
order to change federal ordinary as well as organic laws, then majority of the votes must be cast 
in the two houses. Also, a rejection by the president or senate may be overturned by an absolute 
(two-thirds) majority rule within the Representatives’ House. For the intermediate period, 
which lasted until 2015.  
 
Outcome and Assessment 
According to Wolff, the power sharing arrangements at the centre are established across all 
arms of government (judiciary, executive and legislature) as well as the civil service.463 Quite 
often, it is the executive power-sharing, which is perceived as the crucial element among 
various power-sharing arrangements. One of the most relevant and interesting approaches464 to 
representation was the proposed multiple-asymmetric federacy, involving formal arrangements 
that make the central cabinet members to be heads of federated executives (the same 
requirement applies for the line ministries). Already, Moldova has encountered this experience 
                                                 
462 Wolff, 2011(a). 
463 Wolff, 2011(a), p. 21. 
464 See also: Houten and Wolff, 2008. 
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in relation to the Gagauzia. Minimum representation would be guaranteed with no need for 
wieldy unmanageable, overblow executives.  
Wolff observes that based on the legislative power-sharing agreement, various irregular 
federacy provisions would not necessitate governance system with two tiers as predicted by 
Kozak Memorandum. The selection of electoral systems that generates proportional results will 
ensure representation of entities.465 The judicial power-sharing arrangement can be achieved 
through compulsory representation by judges who are nominated by various legislative 
institutions. These institutions comprise of federated units within higher courts, such as the 
constitutional court as well as the Supreme Court. In each entity, there is need for local branches 
to represent these courts regionally. 
The co-optation that was employed in Gagauzia’s case and Moldovan Package proposal of 
2007, is considered a significant mechanism for policy coordination, ensuring that all the 
federated entities’ special circumstances will be taken into account during the debates on 
national legislations and policies. 
A number of these approaches can either be reduced or increased to reflect precise requirements 
during the period of transition.  Particularly, during the initial settlement implementation stages, 
international involvement in various mechanisms (like the presence of an international 
constitutional court) or certain bodies that are actively involved, for instance the Conciliation 
Committee that the Ukrainian plan proposed (as well as in implicit Mediator Proposals).   
One of the challenging issues involve discussing how to address demilitarization, foreign 
troop’s presence and neutrality, and, in particular, to determine whether the negotiated 
agreement will be implemented at all. To ensure a higher level of responsiveness, responsibility 
and commitment, the agreements should either be guaranteed by international actors or the 
international actors should be directly involved in the negotiation and drafting processes. These 
kinds of agreements should replace local arrangements between Tiraspol and Chisinau.  
The Romanian dimension is comparable to that of the Gagauzia settlement and should be able 
to offer options to Transnistria in case Moldova wants to join Romania. 
There are various dimensions to Transnistrian conflict. These dimensions require particular 
mechanisms to ensure they are implemented and remain operational. Some of these 
mechanisms require guarantors and guarantees so that their parties will remain committed to 
them. The necessity for various guarantees is acknowledged, although in different detail, in the 
various proposals discussed and examined in this section.  
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In this sense, three main types of guarantees can be identified. To start with, there are formal 
and informal agreements. These agreements are often legally-binding arrangements that involve 
a particular provision or the entire settlement, and give detailed information on how the parties 
foresee the implementation as well as adoption of the settlement provisions. For instance, 
parties usually agree on various principles that will control their joint conduct in terms of policy 
and legislation coordination. Transitional period is the other alternative the can make current 
working groups to be extended or remain permanent in their presence. However, the 
permanency or extension has its own terms of reference and mandates. 
Second, various federated entities must ensure that their settlements are embedded into the 
constitution and legislation. For the case of Gagauzia, this is already achieved: Gagauzia’s 
status is anchored in the constitution as one of the special entities of Moldova466  as well as the 
organic law that dated back to 1995, which specifies Gagauzia’s rights and competencies. This 
could be employed for Bender and Transnistria settlements. Currently, in order to modify this 
legislation, parliament must reach a threshold of three-fifths majority.  
In line with various suggestions presented in Mediator Proposals and the Kozak Memorandum, 
this can be strengthened by getting parliament’s consent on each of the entities that require 
alternation on its competencies or status.  
Both soft and hard international guarantees will play a crucial role not only in establishing 
agreements, but also in persuading external parties to remain committed and to fulfil the 
stipulations of the agreement. For the case of Transnistrian conflict, this can take two major 
forms. First, in order to attain settlement using the 5+2 approach, Russia and Ukraine will be 
involved as the guarantor states, with EU and the US acting as observers and OSCE as the 
leading mediator.  
As various conflicting parties become eager to accomplish additional guarantees and both 
observers and mediators of the 5+2 model have recognized and agreed to this, each of the actors 
must be realistic on what is delivered by the guarantees. They can decide to enhance compliance 
or discourage non-compliance to the settlement provision using various political means, such 
as non-judicial dispute resolution, dispute avoidance, peace-keeping and negative 
conditionality, as well as judicial means (i.e. international courts like permanent Arbitration 
courts, as well as the EU court that deals with matters Human rights.) Nevertheless, guarantees 
serve a very special purpose: ensuring the institutions are working and promises/commitments 
are being respected, assist to bridge the trust gap, promote a secure and safe environment, where 
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1.09.2018.  
Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and Evaluation 
148 
institutions can prove themselves as valuable, create opportunities to revise or review previous 
agreements. In simple terms, guarantees assist to implement as well as operationalize 
agreements, and they are unable to replace any agreement.  
For this reason, a proposal for multi-asymmetric federacy arrangement was created in order to 
discuss within the current format of 5+2 and ensure it is embedded on both the constitution and 
domestic legislations as well as multi-lateral international treaties.  
While there are various contrasting features in the case of Transnistrian conflict in Moldova, 
this is not entirely unique. There are conflicts that entail similar territorial conflicts and their 
consequences are felt beyond the conflict’s neighbourhood, including the external powers. that 
have a significant impact on the outcomes. In elucidating the agreement elements of 
Transnistrian conflict in Moldova, there is no blue-print created for the same conflict anywhere 
in the world, however it can aid in understanding in detail the settlement frameworks as well as 
how they solve various issues. Beyond regional and local consequences, the importance of 
settlement for Transnistria is demonstrated as it enables one to comprehend better as well as 
know the appropriate way to handle international and domestic politics to achieve self-
determination.  
Table 20: Group-Based Representation an international involvement in complex power 
sharing systems467 
 Parliamentary 
representation 
Veto rights Proportionality 
in 
administration 
Segmental 
autonomy 
International 
involvement 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
PR electoral 
system; Bi-
cameralism; 
House of People 
(15 Member): 
reserved seats (5 
for each entity, 
i.e. Bosniacs, 
Serbs and Croats) 
Yes. “vital 
national interest 
of constituent 
people”, (1/3 
from each 
entity, ½ in 
HoP) mediation 
procedure, 
constitutional 
court 
Generally 
reflect the 
ethnic structure 
Symmetrical 
federalism: 
Two entities 
(Federation of 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
and Republika 
Srpska), one 
district 
Direct 
intervention by 
international 
community as 
a mechanism 
to coordinate 
law and 
policy-
making; 
judicial review 
and arbitration 
Gagauzia 
(Moldova) 
Two Round 
Voting System 
Yes. In case 
Moldova 
decides to join 
Reflect the 
ethnic structure 
Asymmetrical 
federalism:  
Autonomy 
No extensive 
international 
involvement, 
                                                 
467 Source: Bieber, F. (2004). Institutionalizing ethnicity in the Western Balkans: managing change in deeply 
divided societies. ECMI Working Paper, 19. Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues; Weller, 2008. 
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Romania, 
Gagauzia has 
the option to opt 
out of Moldova 
conflict solved 
bilaterally 
Moldova 
(Transnistria) 
Unicameral 
Parliament, FPTP 
Electoral System 
Since 1992 a separate, de jure unrecognized, de facto 
independent state within Moldova, with its own 
parliament, government, military, police, postal system 
and currency. 
Extensive 
involvement 
through the 
Russian 14th 
Army, acting 
as a peace 
keeping force 
and CSCE 
Missions 
 
III.3 Lessons Learnt from the Case Studies 
Following Biebers pertinent observations, the former Yugoslavia has experienced sharing of 
power and the accommodation of the various ethnic groups despite depending on foreign 
imposition.468 In spite of having an authoritarian framework Yugoslavia had had experience 
with federal system and decentralization. Ethnic representations – known as ethnic key - were 
dissolved in 1991 after dominating Yugoslavian political system for a long time. The 
experiences with the decentralization and coping with diversity up till 1991 resulted in both 
instability and accommodation after the collapse. States such as Sri Lanka facing demands of 
federalization and devolution of power, reject these based on lessons learnt from the 
Yugoslavian territorial autonomy case and the equation of federal arrangements with 
secessionist movements, decay and subsequent dissolution of Yugoslavia. Thus, the threat of 
the latent secessionist movements from any kind of territorial autonomy. The various kinds 
consociational power-sharing arrangements in Bosnia (BiH), Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia 
were results and consequences of international interventions. However, the intervention pattern 
was varying. For instance, in Kosovo, the special people representing the UN Secretary-General 
Hans Haekkerup, created a constitutional framework in 2001 to establish an effective power 
sharing moderate framework. As much as there were consultations with political forces in 
Kosovo, the institutions that were incorporated in the framework of the constitution were 
directly imposed. The pressure from the U.S significantly influenced the Dayton Peace 
                                                 
468 Bieber, F. (2013). The Balkans: The Promotion of Power Sharing by Outsiders. In Joanne McEvoy and Brendan 
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Agreement (DPA). Concisely, the DPA’s constitution was written by the U.S state department 
lawyers in the native English language. Moreover, Bieber observes that the negotiated 
mechanisms ensuring weak institutions and the group protections showed the involvement in 
framing of the peace agreement of persons with wartime parties mentality. The international 
bodies were less forcefully prominent in the power-sharing deals in Macedonia and Serbia and 
Montenegro (SCG). The EU and NATO mediated the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001and 
the principles sharing of power arrangements were suggested through the international forces. 
Moreover, the role of the third party was made irrelevant by a number of factors including the 
power-sharing arrangements in Macedonia and Albania's grand coalition since 1991, and also 
the Ohrid Agreement did not highlight the rules for sharing power while the particulars and the 
legal provisions were enacted by the parliament of Macedonia. The mediated agreement in 2002 
by the EU led to the establishment of the new state in Serbia and Montenegro, outlining the 
principles of creation of the new states. The two-member states negotiated the details for one 
year leading to the formal establishment of the new state - SCG in 2003. In April 2008, the 
Kosovo parliament passed the new constitution to replace the 2001 power-sharing 
arrangements. As much as the document was initially adopted by the domestic institutions, the 
drafting was heavily associated with the international actors. There was a negotiation about the 
inclusion of the communities from Serbia in the Kosovo institutions, unlike the other systems 
of power-sharing that were analyzed and discussed in the thesis. The mediation and the level of 
imposition by the international actors are vital in evaluating the legitimacy of the agreement for 
the political players and the citizens. However, the arrangements that have been imposed are 
less legitimate, if at all and are not considered by the parties and do not show the levels of 
concentration to the structures that have been imposed or the country which is being 
governed.469 The role of the international players is significantly equal to the working of the 
system of sharing power. For instance, the external bodies were formally and informally 
associated with the power-sharing institutions in both Kosovo and BiH. The SRSG470 in Kosovo 
and the OHR471 in BiH and also the ICR472 between 2008 and 2012 have the powers to impose 
and refute and disconsider the local institutions’ decisions. The problems that associate with 
the way the international officials override the institutions that have been elected democratically 
have been discussed adequately and precisely for the scenario of BiH as instances of 
                                                 
469 In a sense, BiH and Kosovo experienced a ‘catch 22’ situation. The new power-sharing institutions could not 
emerge and consolidate without the support of international actors, but these could not sustain and collapsed 
without the support from international actors.  
470 Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo. 
471 Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and Evaluation 
151 
undermining democracy, democratization, and sharing of power.473 The degree of impositions 
of consociational power-sharing institutions in BiH vary greatly from the ones in Kosovo. 
While the external intervention in BiH happened in the form of OHR impositions, breaking the 
standstill that existed among the various ethnic groups, in Kosovo, the result was that the SRSG 
annulled the decisions often and the Albanian who were the majority in parliament decided to 
disregard other minority communities, such as the Serbs. After the independence, the ICR in 
Kosovo has been silent despite being affected by the extensive formal powers. The external 
imposition has affected the process of seeking a compromise of local parties and created a way 
for the posturing of the confrontational politics since imposition could be a stalemate breaker 
in both cases. According to Bieber,474 besides the exercise of formal powers, the actors from 
international bodies in both nations are arbitrating and mediating informally among their 
communities and depending on the circumstances. In BiH but not particularly in Kosovo, the 
actors from the International bodies have been included into the domestically available 
institutions. Significantly, this has been noticed in the decisive voting of the three international 
constitutional court members apart from the two Bosniak, two Croat, among others in BiH. 
External bodies have witnessed a diminished role in Macedonia. NATO monitored the 
agreement pact regarding peace aspects of the military, but the Ohrid agreement established a 
civilian authority that was non-comparable. The post-conflict period has furthermore limited 
the roles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU 
Special Representative (EUSR). The conflict over the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement 
was informally mediated by the EUSR and the representatives of the involved embassies.475 
The external intervention taking place in SCG was of lowest. After just three years, however, 
the SCG disintegrated hence making it difficult to render the joint state functions. The EU 
engaged again for mediation to negotiate the conditions for dissolving the state.  
Kosovo and BiH are “a reflection of the provisional nature of the arrangements” of the 
consociational power-sharing institutions. For example, in Kosovo, the framework of the 2001 
constitution and the constitution of 2008 are interim arrangements both with the regard to 
Kosovo sovereignty and the interethnic negotiations and interactions.476 The Dayton 
constitution is thought to be a permanent settlement, however the international actors were 
                                                 
473 See Bieber, F. (2006a). Power-Sharing After Yugoslavia: Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power-Sharing 
Institutions in Post-War Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. In Sid Noel (ed.) From Power-Sharing to Democracy: 
Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press; and Bieber, 
F. (2006b). After Dayton, Dayton? The Evolution of an Unpopular Peace. Ethnopolitics, 5(1); Weller and Wolff, 
2006, pp. 1-13. 
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strong and particularly the powers of OHR were improved at the Peace Implementation Council 
meeting that happened in 1997 Bonn, which shows that arrangements that are thought to be 
permanent are of temporary nature in BiH. As a matter of fact, the framework of Dayton did 
largely change both de facto and de jure as a consequence of numerous interventions from the 
international parties that enhanced the institutions of the state to destroy the entities that led to 
the expansion of the power-sharing in the entities themselves.477 The efforts to incorporate and 
widen the amendments in the structure of the institutions did not succeed after a package of the 
constitutional reforms was closely turned down in parliament and subsequently, there was a 
crisis in the consociational power-sharing arrangements causing delays and impacting the 
closure of the OHR.478 
The ability of external actors to annul, abolish, modify, impose power-sharing principles and 
institutions that were reached at and based on consensus and thorough negotiation was the 
primary criticism point regarding the international intervention in the consociational power-
sharing institutions both in the BiH and to a less extent in Kosovo. In most cases, the 
intervention is often initiated by the imposition that is done contrary to the agreement of at least 
one party and not by the mediation and arbitration methods. As a consequence, the political 
players of the various communities have suggested that their rights have not been protected 
effectively by the frameworks of the institutions since the intervention from the international 
framework and the system of power-sharing had already been conflated. In essence, there has 
been a frequent undermining of the practices of building consensus and trust in the 
consociational power-sharing institutions, which are supposed to represent and protect group 
interests.479 
The degree of consociational power-sharing arrangements and institutions varies in BiH, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, and SCG. As previously, denoted, the systems of sharing power have 
considerable varying technicalities. However, all the systems can be grouped as the 
consociational power-sharing arrangements and not as other power-sharing models such as the 
centripetal power-sharing.480 In spite of evident differences, all four cases of externally imposed 
power-sharing arrangements show the presence of four key principles of consociationalism, 
(i.e., 1) the executive power-sharing, ensuring the representation of the important ethnic groups 
in government, 2) minority veto, providing tools preventing the majority dictatorship and 
protecting minority rights; 3) proportionality in the public administration sector481 and 4) 
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segmental autonomy, ensuring different levels of autonomy). Autonomy is vital and will form 
the difference throughout the cases and hence will be explained in the subsequent sections after 
evaluating the contentious power-sharing aspect; which is the mechanisms of power-sharing 
that does not allow the exclusion of the minority. 
Bieber considers the veto power mechanisms based on the Dayton agreement destructive and 
extensive.482 The parliamentary procedures of BiH accept two veto rights forms; the entity veto 
and the constituent people veto. Therefore, all the laws need the support of one-third or more 
Members of Parliament from the respective entities in all the two parliament chambers. 
However, the minority’s vital interest is crucial and can therefore be invoked since it is not 
properly stipulated in the constitution. It is therefore concise that the Constitutional Court is 
mandated to come up with the jurisprudence on the definition of the vital interests and has since 
taken up a firm stand in resisting loose interpretations.  
The voting mechanisms of Serbia and Montenegro were similar to the concept of the veto entity 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In essence, the decisions were subjected to the support of the 
majority from the republics plus the overall majority. The Constitutional Charter required 
majority support from the 126 deputies (91 from Serbia and 35 from Montenegro). That led to 
the cancellation of the sessions of parliament because numerous MPs from Montenegro failed 
to attend the sessions and thus their blockage did not directly affect the veto in the making of 
decisions but was used as a tool to make the existing weak institutions further inefficient. The 
veto mostly involved rectifying the international treaties. 483 
The double majority established the veto rights in Macedonia. The decisions of the parliament 
in the specific fields of relevance to the Albanian and the other communities and also the places 
of wide significance need the acceptance of the overall majority from the MPs and a majority 
from the MPs elected among the minority communities. The principle of voting was commonly 
known as the Badinter majority,484 a name derived from the French lawyer of the constitution 
who was responsible for the 2001 proposed mechanisms. Concisely, the constitution helped in 
ensuring the fundamental legislation was favorable to the Albanian and the minority group. The 
2006 elections and the formation of a government that followed showed that the system of 
voting has significantly impacted the formation of the government and the government abilities 
to have the necessary majorities for the laws they wanted passed in the parliament. 
The 2006 elections were won by the conservative VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) after co-
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operating with the minor parties such as the ones representing Roma, the Turks, the Vlachs, and 
the Bosnians. Therefore, the party decided to conspire with the second largest party in Albania 
known as the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), instead of the winning party the 
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). DUI, therefore, boycotted parliament stating that it 
was the most active party in Albania and consequently it should join the government.485 Party 
inclusion in Macedonia is an informal practice and not a formal requirement by law, hence the 
inclusion of the largest party of the minority does not mean that it is the base for power-sharing. 
The result of this decision was that the government did not have a parliament majority for 
double majority voting of their choices. DUI controlled only 17 seats out of the 36 total seats 
held by the minority community.486 The decisions to be voted and other laws needed consent 
from the Albanian communities of the DPA and the other smaller communities. The governing 
aspect was made difficult and the powers of the smaller communities were enhanced. 
Furthermore, the constellation also showed the tension that existed in Macedonia between the 
binational system of the interethnic tensions and the addition of other communities to the 
system. The arrangements in Macedonia led to the constitution of Kosovo heavily rely on and 
be inspired by them. The constitution was passed in 2008. It establishes same patterns of voting 
as those from Macedonia and predicts autonomy of the territories by enhancing the powers of 
the municipalities. Therefore, the laws that affect the minority groups required the consent of 
the majority of the communities in possession of the reserved seats. However, the provision is 
not likely going to be efficient in Kosovo. The majority can easily adopt the relevant laws. The 
ability of the minorities to meddle in the creation of the legal framework is therefore 
undermined.487 
The various ways of preventing the outvoting of the majority and the other power-sharing 
considerations influence the system performance with regard to the ability of the elites to govern 
the country efficiently and be ready to reach consensus-based decisions based on compromise 
and ‘principled’ negotiation. The inefficiency in the governance system is not a result of the 
problems associated with the veto mechanisms. 
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Figure 16. Case Applied Composite Model for Conflict-Regulation in Plural Societies488  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  for India 
  for Sri Lanka 
 
The findings from the case studies show that by applying consociational power-sharing 
principles the conflicts resulting from demands of minorities, such homeland and linguistic 
recognition can be settled through provisions based upon the principle of segmental autonomy; 
demands for proportional representation in political decision-making were met on the one hand 
through the specificity of “centric-regional” parties and, on the other, through policies of 
reservation; demands for security, such as preservation of cultural identity among other things, 
were also met through segmental autonomy as well as formal and informal blocking rights 
(minority veto principle).489 
The case study of Sri Lanka proved again the validity of crucial importance of elite agency not 
only in institutional engineering but also in the maintenance of power-sharing arrangements. 
Although originally blessed with favorable conditions, but without an independence movement 
that could have served additionally a unifying force, it was not blessed with accommodative 
and moderate leaders. Instead of delicate and balancing institutional engineering, the Sinhalese 
elites chose the path of preferential treatment of majority, and unfortunate misunderstanding of 
democratic principles. Sri Lankan case demonstrated also the validity of Lijphart statement that 
in a deeply divided society there can be either “consociational democracy or no democracy at 
all.” In his seminal work “Patterns of Democracy”, Lijphart asserts that “In the most deeply 
divided societies, like Northern Ireland, majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil 
strife rather than democracy. What such societies need is a democratic regime that emphasizes 
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consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize 
the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority.”490  
 
Sri Lanka: From Power-Sharing to Majority Rule491  
Favorable Conditions at the Independence 
Sowell observes that at the Independence Sri Lanka expected “a promising future” and there 
were good reasons for such a positive anticipation: “… although the Sinhalese and the Tamils 
differed in ethnicity, language and religion there was much evidence of goodwill across the 
social lines that divided them. The elites of both groups were Westernized, English-speaking, 
and cosmopolitan, and were used to working together.”492 
Another favorable aspect, according to Wriggins, constituted the fact that “of the ten newly 
independent countries of South and South East Asia, Ceylon has more of the attributes of a 
modernized social and political system than any other”493 “Some of these attributes were 60 per 
cent literacy rate, the highest per capita income of any country in Asia except for Japan” and 
that “the civil service by 1949 was almost exclusively indigenous.”494 
As I have mentioned above, the first Constitution of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), an adjusted 
version of the Soulbury Constitution, though not having provisions on fundamental rights, 
contained entrenched safeguards for the protection of minority groups and prohibition of their 
discrimination under Article 29(2). It stated that Parliament was not competent to pass laws 
that: 
 
a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion; or 
(b) make provisions of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons or other 
communities or religions are not made liable; or 
(c) confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred on persons 
of other communities or religions; or 
(d) alter the constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the governing authority of that body.495 
 
According to Wilson, “the unexpressed premise of the Soulbury Constitution was a 
consociational arrangement between the English-educated elites, of all island’s principal 
groups: communal (Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim), religious (Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Catholic, 
                                                 
490 Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 33. 
491 Carciumaru, 2012. 
492 Sowell, T. (2004). Affirmative action around the world: an empirical study. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
p. 78. 
493 Wriggins 1965, p. 6. 
494 Wriggins 1965, pp. 66-8, 100-101, 458-70. 
495 See the full text at: http://www.tamilnation.org/srilankalaws/46constitution.htm. Consider also Marasinghe, 
2004, p. 14; de Silva, 1981, pp. 510-539; Wilson, 1988, pp. 36-37. 
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Protestant) and social (the various castes among the Sinhalese and Tamil communities).”496 
Besides Article 29, the consociational arrangements included, other important safeguards, such 
as “weightage in representation including Appointed Members (not exceeding six in number) 
in the popular House of Representatives, a second chamber (the Senate), […] and independent 
public services and judicial services commissions.”497  
Moreover, Sowell observes that “there had never been a race riot between Sinhalese and Tamils 
during the first half of the twentieth century.”498 Furthermore, the interactions between different 
ethnic groups were "cordial, unmarred by the sort of friction that exists between Hindus and 
Moslems in India."499 Sowell concludes that this inclusive and integrative approach was not 
limited to politics or elites, but that in general “the situation seemed to provide an impressive 
basis for a solid start in state- and nation-building.”500 
Based on the above mentioned, Stepan asks pertinently whether Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict 
could be understood and explained “by any resource to arguments about “historic hatreds” or 
“absolute poverty.””501 Thus, how can one explain the emergence and escalation of the 
unparalleled violence leading to a civil war that lasted over 25 years? 
A possible answer provides Wilson, stating that “the consociational that could have cemented 
the foundations of a pluralist democratic society disintegrated in stages …”502 The institutional 
arrangements as well as causes and stages of disintegration of such a favorable basis to build 
upon, will be analyzed in the next section.  
 
Majoritarian Practices and Gradual Minority Exclusion503 
There are strict definable stages that led to the escalation of an incipiently mild conflict into a 
full-blown war on secession and a near break-down of the state. These stages include both cause 
and effect as well as action and reaction variables. On part of Sinhala elites that is the 
development of a majoritarian control strategy, concerning policy implementation and 
institutional engineering. On part of Tamil minority that is the radicalization of their demands, 
from parity within a unitary state to commitment and pledge of loyalty to the idea of a separate 
state of Tamil Eelam. These stages, in chronological and conflict-escalation order, are: 
                                                 
496 Wilson, 1988, p. 34, (emphasis added). 
497 Wilson, 1988, p. 34. 
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499 Sowell, 2004, p. 79. 
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Citizenship Act of 1948, peasant settlement policies, Official Language Act of 1956, affirmative 
action policies such as University Entrance System of 1972, and the Constitution of 1972.  
 
a. Citizenship Act of 1948 and the “ethnic outbidding” 504 
According to Stepan, the Upcountry Tamils (also known as Tamils of Indian origin) that 
participated in elections since the universal franchise was introduced in Sri Lanka in 1931, were 
disenfranchised on the grounds. That they “were not really part of the Ceylonese nation and 
thus should not be voters in Ceylon”, coming to the island as workers in the 19th Century.505 As 
a result, ten pro cent of Sri Lanka’s population were without civic status, with neither 
citizenship nor right to vote, becoming de facto stateless people. 
Consequently, Wilson pointedly observed that the disfranchisement reduced the total number 
of Upcountry Tamils from seven to nothing, and increased the Sinhalese seats by exactly the 
number of the seats Upcountry Tamils lost; the Sinhalese thereby increased their representation 
from 68 in 1947 to 75 at the 1952 general election. 
 
Table 21: Ethnic distribution of Parliamentary Seats, 1947-1977506 
 General 
elections 
Sinhalese Sri Lankan 
Tamil 
Muslims Upcountry 
Tamil 
Other
s 
Total 
Seats due on the basis of 
population 
 66 12 6 10 1  
Seats obtained 1947 68 13 6 7 1 95a 
 1952 75 13     
 1956 75 - - - - - 
Seats due on the basis of 
population 
 106 17 10 18 0 151b 
Seats obtained 1960 March 123 18 9 0 1  
 1960 July 121 18 11 0 1  
 1965 122 17 11 0 1  
 1970 123 19 8 0 1  
 1977 137 18 12 1 0 168c 
a - The total number of seats in the House was 101, 6 being reserved for “Appointed M.P.’s” by the Governor-
General on prime ministerial advice. 
b - The total number of seats had been increased to 157, 6 being reserved for “Appointed M.P.’s” 
c - The total number of seats was 168, the class of “Appointed M.P.’s” was abolished in the 1972 Republican 
Constitution. 
                                                 
504 Mendis, D. (2008). Democratization in Sri Lanka. In Pai V.A. Panandiker and Rahul Tripathi (ed.) Towards 
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505 Although more than a million Tamil plantation workers were disfranchised, G.G. Ponnambalam, Jaffna Tamil 
and the founder and head of the Tamil Congress opportunistically condoned the Citizenship Act by accepting a 
ministry in the United National Party government, in Daniel, 1996, p. 113; consider also Stepan, 2006, p. 7; and 
Wriggins, 1965, pp. 212-228 on backgrounds of disfranchisement. 
506 Wilson, 1988, p. 35. 
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After the disfranchisement of the Upcountry Tamils, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, a prominent leader 
of the All Ceylon Tamil Party (ACTP), left the party and founded the Tamil Federal Party. The 
reason for founding a new party was his conviction that Tamils needed an party based in the 
north to protect their interests and demand self-rule.507 According to Wilson, the party’s name 
was clear in English, but its Tamil translation left room for speculation meaning: “the Ceylon 
Tamil state party.”508  
The disfranchisement of Upcountry Tamils impacted the politics within the Sinhalese majority. 
The considerable reduction of Tamil voters led to the increase in the attractivity of the main 
Sinhalese parties to outbid each other for Sinhalese votes. Thus, the Tamil voters were 
perceived as too small to count.509 As Horowitz observes, in spite of the fact that some Tamils 
were members of mostly-Sinhalese parties, such as United National Party (UNP),510 “by the 
mid-1950s virtually all politically-active Sri Lankan Tamils had opted for either the Tamil 
Congress or the Federal Party, leaving the UNP, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) as well 
as the various left-wing parties to the Sinhalese.”511  
As a result, Sri Lanka's party system could be basically described as having two major Sinhalese 
parties outbidding each other for Sinhalese votes and two main Tamil parties competing for 
Tamil votes. The Tamil parties merged in 1972.512  
Disfranchisement of Upcountry Tamils had also direct consequences on the shift of intent of 
the language movement. 
 
b. Official Language Act of 1956 
At first, the intent was to replace English by the two indigenous languages-Sinhalese and Tamil-
as main political languages. The term “swabasha” or “mother tongue” had been applied to this 
aspiration.513 However, the demand for "mother tongue" was erroneous. As Sowell pointedly 
observes, “there was no "mother tongue" of the Sri Lankan people as a whole, but two different 
languages representing the two largest population groups.”514 According to Sowell, the demand 
for “mother tongue” was made at the beginning of 1940s, but Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake 
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“sensed the explosive potential of issues like language and religion in a newly independent and 
ethnically divided country” and thus kept delaying the implementation.515 
Moreover, Sinhalese political leaders realized that there is no need in respecting the agreements 
of “swabasha”-movement anymore, due to insignificance of Tamil voters, and became aware 
that nothing and no-one stops them to establish Sinhala language as the sole official language 
of the country. This led the two main Sinhalese parties, UNP and SLFP, as DeVotta&Sahadevan 
put it, “to outbid each other on who could provide the better deal for the Sinhalese 
community.”516 
Consequently, the 1956 general election saw the institutionalization of outbidding process. The 
key actor to make use of the opportunity to dismiss Tamil language rights was Bandaranaike, 
the leader of SLFP. According to Sowell, Bandaranaike was not representative of those for 
whom he spoke for, being a “Oxford-educated, Christian, Sinhalese aristocrat, who grew up 
speaking English and unable to speak Sinhala.” 517 However, “like some other Sinhalese 
politicians of his time, Bandaranaike became Buddhist, Sinhala-speaking and an extremist on 
language, religion, and Sinhalese culture. His own goals were neither religious nor ideological. 
He wanted to become prime minister—and he succeeded.”518 
To his electorate Bandaranaike had a very simple and direct message “Sinhala Only and within 
twenty-four hours”.519 The bill to make Sinhala the “one official language” of Sri Lanka was 
introduced on June 14, 1956 and passed nine days later. Wriggins captured “the tone of the 
nation state policy”520 making process that followed: 521 
 
Proponents of changing the language of government rapidly advanced within public service. 
The Minister of Education argued in public that the English medium for schools should be abolished in 1958. 
It was announced that one of the leading teacher training colleges would be reserved for Sinhalese teachers 
only. 
The government made no moves to allay the Tamil fears. 
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The ‘Sinhala Only’ policy exacerbated the polarization in the electoral campaign, already 
started as a consequence of the disenfranchisement of Upcountry Tamils.522 Thus, Sri Lanka 
had ceased to have any major broad parties but only ethnic parties without any incentives to be 
accommodative- the party system became almost exclusively ethnic in form. 
Additionally, Stepan draws our attention to an important aspect that refutes the master narrative 
of Bandaranaike giving in to the pressures of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists.523 Thus, for 
example, in January 1956 the president of the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress wrote that 
Buddhists “have no desire to make Buddhism the State religion—in spite of the cry raised by 
self-seeking politicians—but they do want the State to help them rehabilitate themselves and 
undo some, at least, of the injustices perpetrated against them during the days of their [colonial] 
subjection.”524  
Sowell remarks that the lack of opportunities in education or employment, as a direct result of 
the policies mentioned above, led to increasing dissatisfaction amongst the Tamil population. 
Tamils resorted to Satyagraha (peaceful protests in the tradition established by Gandhi) in 
parliament and in the entire country. This in turn lead to anti-Tamil mob attacks “in the frenzied 
atmosphere whipped up by Sinhalese politicians and Buddhist monks” 525 that saw at least 150 
Tamils killed.526 These were only the first casualties in what would become a long series of 
bloody and lethal riots in the years ahead. 
Thus, the implementation of the Official Language Act of 1956 can be considered as a turning 
point with regard to several political, cultural, social, ethnic and linguistic problems in Sri 
Lanka. The introduction of the Sinhala Only affirmative action policy by this act became highly 
discriminatory to Tamil-speaking minority527 and, as a result, several long-lasting and 
unsolvable problems including the struggle for secession surfaced. Instead of polity-wide 
measures of inclusion and empowerment of discriminated minorities, such as in India, 
affirmative action in Sri Lanka led not to “ceylonisation” (Wriggins 1960), i.e. according to its 
plural ethos, but to its sinhalisation, being exclusively tailored for the needs of the majority. 
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c. Affirmative action policies  
Under its affirmative action and positive discrimination programmes, the government’s 
preference to hire Sinhalese into the government service saw Tamil representation, who due to 
historical reasons had been overrepresented in public employment,528 in certain government 
sectors decrease drastically.529  
Based on the findings of Stepan in 1955, “26% of the cadre in the elite, and politically powerful, 
Sri Lankan Administrative Service (SAS), were Tamils. By 1979 this figure had been cut in 
half. But, for younger Tamil aspirant professionals, recruitment trends into the SAS were even 
more ominous. According to Stepan, from 1970 to1977, of the 467 admissions via the Open 
Competitive Examination route 34 (only 7.2%)´were Tamils. In 1977-81, of the 159 new 
admissions via this route, none were Tamils.”530 Additionally, according to Phadnis, “while 30 
per cent of the Ceylon Administrative Service, 50 per cent of the clerical service, 60 per cent 
of engineers and doctors, 40 per cent of the labour forces were Tamil in 1956, those numbers 
plummeted to 5 per cent, 3 per cent, 10 per cent, 5 per cent respectively by 1970s.”531 
The consequences of the official language policy implementation led to the following situation 
in the state sector employment: 
 
Table 22: The state-sector employment of minorities in Sri Lanka (1990)532 
Minorities population 
(%) 
state  
services (%) 
provincial 
services (%) 
semi-government 
services (%) 
Sri Lankan Tamil 12.7 5.9 7.1 8.2 
Muslim 7.4 2.0 4.6 1.0 
Upcountry Tamil 5.5 0.1 0.2 0.5 
 
Concerning the education sector, in 1959 Sri Lankan Universities’ Committee reported that the 
proportion of Tamil students compared to their ethnic population was 1:320 while that of the 
Sinhalese was 1:3,212. 533 As a result, according to Sowell the government implemented the so 
called “preferential admissions policies” called “standardization” at the university level, to 
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attempt to reduce Tamils’ over-proportionate representation. Under the ‘standardization’ 
system, the proportion of Tamil university students in the sciences fell from 35 percent in 1970 
to 19 percent by 1974.534  
Finally, Horowitz points to the fact that UNP-party did try to cancel the standardization policies, 
in 1977. However, this initiative was met by a decisive protest from the Sinhalese, which led 
the UNP to give it up the initiative.535 The official purpose of the instituted system of weighted 
application for admissions to universities in favour of Sinhalese youths was to level the playing 
field for the Sinhalese. It outdid itself in its effect. 
 
d. Peasant settlement policies536 
Another state-sponsored discrimination against the Tamils represented the peasant settlement 
policies with ethnic bias during the 1950s. Indeed, according to Bandarage, significant changes 
were occurring in the ethnic composition of the Dry Zone population, especially in the Ampara 
and Trincomalee districts in the Eastern Province due largely to the Gal Oya scheme in the 
former and the Kantalai and Morawewa peasant settlement schemes in the latter. In the Ampara 
and Batticaloa Districts, the Sinhala population increased from 5.9 per cent to 17.7 per cent 
while Tamil population declined from 50.3 per cent to 46.4 per cent and the Muslim population 
declined from 42.2 per cent to 35.1 per cent between 1946 and 1971. During the same period, 
the Sinhala population in Trincomalee district increased from 20.6 per cent to 28.8 per cent and 
the Tamil population declined from 44.5 per cent to 38.2 per cent and the Muslim population 
increased from 30.5 per cent to 32 per cent.  
Bandarage’s findings confirm that D.S. Senanayake was keen to reclaim the Sinhala Buddhist 
civilization of the Raja rata, i.e. the Northeastern region, including Jaffna peninsula, from which 
monarchs ruled the country from approximately the 5th Century BCE to the 11th Century CE. 
D.S. Senanayake wanted “to settle Sinhalese in Trincomalee and the hinterland in Padaviya in 
the North and in Seruwila and Ampara in the North and the East to block a contiguous and 
homogenous Tamil speaking area in the Northeastern region.” 537 This state-sponsored targeted 
manipulation in terms of destabilization of the ethnic composition could be contrasted with 
differentiated land settlement policies in India, regarding Kashmir as well as Northeastern 
states. It also shows the role history and mythology started to play in the Sinhalese 
consciousness and political discourse. The institutionalization of this factor occurred in 1972. 
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e. The Constitution of 1972 
The climax of “sinhalisation” of the state and imposition of the will of majority represented the 
Constitution of 1972. The new constitution abrogated the preceding constitution, which derived 
authority from the British Crown and Parliament. According to Jayasuriya the constitution was, 
in essence, meant to be an expression of a new nationalism as well as the embodiment of 
progressive socialist ideals of people’s power and centralized planning.538 However, the “new 
nationalism” meant not a Sri Lankan nationalism, but that of the Sinhala Buddhist majority.  
In this sense, the country’s colonial name, Ceylon, was replaced with Sri Lanka, according to 
Bandarage, a term used in ancient Indian epics over Sinhala, the pre-colonial name which 
claimed the island as the land of the Sinhala people. 539 Additionally, the new constitution stated: 
“The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall 
be the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddhism” virtually ignoring the presence of other 
religions (Hindu, Christian, and Muslim) in the country. It also removed the safeguards that had 
been in place to protect minorities- Article 29(2)540 and incorporated the provisions of the 
Official Language Act of 1956.541  Moreover, Article 2, declared Sri Lanka to be a unitary state 
and Article 3, declared that sovereignty was inalienable: “In the Republic of Sri Lanka 
sovereignty is in the people and is inalienable. Sovereignty includes the powers of government, 
fundamental rights and the franchise.”542  
Thus, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism was institutionalized and becoming one with the state.  
 
f. the Constitution of 1978 
The 1978 Constitution followed closely the contents of the 1972 Constitution. The only official 
language of Sri Lanka was still Sinhala (Article18), but in a new provision the 1978 Constitution 
introduced Sinhala and Tamil as the two national languages. (Article 19 and Article 21). 
Marasinghe pointedly sums up: “what was meant by this new category or status was not clearly 
specified.”543  
However, three changes with far reaching consequences for political system were also 
introduced. First change represented the shift from parliamentary to presidential system. Stepan 
pointedly observed that the constitution “gave the president more powers than in France.”544 
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Just to enumerate some of the power mentioned by Stepan, these included: the right to “be head 
of the Cabinet of Ministers” (Article 43); appoint all members of the “Public Service 
Commission”(Article 56); “in his discretion submit to the people by Referendum any Bill” so 
long as it does not change the constitution (Article 85); appoint the Chief Justice, and after 
ascertaining his views, appoint “every other Judge of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals” 
(Article 151); and with some minor limitations the president “may, from time to time, by 
Proclamation summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament” (Article 70).545 Because of such a 
powerful presidential office, executive power-sharing, as is possible in a plural society with a 
parliamentary system, was made extremely difficult to reach. As I have argued in the theoretical 
chapter, parliamentary system represents a favorable condition for the establishment and 
maintenance of a power-sharing system. 
The second change was the introduction of the Referendum principle (Article 85). According 
to de Silva, it had a three-fold role. It was essential for constitutional amendments to entrench 
clauses of the Constitution, a means of testing public opinion, and, a way of resolving conflicts 
between the President and Parliament.546  
The third change was the introduction of proportional representation instead of plurality, first-
past-the-post voting system. Mainly, it was introduced to avoid the wild electoral swings 
experienced under the previous system.547 Moreover, proportional representation, based on 
consociational theory, should have been of remarkable benefit to and had an accommodative 
effect on religious and ethnic minorities, under normal circumstances. However, as Horowitz 
pointedly stated “[s]oon after these changes came into effect […] conditions were anything but 
normal. The Tamil United Liberation Front […] had been excluded from parliament; separatist 
violence had begun in earnest; and Sinhalese and Tamil opinion had become so polarized that, 
in the short term at least, no electoral system could foster moderation.”548 Thus, he continues, 
timing variable should be also taken into account.  
Representation is one of the primary concerns to the minorities. However, as I have exemplarily 
argued, on vital questions of individual and group identity, social and economic opportunity, 
access to state sector employment, as well as the crucial issue for a plural society such as form 
and character of the state (unitary/federal based on secular principles), minorities have not stood 
                                                 
545 Precipitating the events, the President did dissolve the Parliament in 2004, neither on a successful vote of no-
confidence nor the loss of a vote on the budget, but purely on presidential discretion, see Mendis, 2008, pp. 119-
20. 
546 So far there has been only one Referendum – in 1982 – to extend the life of the 9th Parliament elected in 1977, 
for a further period of six years until 1989, in de Silva, 1997, p. 101; also consider Jayasuriya, 2005, p. 21. 
547 See Marasinghe, 2004, pp. 20-21; Mendis, 2008, pp. 118-9. 
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a chance. On these crucial issues with direct relevance to the majority group, the major political 
parties UNP and SLFP were either united or not open in their opposition. The democratic 
stability549 from an originally power-sharing system to majoritarian “control” system was 
established. In the Figure below I show how the analyzed processes fit the pattern of the 
“control” system: 
 
Figure 37. Sri Lanka’s majoritarian “control” system 
Criteria Control System 
Laws, policies and institutional 
arrangements  
Effective govern of the 
authoritative allocation 
o f  resources 
The interest of the majority segment as perceived and 
articulated by its elite. 
Citizenship Act of 1948; Official 
Language Act of 1956; affirmative action; 
peasant settlement; 1972 and 1978 
Constitutions  
Linkages between the two 
segments 
The majority segment extracts what it needs from the 
minority segment and delivers what it sees fit. 
Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act 
of 1958550; propotional representarion, 
1978.  
The significance o f  
bargaining 
No bargaining between elites of the majority and 
minority segments.  
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact; 
Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact551 
The role o f  the State 
 
The bureaucratic apparatus of the state uses what 
discretion is available in the interpretation and 
implementation of official regulations to benefit the 
segment which it represents at the expense of the 
minority segment 
Citizenship question, affirmative action; 
language policy, respectively state 
employment etc. 
The type o f  normative 
justification  
Legitimacy is reached by an elaborate and well-
articulated group-specific ideology. 
Sri Lanka instead of Ceylon; Buddhism- 
foremost place etc. but also the “minority 
complex” 
Visual metaphor “puppeteer manipulating his stringed puppet” 
Solomon & Sirimavo Bandaranaike; J.R. 
Jayewardene. 
Source: Author’s figure (see also Lustick, 1979, and Carciumaru, 2012, p.18). 
 
Radicalization of Minorities’ Demands  
In what follows, I will show how majoritarian practices exacerbate a conflict in a deeply divided 
society. The theoretical and practical recommendations stipulated by Ian Lustick (1979) 
regarding the establishment of a “control” system for plural societies will also be refuted. The 
“control” political system starts from the premise made by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) that 
deeply divided societies cannot develop as stable democracies, but through “the dominant 
majority configuration.”  
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912; Mendis, 2008, p. 113.). But democracy, as we have established, means more than holding elections.  
550 This act provides for Tamil as the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces where the 
Tamils are the majority of the population. However, the provisions of this act were implemented only in 1965, see 
Gunasena, S. (2006). Language Policy: An Overview of the Sri Lankan Experience. In Amal Jayawardane (ed.) 
Perspectives on National Integration in Sri Lanka. Colombo: NIPU, p. 234. 
551 Both pacts could be retrospectively perceived, due to “ethnic outbidding” and no concessions that could 
detriment the majority, as pseudo-bargaining efforts. The devolution promised to Tamil minority was never 
honored. 
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My analysis of the Sri Lankan case study follows the logic of cause and consequence espoused 
by Wilson (1988), who made the following observation: 
 
There is an unstated law-that of escalation of demands when reconciliation between ethnic groups 
is delayed. The majority ethnic group’s response is generally negative. If the minority ethnic groups 
show solidarity and inhabit contiguous territory, it becomes difficult to resist their demands. The 
better course is then to effect a compromise on the demands, but the general trend has been to deny 
concessions until they have lost their appeal, which result in a stepping-up of the minority ethnic 
group’s demands. These demands take form of separately carved-out communal electorates, and a 
measure of autonomy within a unitary or federal set-up. If these too fail, there is civil disobedience 
and non-violent non-cooperation from the minority ethnic leaders and their followers. If the strategy 
still fails to bring results, the politicized younger groups in the minority ethnic groups take up arms 
against a sea of troubles and win or lose in the resulting war. The stages are usually of this pattern.552  
 
a. Tamils 
According to Wilson, the Sri Lankan Tamil political leaders, despite the Citizenship Act, were 
willing to enter into consociational power-sharing relationships, but no longer in a centralized 
unitary set-up.553 Respectively, Federal Party pressed claims for Tamil self-determination 
within the Sri Lankan state.554 
The disfranchisement also had an impact on electoral politics. The “ethnic outbidding” 
radicalized during the electoral “the Sinhala Only” campaign of 1956. Even before the Official 
Language Act was enacted, in July 1956, already in June 1956, and also as a consequence of 
land settlement policies, the Federal Party held a meeting in which it confirmed the objective 
of establishing an “autonomous Tamil linguistic state within a Federal Union of Ceylon” as the 
only chance of protecting the “cultural freedom and identity of the Tamil-speaking people.”555 
The government was warned that “unless the Government took measures to constitute a Federal 
Union in Ceylon within a year the Federal Party would undertake a campaign of non-violent 
direct action (Satyagraha) to achieve its objectives.”556  
The polarization of the two ethnic groups –the Sinhalese and the Tamils– has proceeded 
unabated since 1956. However, through the 1960s the Federal Party sought to collaborate with 
Sinhalese politicians of the UNP in pursuit of immediate equality within a unified polity. It 
expected restoration of the status quo ante wherein Sinhalese hegemony and particularly the 
Sinhala-only law would be excised.557 This was the still the moderate solution to the ethnic 
                                                 
552 Wilson, 1988, p. 39. 
553 Idem. 
554 Cf. Wriggins, 1965, pp. 143-147; also see the Chelvanayakam’s inaugural address on 18 December 1949, 
formal launch of the Federal Party, and demand for self-determination, in Wilson, 1988; p. 100.  
555 Times of Ceylon, June 25, 1956, quoted in Wriggins, 1965, p. 264. 
556 Ceylon Daily News, August 20, 1956, quoted in Wriggins 1965, p. 264. 
557 Björkman, 1996, p. 337. 
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strife. The strategy was unsuccessful as the return of the SLFP to power in 1970 was followed 
by the promulgation of the republican constitution. 
As a direct consequence of language provisions, Tamils in government positions were given a 
year in which to pass an examination in Sinhala or lose their employment. A stagnating 
economy under SLFP government worsened the situation. While figures are difficult to obtain, 
Kearney (1978) reports for Tamil districts a rate of unemployment of 80% among those with 
college degrees in 1969-70.558 Many Tamils in the professions therefore migrated to Canada, 
Australia, the USA and Western Europe.559 But in Sri Lanka a generation of Tamils remained 
who feel grossly victimized, who lost jobs and promotions, and whose own children lost the 
opportunity of a university education, as a result of standardization policies and quotas for 
university admission. Stepan pointedly remarks that by such measures, “a half generation of 
recruits for Tamil separatist organizations was created.”560 
Even before the constituent assembly enacted the new constitution, the previously fractious 
Tamil political parties, Ceylon Workers’ Congress representing Upcountry Tamils and All 
Ceylon Tamil Congress representing Sri Lankan Tamils, formed in May 1972 the Tamil United 
Front (TUF). Among other things, its platform advocated secularism, a defined place for the 
Tamil language, fundamental rights of ethnic minorities, and decentralization of 
administration.561 Exactly four years later, in May 1976, the Federal Party joined the TUF, out 
of this merger Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was constituted. At its first convention at 
Vaddukoddai it resolved “that the restoration and reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, 
Socialist State of Tamil Eelam, based on the right of self-determination inherent to every nation, 
has become inevitable in order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil nation in this 
country.”562 Thus, Sowell indicates that “moderate leadership among the Tamils gave way to 
more militant and extreme leadership, eventually led by a guerilla group called the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam”563. The LTTE was founded by Velupillai Prabhakaran564, a former 
student activist. Sri Lanka was now on the road to civil war. 
                                                 
558 Quoted in Björkman, 1996, p. 338. 
559 Daniel, 1996, p. 115. 
560 Stepan, 2006, p. 16; “a drying up of educational opportunities was especially serious for Tamils, because of 
their concentration in a part of Sri Lanka with poor geographic conditions for making economic progress without 
relying heavily on education.” In Sowell, 2004, p. 88. 
561 Wilson, 1988, p. 132; Björkman, 1996, p. 337. 
562 The full text of the resolution available at: http://www.tamilunitedfront.org/articles/Vattukottai.html (22.11.09). 
563 Sowell, 2004. 
564 In 1972 Prabhakaran formed a small organization called the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). The symbol of a tiger 
seemed “to represent a deep-rooted nostalgia for the era of Cholas when the Tamils were supreme.” In 1976 TNT 
was renamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which began to pursue its demand for the creation of 
a separate Tamil state by violent means, in Björkman, 1996, p. 342. 
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In response to Tamil population’s campaign for a separate state, the government enacted the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979.565 Correspondingly, according to Daniel, a 
situation was reached where “for the average Sinhala soldier, every Tamil was not only an anti-
Sinhala but an antinationalist.”566 Respectively, for many young Tamil men the choice was 
flight from the atrocity of the Sri Lankan armed forces or flight into the membership in one of 
the many militant separatist groups.”567 
By 1983, according to Marasinghe, the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka reached a political climax 
resulting in the birth of five or more Tamil militant groupswhose chosen path for establishing 
a separate Tamil State of Eelam was one of armed struggle. 568  
 
b. Muslims 
Because the Muslims have been largely absent from the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, they have 
been labeled as a “forgotten minority”.569 Indeed, until the conflict, Muslim politics had largely 
been dominated by the Muslim politicians of the south.570 Many of these politicians were from 
the two main national parties –UNP and SLFP. There were Muslim politicians who contested 
with Tamil political parties, but they would defect to the ruling party and join the government 
after having won their seats.571 Muslims came to be seen as allies of the state, but after 
experiencing the consequences of Sinhala-oriented policies with regard to language rights, land 
colonization and constitutional stipulations of 1972, Muslim leaders joined TULF during the 
Vaddukoddai Declaration of 1976, jointly calling for creation of a separate Tamil state in Sri 
Lanka.572  
In the early 1980s, M.H.M. Ashraff, a lawyer from the Eastern Province, formed the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress.573 It made use of the Islamic both of religious and ethnic symbols for the 
electoral purposes and mosques as its base.574 Thus, yet another ethnic party emerged as a direct 
consequence of “ethnic outbidding” process and majoritarian policies. 
                                                 
565 Wilson, 1988, p. 164. 
566 Daniel, 1996, p. 169; see also Bandarage, 2009, p. 101. 
567 Daniel, 1996, p. 170. 
568 The five organized militant ethnic groups were Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), 
Tamil Eelam Army (TEA), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) – these three later joined together to 
form the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). The fourth and the fifth militant groups did 
not join into any axis. These two are Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Eelam Revolutionary 
Organisation of Students (EROS). In addition to this there was a non-combative research unit established in Madras 
called Protection of Tamils of Eelam from Genocide (PROTEG); Marasinghe, 2004, p. 52. 
569 “Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Homeless and Homesick”, The Economist, 13 October 2007, p. 45. 
570 Imtiyaz, 2009, p. 411. 
571 Idem., p. 412. 
572 Idem. 
573 Ameerdeen, V. (2006). Ethnic Politics of Muslims in Sri Lanka. Kandy: Center for Minority Studies, p. 232. 
574 Imtiyaz, 2009, p. 412. 
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c. exogenous factors: India 
In the previous chapter, I have outlined some of the main causes of the Sinhalese “majority with 
a minority complex.” This aspect may have played a role in institutional engineering, e.g. 
unitary instead of federal and policy making, e.g. Sinhala as the only official language, taking 
into account that there were at least, at that time, 30 million Tamil speakers just over the Palk 
Strait; special provisions for Buddhism etc.575 Nevertheless, one exogenous factor that certainly 
did not favor a relationship of trust and cooperation between Tamil minority and 
unaccommodative majority was India’s direct implication into the Sri Lanka conflict and its 
disputable role as “the protector and patron of Sri Lankan Tamils.”576 According to Bandarage, 
from the early 1970s, the politics in Tamil majority Northeastern provinces were viewed in 
India as “part of internal Tamil Nadu politics.”577 As de Silva has remarked, “seldom has a 
constituent unit (a province or state) of one country influenced the relationship between it and 
a neighboring country with the same intensity and to the same extent that Tamil Nadu did.”578 
M.G. Ramachandran, the Sri Lankan-born Upcountry Tamil and Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, 
offered its “patronage”, i.e. covert support, to LTTE.579 
According to Bandarage, a number of camps were thus established in Tamil Nadu as well as in 
various parts of India training Sri Lankan Tamil guerilla groups.580 The support for Tamil 
separatism alienated the relations between the governments of Sri Lanka and India: “Sri Lanka 
accused India of interfering in her internal affairs. India on the other hand accused Sri Lanka of 
violating the human rights of Tamils”.581 In background, an additional factor certainly 
augmented Sri Lanka’s anxieties and lack of trust regarding India’s intensions-the inevitable 
vivid recollection of India’s role during the Bangladesh Liberation war and Mukti Bahini. Thus, 
parallels were legitimate to be drawn. 
 
  
                                                 
575 I showed, by quoting Bandaranaike that one of the reasons for “Sinhala only” was indeed the anxiety of being 
“assimilated” by a superior culture, at least concerning numbers, see pp. 60-61. 
576 Bandarage, 2009, p. 100. 
577 Ibid, p. 99. 
578 de Silva, quoted in Bandarage, 2009, p. 99. 
579 Wilson, 1988, p. 204; Björkman, 1996, p. 343. 
580 Bandarage, 2009, p. 113; see also Sowell, 2004, pp. 91-93. 
581 Balasuryia cited in Bandarage, 2009, p. 114. 
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Figure 18. Conflict escalation and legitimacy of the state in Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s figure, see Carciumaru, 2012, p.20. 
The constitutional stipulations from 1978 were perceived as “too little, too late”.582 
                                                 
582 Carciumaru, 2012, p. 20. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The findings of my thesis confirmed all four hypotheses, including the chances of the dialogue, 
which are much higher to happen in a democracy than in an autocracy; the advantage of federal 
political systems as opposed to the unitary ones, in terms of accommodation of diversity, the 
general beneficial and peace promoting effects and impacts of mediations and, even (military) 
interventions.  
As Sri Lankan and BiH case studies have shown, finding a solution is hard if the parties involved 
in negotiating a peaceful cessation of a violent conflict are deeply distrustful of each other and, in 
addition, the government, representing the state, does not have the backing of the opposition parties 
and, even worse, is constantly harassed. The case studies have shown how crucially important a 
mediating party to a conflict marred by mistrust between parties can be and how difficult the role 
of such a mediating party is to keep treat both parties fairly and equitably. The findings of my 
thesis will certainly for the basis of future research that I will outline in my summary to the thesis.  
 
IV.1 Theoretical and Empirical Findings for Negotiating Conflict in Deeply 
Divided Societies  
The thesis has shown that consociational power-sharing arrangements lead to cessation of violent 
conflicts, secure stability, and it also enhances and ensures moderation and conflict mitigation in 
deeply divided societies. Consociational power-sharing arrangements facilitate the inclusion of 
both the moderates and the extremists. Turning rebels into stakeholders may prove to be difficult 
or noisy, but the benefits are obvious – access to the privileges of governance, to power! If the 
parties realize that the government is beneficial, they have an incentive to hang on to the system. 
 Consociational power-sharing institutions enable regulation of conflicts and management of 
divisions. As Bosnia and Herzegovina’s example shows, consociational arrangements should not 
be rigid and should offer room to maneuver, having the capacity of evolving into classical 
(majoritarian) forms of democracy. Some scholars recommend the temporary implementation of 
such arrangements (i.e., with an “expiry date,” as in the case of South Africa, between 1994 and 
1999). However, as we have seen from the case studies, those arrangements that are informal in 
nature do not have an ‘expiry date,’ whereas the formal ones need time to institutionalize and once 
they enjoy legitimacy, the institutions are ensconced into the political system of a country and 
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internalized in the DNA of its citizens. Should the institutions work and not be misused, there is 
no need to put a limited date on them, in particular if these are informal, but consolidated. 
Moreover, the conflict groups and in particular the minorities are usually not willing to accept the 
“expiry dates” in advance because they are not sure the time the transition to a society in which 
the conflict has been solved or is being managed will occur. Should one however accept the 
temporary nature of the consociational power-sharing institutions, one should have the answer to 
the question, what kind of institutions, if not power-sharing would be able to prevent the re-
emergence and escalation of a dormant or latent conflict?  
The inherent dynamic of ethnic relations is continuously evolving, as such, none of the things 
stated in the thesis should preclude the statement mentioned above. The preference to choose a 
certain consociational power-sharing institution or another conflict settling arrangement, as in a 
menu a la carte, depends on the context, its specificity and characteristics and on historical settings 
and periods of time (critical junctions). One of the main arguments of the thesis illustrates the point 
that context and process (path dependence) are inherently meaningful and do matter.  
The following Tables 24-28 below summarize the analysis of the case studies, structure the main 
argument based on the concepts and ideas from the Thesis as well as measure the variables and 
test the hypotheses advanced and applied to the six case studies.  
Before testing, the information contained in Table 23 offers a succinct overview and some 
pertinent information tailored to the forthcoming requirements and expectations from the 
subsequent tables. Upon a closer analysis of the Table 23, one is able to see what are the countries’ 
indicators regarding democracy index score as evaluated by the leading specialized institutions 
analyzing democracy indices such as Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Polity IV and varieties 
of democracy. The second raw categorizes the case studies according to the typo of violent conflict 
they have experience (all of them had been or are still confronted by the most violent form of 
conflicts, i.e., the ethnic conflicts). A quintessential part of the ethnic identity, as defined by me in 
the introductory chapter as an ‘umbrella’ concept,583 and quite often one of the root causes of the 
ethnic conflict is the language and the policies regulating its use and status. Thus, the language 
issue features prominently in at least four out of six case studies584 and represents one of main 
                                                 
583 … an umbrella concept that “easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers 
'tribes,' 'races,' 'nationalities,' and castes”, Horowitz, 2000, p. 53. 
584 Some would argue that language issue is relevant in all six case studies.  
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causes for conflict emergence and escalation (Mizoram, Sri Lanka, Transnistria and Gagauzia). 
Based on one of the main defining values of the ‘principled’ negotiation approach, the table offers 
an important differentiation between positions and interests of each conflicting party. Insisting on 
one’s position and not being aware of one’s interests is always prone to exacerbate a conflict, 
which might still be in its incipient stages. Several case studies experienced the instance of 
majorities with a minority complex, which will certainly need further research. This is per se not 
a new finding to have discovered or challenge to be confronted by, as there have been (economic, 
cultural or political) dominant minorities before. What these case studies show and analyze are 
those instances where this is a volatile issue that leads to violent clashes, partly because it is 
accompanied by positive discrimination policies for the majority population.585 One of the most 
important variable explaining the emergence or escalation of ethnic conflicts, when adopting the 
levels-of-analysis approach as well as the quintessential actor in a multilevel principled negotiation 
is the presence of and the role played exogenous actors. The involvement of the exogenous actors 
can stop the bloodshed, manage or solve  a conflict (see imposition of power-sharing arrangements 
in BiH or mediation of such arrangements in Gagauzia) or either cause a conflict to freeze (i.e, 
unnecessarily or artificially prolong its existence) or escalate its level, sometimes causing even 
more bloodshed (see the involvement of Russian army in Moldova, the involvement of NATO in 
the Balkan region, or the involvement of diaspora or regional actors, Pakistan and China, in the 
secessionist movements for an independent Khalistan or Mizoram). Thus, the involvement of the 
exogenous actors can have a benefic effect, when acting in a balanced and partisan (towards the 
discriminated) manner or conflict-exacerbating effect, when acting as an enforcer, destabilizer or 
imposer. Very often the external actors can have a dual impact, acting concomitantly as a protector 
and facilitator as well as imposer and destabilizers. 
  
                                                 
585 As mentioned, it is not a new finding as there have been (economic, cultural or political) dominant minorities (see 
elitism) before, what I am interested in is those instances that lead to violent conflicts and are accompanied by positive 
discrimination policies for the majorities (e.g. Moldovans vs Russians in the Republic of Moldova or Sinhalese vs 
Tamils in Sri Lanka. As a matter of fact, one finds such a conflict generating asymmetric stricture in all Soviet 
republics but the Baltic states after the collapse of the Soviet Union).  
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Table 23: Typology of Conflicts, Negotiation Techniques and Methods 
 Sri Lanka India Moldova Bosnia 
  Mizoram Punjab Transnistria Gagauzia   
Political 
regime, 
polity IV, v-
dem, 
democracy 
index 
(EIU586) 
(Flawed) 
Democracy 
(6.48) 
(Flawed) Democracy (7.23) Hybrid regime (5.94) Hybrid 
regime 
(4.87) 
Identity Ethnic  Ethnic  Ethnic  Ethnic  Ethnic  Ethnic  
Language 
policies 
Yes (Sinhala 
Only) 
Yes 
(Assamese) 
 Yes 
(Moldovan) 
Yes 
(Moldovan) 
No 
Goal / 
Interests and 
/or Positions 
Territorial, 
representatio
n, 
devolution, 
federalism, 
secession / 
statehood 
Territorial, 
representatio
n, 
devolution, 
federalism, 
secession / 
statehood 
Territorial, 
representatio
n, 
devolution, 
federalism, 
secession / 
statehood 
Territorial, 
representatio
n, 
devolution, 
federalism, 
secession / 
statehood 
Territorial, 
representatio
n, 
devolution, 
federalism, 
secession / 
statehood 
Territorial, 
representatio
n, 
devolution, 
federalism, 
secession / 
statehood 
Majority 
with 
minority 
complex 
Yes 
(Sinhalese 
vs Tamils) 
Yes, Mizos 
vs Indians 
No Yes, 
Moldovans 
vs Russians 
No No 
Exogenous 
factors 
(regional) 
India, China Myanmar 
China, 
Pakistan 
Pakistan Ukraine, 
Romania 
Turkey, 
Bulgaria 
Croatia, 
Serbia 
Exogenous 
factors 
(internation
al) 
UK, US, EU, 
Canada, 
Tamil 
Diaspora 
UK Sikh 
diaspora 
Russia, EU, 
US,  
EU, Russia US, EU, 
Russia 
Facilitating 
exogenous 
and 
endogenous 
factors/even
ts 
 Indo-
Chinese 
War, famine 
 Collapse of the Soviet Union Collapse of 
Yugoslavia 
Post conflict 
Nation and 
state-building 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
                                                 
586 Index consists of scores in 1) electoral process and pluralism; 2) functioning of government; 3) political 
participation; 4) political culture; 5) civil liberties; see The Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). Democracy Index 
2017. Free speech under attack. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. 
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As mentioned above, the following Tables 24-28 below summarize the analysis of the case studies, 
structure the main argument based on the concepts and ideas from my thesis as well as measure 
the variables and test the hypotheses advanced and applied to the six case studies. 
Thus, Table 24 draws on the factors stated in the chapter on Negotiation (II.2) and the scores show 
how high is the probability of reaching an agreement through a bargaining process. Here, the 
understanding of the concept of democracy is based on Robert Dahl’s seven principles,587 which 
would qualify all countries as democracies, but Bosnia and Herzegovina. Interestingly, the score 
and thus probability of coming to the negotiating table and reaching the agreement is higher in the 
case of Gagauzia, the only country which have not experienced external or internal military 
intervention, confirming the hypothesis that military intervention would decrease the likelihood of 
negotiations.  
 
Table 24: Factors Encouraging Negotiations and Agreements588 
States India / 
Mizoram 
India / 
Punjab 
Sri Lanka Moldova / 
Transnistria  
Moldova / 
Gagauzia  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Factors 
Democracy 
(+) 
+1 +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 
Military 
intervention 
(-) 
-1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 
Security 
Guarantees 
(+) 
+1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
Mediation (+) 0 0 +1 +1 +1 +1 
Score 1 1 2 2 3 0 
Source: Author`s own table 
 
In Table 25, I measure the dependent variable ‘power-sharing’ by means of the power sharing 
index developed by Linder and Bächtiger in 2005.589 The highest negative PSI is scored by the 
                                                 
587 1 – universal suffrage, 2 – free elections, 3 – free speech, 4 – free access to information not controlled by the 
government, 5 – freedom to join autonomous organizations, such as political parties, as well as 6) responsiveness and 
7) accountability of the government. 
588 1 applicable/relevant and 0 – not applicable/not-relevant; (-)1 for not present 
589 See Linder and Bächtiger, 2005, pp. 861-880. 
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countries, which have experienced most violent ethnic conflict (BiH and Sri Lanka). Fascinatingly, 
the data from Table 25 regarding Gagauzia can only be fully understood by corroborating it with 
the scores from the Table 24. Thus, even if Gagauzia scores the third highest negative PSI score, 
due to the fact that it also scored highest on willingness to negotiate and reach an agreement, it did 
not experience a violent protracted conflict, but a rather a short and mild one. 
 
Table 25: PSI (Power-Sharing Index) of the Case Studies590 
States India / 
Mizoram 
India / 
Punjab 
Sri Lanka 
(Tamils) 
Moldova / 
Transnistria  
Moldova / 
Gagauzia  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Factors 
Group 
representation 
-1 1 -1 1 0 -1 
Proportionality  -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 
Separation of 
powers 
1 1 1 0 0 -1 
Qualified 
majority for 
constitutional 
amendments 
1 1 0591 1 1 0 
Inclusiveness 
of cabinets 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Minority 
government 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Functional 
veto players 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Veto power for 
political 
parties/groups 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Segmental 
autonomy 
(symmetric 
and 
asymmetric 
autonomy) 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Federalism 
(national level)  
1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Score (-)3 (-)3 (-)6 (-)2 (-)5 (-)8 
Source: Author’s own table 
 
Table 26 tests, measures and confirmed the hypotheses espoused in the methodology section of 
the introductory chapter (Conceptual Framework, I.4 Methodology). There is one notable and 
important exception – the military intervention in BiH, which could point to the fact that when 
                                                 
590 PSI, measuring the power-sharing institutions or the lack thereof at the time of the escalation of a latent into a 
violent conflict: 1 for present/available/applicable and (-)1 for not present and 0 for not available/applicable 
591 Article 29 viewed as an Amendment and required only a simple majority. 
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used as ‘ultima ratio’, military interventions do facilitate rather than hurt chances of coming to the 
negotiating table and try solve or mitigate the conflict peacefully.  
 
Table 26: Testing the Hypotheses 
States India / 
Mizoram 
India / 
Punjab 
Sri Lanka Moldova / 
Transnistria  
Moldova / 
Gagauzia  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: 
The 
probability of 
negotiations 
in 
democracies 
is higher 
compared to 
autocracies. 
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed: 
negotiation 
and military 
force (two-
track 
strategy) 
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed: 
Collapsed 
political 
system, 
negotiation 
and military 
force (two-
track 
strategy) 
Hypothesis 2: 
In federal 
systems, 
chances of 
negotiations 
are higher. 
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
Hypothesis 3: 
In general, 
intervention 
will increase 
the chances of 
negotiations. 
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
Hypothesis 
3.1: Military 
intervention 
decreases the 
probability of 
negotiations. 
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed (in 
spite of the 
presence of 
the 14th army 
– Russian 
troops 
involvement) 
Confirmed Not-
Confirmed 
(power-
sharing 
imposed, 
quasi 
protectorate 
of the 
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external 
powers) 
Hypothesis 
3.2: 
Mediation 
will increase 
the likelihood 
of 
negotiations. 
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
Hypothesis 4: 
Democracies 
increase the 
likelihood of 
negotiation, 
occurring 
after 
intervention. 
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
Source: Author’s own table 
 
The Table 27 tests whether the conditions posited by Lijphart are facilitating or encouraging 
power-sharing arrangements. Due to the fact that the findings are quite controversial and, more 
importantly, inconsistent (e.g., BiH has the highest score, whereas Sri Lanka the lowest), they 
support my argument that conditions, be it structure or actor-oriented, are not as relevant as long 
as there is political will to mitigate or regulate a conflict. Ideally, it should be a two-way process, 
initiated and driven by political elites (top-down) and supported by the civil society (bottom-up), 
ensuring legitimacy of the decisions that are taken, institutions that are established or initiatives 
that are implemented. 
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Table 27: Conditions Favoring Power-Sharing Applied 
States India / 
Mizoram 
India / 
Punjab 
Sri Lanka 
(Tamils) 
Moldova / 
Transnistria  
Moldova / 
Gagauzia  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Conditions 
Structure-oriented conditions favouring power-sharing 
1. No majority 
segment 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 
2. Segments of 
equal size 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 
3. Small 
number of 
segments 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
4. Small 
population size 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
5. Socio-
economic 
equality  
-1 1 -1 1 -1 1 
6. Overarching 
Loyalty 
1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
7. Geographical 
concentration 
of segments 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Actor-oriented conditions 
8. Dominant 
elite 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
9. External 
pressure  
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
10. Traditions 
of 
accommodation 
1 1 1 -1 -1 1 
11. Absence of 
special rights 
claim 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
Score592 1 2 (-)1 (-)1 (-)3 5 
Source: Author’s own table 
                                                 
592 Represents the sum of conditions applicable and relevant (the same weightage system 0,1 and (-)1 is used) 
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As Table 28 below demonstrates, out of six case studies only Mizoram could fit the ‘principled’ 
negotiation and power-sharing conflict resolution approach recommendations. No other cases have 
experienced instances of ‘principled’ negotiation either to reach a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict or to prevent its emergence in the first place.  
 
Table 28: Testing the Dependent Variable of ‘Principled’ Negotiation 
States India / 
Mizoram 
India / 
Punjab 
Sri Lanka 
(Tamils) 
Moldova / 
Transnistria  
Moldova / 
Gagauzia  
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Principles of PN 
Separate people 
from issues 
YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Focus on interest 
and not positions 
YES NO NO NO NO NO 
(jointly) Invent 
new options for 
mutual gain 
YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Objective criteria 
in choosing these 
options 
YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Know your 
BATNA&WATNA 
YES NO NO YES YES YES 
Source: Author’s own table 
 
 
.
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IV.2 Recommendations 
According to McCulloch and O’Leary,593 consociational power-sharing is always preferable as 
a recommendation for settling or preventing conflicts as the arrangement have come to be 
viewed as an immediate and effective “painkiller”, a panacea to all problems. In essence, the 
appeal for consociation originates from a necessity standpoint which states that “it is best not 
to have to build democracy after filling graveyards.”594 Consociation is sometimes compared 
with alternative approaches and models that preferred to the armed violent conflict. However, 
in deeply divided societies, the only possibility to regulate a conflict are consociational power-
sharing arrangements, other strategies, institutions and policies will most likely exacerbate the 
conflict (e.g., Sri Lanka, Punjab, BiH, Moldova). The negotiated agreements based on 
consociational power-sharing are sometimes regarded as “the most rational choice to be made 
in the circumstances of potential or actual civil strife.”595 
As mentioned above, the case studies analysed in my thesis emphasize the importance of time, 
context, critical junctures and path dependency. Furthermore, the conflicts in deeply divided 
societies can only be solved through complex power-sharing institutions as propagated by 
McCulloch, McGarry, O’Leary, Wolff and through my own work in my thesis,596 rather than 
only through four basic principles as originally advocated by Lijphart. Consociation forms the 
basis of conflict management and institutional design. Consociation is more than capable of 
enhancing and ensuring political stability in deeply divided societies. 
 
IV.3 Future Prospects 
John Stuart Mill asserted that democracy is “next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities” –that is, in a multiethnic society– and completely impossible in linguistically 
divided countries, where the people “read and speak different languages”.597 Not only the 
scholars representing the consociational school of thought and Lijphart’s successors, such as 
Bieber, McCulloch, McGarry, O’Leary, Wolff, state that conflicts in multiethnic deeply divided 
societies are not intractable if they are mitigated by means of power-sharing arrangements. 
                                                 
593 O’Leary, 2005, pp. 8-9; McCulloch, 2009, p. 207.  
594 O’Leary, 2005, p. 8. 
595 Lijphart, A. (2007). Thinking About Democracy: Power-Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. 
London: Routledge, p. 278. 
596 See more on this in last part of my thesis, summarizing what is new and the contribution done to conflict 
settlement theories as well as the theory of complex consociational power-sharing.  
597 Quoted in Lijphart, A. (2002). The Wave of Power Sharing Democracy. In Andrew Reynolds (ed.) The 
Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford 
Uniersity Press, p.38.  
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Other scholars that were not a part of consociational school of thought598, e.g. Nordlinger599 
and Gurr, accurately concluded that settling and managing ethnic conflicts would and should 
imply “some combination of the policies and institutions of autonomy and power-sharing.”600 
Thus, power-sharing, rightly, became a standard prescription for protracted national, ethnic and 
communal conflicts in deeply divided societies, especially ones focused on antagonistic self-
determination claims.601  
Out of the four basic principles of the consociation, segmental autonomy is considered crucially 
important, if not vital to be present in any agreements that manage the diversity of a deeply 
divided society. To give groups autonomy, it is necessary to ensure that the groups are self-
determined and that they have the self-governing institutions.  
The arrangements of liberal consociation (McGarry & O’Leary are its main proponents) have 
an advantage since they give the political space to ensure that there is a de-escalation in ethnic 
divisions (self- vs pre-determination of groups). Liberal consociations have the flexibility to 
include the forms of divisions that may come up in the future. Thus, liberal approach is much 
better and relevant than the corporate one. The factors that are interrelated concerning the size 
and group number implies, thus, the choice tackles its adoption dilemma. Lijphart also asserts 
that liberal consociation has a weakness because it tends to preclude how the overrepresentation 
of the minority is handled and applied.602 It is therefore difficult to implement the principle of 
proportionality. However, it is commonly considered that the liberal arrangements are preferred 
because they can take care of the unavoidable dissimilarities of the demographics in deeply 
divided societies. Finally yet as importantly, based on Lijphart’s brilliant distinction,603 the case 
studies selected by me were interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory confirming and 
theory-infirming, enabling me to formulate generalizable recommendations based on the 
findings from my case studies. 
                                                 
598 End of the 60s and beginning of the 70s such scholars as Lehmbruch, McRae, Steiner–to name just a few. 
599 Nordlinger, 1972, the meaning of conflict-regulating arrangements as well as other concepts used in this 
introductory part will be explained in the next subchapter.  
600 Gurr, 1995, pp. 290-2. 
601 Empirical examples on “internationalization”, i.e. consociational institutional designs, of power-sharing as 
theory and practice will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
602 Lijphart, A. (1995). Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing 
Systems. In Will Kymlicka (ed.) The Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 286. 
603 Lijphart, 1971, p. 691 indicates that there are six types of case studies. He differentiates between - atheoretical, 
interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory confirming theory-infirming, and deviant case studies. 
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V. Summary 
The thesis sought to explain how and why power-sharing arrangements come into being, 
succeed or fail their purpose by combining negotiation theory with consociational power-
sharing theory. Additionally, by marrying the before mentioned theories and based on the 
lessons learnt from the case studies, it analyzed and advanced strategies to negotiate what seems 
non-negotiable and irrational. The thesis contributes to the existing research on conflict 
resolution and explains how traditional and modern approaches lead to innovative solutions, 
e.g. public policy, whereas the innovative solutions thus emerging lead to legitimacy, stability, 
robustness and efficacy of a power sharing system.  
The thesis compared case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe. With regard to the 
selected case studies from South Asia, these are India (Punjab and Mizoram) and Sri Lanka 
(Sinhala – Tamil, Sinhala - Tamil - Muslim), whereas in the case of Eastern Europe, the thesis 
analyzed Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova (Transnistria and Gagauzia).  
The thesis built its own model of negotiating conflict in deeply divided societies; by combining 
and extending the neo-institutional dynamic model (Mitra 2005), Faure and Rubin’s model of 
structure and agency in negotiating cultural conflicts (1993) and the methods of levels-of-
analysis approach (Cordell and Wolff 2014). The thesis fine-tuned its model of “multilevel 
‘principled’ negotiation,” and claimed its validity and applicability both in western as well as 
non-western contexts. 
Chapter 1 introduced the reader to the general theme of ethnic conflict and negotiation in post-
conflict societies. Besides the research questions and hypothesis, it includes subchapters on 
definitions, terminology, methodology and the structure if the thesis. It first explained why the 
selected case studies are compared, whether the size matters, and how one can generalize from 
these findings. The case studies were selected both purposively and information-oriented. The 
thesis combined both Most Similar Case Studies (MSSD) and Most Different Case Studies 
(MDSD) methods of comparison.  
Chapter 2 set the analytical framework of the thesis. It undertook a critical review of the existing 
body of literature on negotiation and (consociational) power sharing (both liberal and corporate) 
theories. It analyzed and explained what is ‘power sharing’, how does it work and not work 
sometimes, and whether favorable conditions to achieving as well as maintaining power sharing 
system matter. With regard to negotiation, it started with analysis of two principles of 
negotiation process - positional and principled negotiations. The chapter looked at how one 
comes to the negotiation table and, eventually, to an agreement based on power-sharing 
institutional arrangements. The chapter deconstructed the process of negotiation by showing 
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how to ‘negotiate negotiation’ and what the conflicting groups have to give up in order to be 
able to negotiate and reach a durable solution. The concluding part of the subchapter analysed 
whether principled negotiation is adequate in negotiating identity-based conflicts. The final 
subchapter combined power sharing and negotiation theories into a comprehensive theory of 
ethnic conflict management in deeply divided societies. It posited that a durable settlement of 
an ethnic conflict can be reached through a “multilevel ‘principled’ negotiation”, whereas the 
durability and legitimacy of solutions depend on finding an appropriate formula for handling 
ethnic relations - a “hybrid” consociational power sharing system. 
Chapter 3 analyzed the case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe. With regard to the 
selected case studies from South Asia, these are India (Punjab and Mizoram) and Sri Lanka 
(Sinhala – Tamil, Sinhala - Tamil - Muslim), whereas in the case of Eastern Europe, the thesis 
focused on case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova (Transnistria and 
Gagauzia).  
In case of the European states, various degrees of involvement of international actors have taken 
place. I analyzed the (re)action and support of domestic actors in terms of efficacy and 
legitimacy of and involvement with central state institutions, perceived as de facto or de jure 
protectorates of the external powers. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Serbia constitute 
a part of a broader regional phenomenon such as transition from authoritarian to democratic 
systems, subsequent inclusion of minority demands, as well as both experience with different 
intensities of violence based on ethnic/cultural conflict and international actors’ intervention 
and mediation. The knowledge gained from the European cases viewed as instances of complex 
consociational power sharing serves as a viable tool and sheds a new light on mitigation and 
management of such seemingly intractable and protracted conflicts as Kashmir and Sri Lanka. 
The analysis of each case study followed the levels-of-analysis approach and analytic narrative 
methods. Thus, each ‘story’ had a ‘prelude’ explaining how and why did the conflicts emerge 
and escalate as well as how these were settled (in terms of structure, agency and process).  
The dependent variable ‘power sharing’ was measured through a ‘power sharing index’ (PSI), 
which includes the following factors, which serve as explanatory and/or independent variables: 
(1) group representation; (2) proportionality; (3) separation of powers; (4) qualified majority 
for constitutional amendments; (5) inclusiveness of cabinets; (6) minority government; (7) 
functional veto players (8) veto power for political parties/groups; (9) segmental autonomy 
(including both symmetric and asymmetric autonomy); (10) federalism. These are quantified in 
a scale going from one to ten, with an additional point for each factor. For the second dependent 
variable “enduring peace”, which a conflict settlement should lead to, the data from Polity IV 
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and v-dem used. The logic and empirical accuracy of the coding is done transparently in order 
to be easily verified. The dependent variable “’principled’ negotiation” is measured through its 
four constitutive characteristics (people, interests, options, criteria), which are quantified by 1 
(applicable) or 0 (non-applicable).  
Chapter 4 consisted of conclusions and lessons drawn from the case studies, it revisited the 
theoretical framework and the hypothesis, and evaluated the proposed model of “multilevel 
‘principled’ negotiation” across the cases.  
Chapter 5 spelled out the contribution to the theories of conflict resolution, negotiation and 
power sharing, whereas Chapter 6 comprised policy recommendations based on theoretical and 
empirical findings of the thesis. 
 
What is new? 
In my thesis I have tried to marry the ‘principled’ negotiation with the complex consociational 
power-sharing institutions, showing under what circumstances and how both power-sharing 
and bargaining can be combined into a multilevel principled negotiation approach ensuring 
prevention or regulation of violent ethnic conflicts in deeply divided societies. This finding has 
not only contributed but represents something new, expanding the general body of literature on 
and the theory of conflict resolution. The thesis enriched the complex consociational power-
sharing arrangements by proposing informal arrangements to be considered as when analyzing 
or recommending such arrangements. Another literature enriching contribution of my thesis is 
the comparative endeavor of case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe that represent a 
trans- and interregional comparative approach exceeding area studies. Moreover, being 
interpretative, hypothesis-generating, theory confirming and theory-infirming, the case studies 
enabled me to formulate generalizable recommendations. Interestingly, South Asian case 
studies have a vast background in negotiations and less in agreements, whereas in the case of 
the Eastern European case studies vice-versa is true (i.e., these have/had a vast background in 
(imposed?) agreements and less in negotiations). Finally, yet importantly, the practice of 
complex consociational power-sharing is still unsatisfactorily studied and researched. My thesis 
contributes to the better understanding of this theoretical approach and to advancement of its 
normative recommendation in settling and regulating ethnic conflicts in plural, deeply divided 
societies.  
 
To sum it up, the thesis tried and hopefully achieved: 
1.  Marrying power sharing and bargaining theories 
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2. Extend the systematic comparative work on complex power sharing systems;  
3. Comparison between South Asia and Eastern Europe;  
4. Understudy of India’s power-sharing institutions; 
5. Unsatisfactory exploration of the (relatively) new practice of complex power 
 sharing; 
6. Contribute to the existing research on conflict resolution
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